

*Who Voted for Perón?*  
*Essays on the Argentine mid-20th century*  
*Presidential Elections*

José Javier Bercoff

A dissertation submitted by in partial fulfillment of  
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in

Economic History

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Advisor:

Jordi Domènech Feliu

Tutor:

Jordi Domènech Feliu

September, 2019



Esta tesis se distribuye bajo licencia “Creative Commons Reconocimiento – No Comercial – Sin Obra Derivada”.

To my parents, for their endless and unconditional support since 1971.

## Acknowledgements

As I started working on my thesis, I came to understand that my own willingness to complete it was not enough; such factors as the proper intellectual environment, the right adviser, generous and inspiring colleagues and friends, and a loving family had to combine. I was fortunate to have all these on my side, thus achieving the final objective of answering a question that allows a better understanding of the complexity that surrounds us. The purpose of these lines is to express them my deepest gratitude.

To begin with, I have been intellectually challenged throughout my academic life. I had the opportunity to work in such a stimulating environment as the Economic Department of *Universidad Nacional de Tucumán*, which provided me with the right analytical tools and the liberty to ask questions from a bias-free standpoint. Attending the 2018 Workshop, and the interaction with the members of the Social Science Department of Universidad Carlos III, was also helpful in that it gave me the confidence to follow the path that the research was taking. I thank all the participants for giving me an early and friendly feedback on my research.

Moreover, I could count on the inestimable guidance of Jordi Domenech Feliu, who has been a superb and lucid adviser. He has helped me take the right direction throughout the whole process, by making me focus the research on the relevant issues, always with enthusiasm and wisdom. His knowledge, assistance and selfless commitment have been invaluable, and I am in great debt.

The support from colleagues and friends has also been of extreme importance. Among them, Osvaldo Meloni has probably been the most influential of all, by encouraging me to pursue the PhD program at this point in my life. I also thank him for his friendship, his permanent support, and his intellectual stimulus, as well as for all the fruitful conversations and the useful ideas he has provided me with. The part Esteban Nicolini played is also worth mentioning, for he has been crucial in my deciding to change the research focus from the field of political economy to economic history. Without his disinterested generosity, I would not have ended up being admitted in the Economic History Program. His kindness and advice too have been very important during the whole process. I am also in debt with Santiago Foguet, having generously helped me with the use of the R statistical program, and with Gustavo

Wallberg who has made time to patiently read all my drafts in detail, always making relevant observations which have helped me improve my interpretation of the historic and political events. I must also express my appreciation to Daniela Piloni Durand who has made an outstanding job recommending me how to improve the style and the prose of the thesis.

Last, but not least, to successfully cope with the demanding work of a thesis, one needs an understanding and loving family. I could not have been luckier in this respect. My parents have been confident in my abilities, even when I was not, and my wife, Rosana Córdova, together with my son, Leandro, have been my absolute affective support, my compass and most vital motivation during many stressful moments. They are the engine behind the effort I make to achieve my dreams. My most profound gratitude to you too.

## Introduction

The advent of *peronism* in the political life of Argentina, together with its permanence as an indisputable factor of power, has been a topic of discussion and controversy for decades. One aspect in question has been whether the political and economic model proposed by Perón could have been avoided if a different leader had won the presidential election in 1946. It is rather unlikely that one could carry out a counterfactual analysis without generating a heated debate, and such speculation is, in some degree, futile. Nevertheless, an undeniable fact, as it will be discussed throughout the chapters of this thesis, is that Perón was a clever interpreter of the shift in the political context of the country, which he used to his advantage to reach the presidency and accumulate power. From the time he was an official in the military administration (i.e. 1943-1946), he was able to interpret the constituency's struggles and the changes in the electoral preferences of the citizens. As a result, he was able to adapt his rhetoric and the policies to capitalize the social demands to his favor in the 1946 presidential election. His opportunistic ability, which would accompany him throughout his political life, also helped him to become the charismatic and popular leader that he is considered to have been.

In his quest for power, Perón confronted two different models of democracies: a liberal republic and a plebiscitary democracy. The latter was based on a populist system which eventually created economic inconsistencies such as interventionist policies, central banking and fiscal centralism, import substitution measures, price controls, an increase in spending, discretionary transfers, and clientelism, thus ending up with an inferior macroeconomic equilibrium.

In the following chapters, I will discuss Perón's first two presidential victories, the unprecedented popular support he experienced, and the characteristics of the regime he embraced in his ascent to power. I will also examine some of the socio-economic reasons behind his electoral success, and the characteristics and behavior of the constituency, which gave him the exceptional levels of power he obtained.

Chapter 1 focuses on characterizing the political government he commanded during his first 10 years as president. Although the populist regime that Perón led is key in

understanding many of his policies, I contextualize this type of system in a world which was moving from a free-trade economic scheme and a liberal democracy to less democratic societies with closer economies. In fact, the plebiscitary democracy that Perón had in mind, in contrast to the liberal system that governed the country since the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, was characterized by the alliance he established with different actors, such as the military, the unions, the growing national industrial sector and nationalistic intellectuals, which allowed him to install a hegemonic system in Argentina. It is worth mentioning that this was not an innovative strategy, for these alliances are generally used by populisms, as they try to build up the authority. By using the right rhetoric, a heterogeneous coalition which comes from a combination of the lower strata of society and sectors of the middle and higher classes is integrated (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1990). Although the economic policies undertaken are aimed to favor each of these groups in the short run, the strategy actually drives the country to an inferior macroeconomic equilibrium when compared to the potential level that could have been reached under different political and economic arrangements. It should be noted that the flowering of populisms waits for the appropriate economic conditions to emerge, which would allow the country to accumulate the required resources to be redistributed among the different groups that support the government. In this regard, the economic context faced by Perón just before the 1946 presidential election and during the beginning of his first presidency could be characterized by favorable terms of trade, an increase in economic autarky, commercial surpluses and a growth in industrial production, which gave him the tools and the required resources to begin a redistribution scheme that boosted his popularity.

Chapter 2 presents the controversy that surrounds the origins of *peronism*, based on the traditional and the revisionist views. The first explains *peronism* as a political movement based on social class, which means that the leader was mainly supported by the industrial workforce, and strongly opposed by the urban middle classes. It later evolved in a poli-classist political party (Germani, 1973; Cantón, 1973; Halperín Donghi, 1975; Gerchunoff and Antúnez, 2002). The latter argues that the heterogeneity of the first *peronist* constituency and the broad social coalition, which was potentially unstable, gave Perón the required impulse to reach the presidency in 1946. It later became a class movement (Smith, 1972, 1974; Kenworthy, 1975; Lupu and Stokes, 2009). In this respect, I show the complexity that surrounded Perón's ascent

to the presidency, including the multiple reasons that can be pointed out in order to explain the *peronist* phenomenon and Perón's vast electoral triumphs. As it will be seen, I find vital factors, involving social, demographic and economic voting causes, that explain Perón's success and were not considered in depth in previous studies. I also make reference to the electoral fraud implemented by the Conservative Party during the '30s (Alston and Gallo, 2010) by analyzing it in combination with aspects borrowed from the economic voting literature, something which has seldom been discussed until now.

To evaluate Perón first electoral victory, a large data set is presented, which includes variables extracted from the 1946 National Industrial Census, the 1947 National Population Census, and the 1947 National Agricultural Census, sorted by counties. It is the consolidation of the information which helps us put the success of Perón into perspective, as the data shows that out of the 364 counties that participated in the general election in 1946, in more than half, 194 of them, Perón obtained a victory. The econometric model used to find the most relevant variables explaining Perón's victory reveals that there are multiple reasons for his electoral triumph. Among them, unemployment, wage levels, the number of migrants across jurisdictions, the density of cattle farms and the proportion of farms rented played a relevant role.

Chapter 2 further determines that the change in certain historical events in Argentina would not have prevented, *ceteris paribus*, Perón's triumph in his first presidential election. I arrive to this conclusion by performing a set of simulations of electoral results based on a counterfactual analysis of some of the variables under consideration. The contribution goes even further; by estimating an ecological inference model, I identify the underlying characteristics of Perón's voters in the first presidential election he faced. The EI Model aims to infer characteristics of an individual from aggregate data which describes the behavior of the whole population. In particular, I have used King's Model (King, 1997) to find essential features that the first *peronist* voters had, and to analyze the data for specific subgroups such as the Literacy Rate, the Internal Migrant Rate, the Urban Rate and the Type of Occupation of the voter, thus obtaining enlightening estimates of those variables.

After a first period of economic growth, Perón's populist regime began to face problems such as inflation, supply bottlenecks, balance of payments difficulties, and the increase of fiscal deficits, which made output fall, and worsened the original economic



conditions of the nation. He could cope with these difficulties by making government decisions that increased his political power and his popular support. In order to obtain overwhelming power, he engaged his party in two main reforms: the change of the National Constitution, which allowed him, among other things, to run for re-election, and the female enfranchisement. Since the electoral reform occurred in September 23, 1947, the electorate more than doubled, mostly because of the inclusion of women in the electorate.

Chapter 3 deals with these issues. Regarding the enlargement of the constituency, my contribution to the literature is significant, since female empowerment has not yet been analyzed using an Ecological Inference methodology. By taking advantage of a large, unique and unusual data set regarding the records of the electoral outcomes which, in Argentina, can be found sorted by gender and that corresponds to the first electoral participation of women in a general election in the country, I am able to establish which features of this new and vast electorate were key in helping Perón obtain an overwhelming and uncommon support that had not been experienced in Argentina so far. To put numbers in perspective, if we compare the 1946 and the 1951 presidential elections, almost 95% of the 4.66 million new voters corresponded to the new female constituency. This electorate mostly voted Perón, even more overwhelmingly than how men did. It is surprising that, despite this striking figure, the features that predominated in Perón's female voters have not been discussed yet. Chapter 3 fills in this literature gap by analyzing the characteristics of the new electorate, which made them more prone to vote for Perón, such as the illiteracy rate, the marriage status, the area of living and the type of occupation. The results are revealing. It has been found that illiterate, single, unemployed women supported Perón relatively more than literate, married, working women did. In a similar fashion, women living in rural areas supported the *Peronist Party* more than females from the urban centers.

## Chapter 1

### Perón's Economic and Social Policies. Contours of a Populist Regime

*"... preferir la irrealidad y los sueños al mundo verdadero sólo trae beneficios en el campo de las artes y la literatura; en el de la vida política y social, por lo común genera catástrofes."*<sup>1</sup>

Mario Vargas Llosa

*Diario La Nación (Argentina). July 7th, 2017.*

#### 1.1. Introduction

For years, the policies carried out by Juan Perón during his first and second government were considered the paradigm of populisms in Argentina and elsewhere (Canitrot, 1975; Zanatta, 2009, 2012, 2014; Di Tella and Dubra, 2010; Di Tella, 2011; Novaro, 2014; Cortés Conde, 2015; Rouquié, 2017). During this period, the economic policies were based on an interventionist scheme, discretionary transfers and clientelism. In order to deepen and extend that system, and to discretionally redistribute the national income, he allied with three key players: the industrialists, the unions and the military. As discussed by Cortés Conde, the growing industrial sector profited from import substitution policies, the unions were favored as they experienced an increasing recognition by Perón as key players, and the military benefited by having him as an active coronel in the force (Cortés Conde, 2015: 99). Although the reallocation of income favoring workers is crucial in understanding Perón's increasing power, there are other dimensions, that ought to be carefully considered when raising the populist issue to describe his ruling years.

To begin with, Perón confronted two different visions of democracies. On the one hand, a liberal paradigm, characterized by an institutional arrangement that followed a system of check and balances between the different branches of the State, together with a representative democracy, which was explicitly stated in the Argentine National Constitution,

---

<sup>1</sup> "...to prefer illusion and dreams over the real world, is only beneficial to the field of arts and literature; to the political and social life, it commonly brings about catastrophes."

enacted in 1853, and maintained in its successive reforms. It is likely that this model may have had some bearing on the fast increase in the economic growth of Argentina during the first decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, placing the country among the most advanced nations.

On the other hand, Perón had to choose between an authoritarian bureaucracy or a populist democracy, where the power is supposed to lay directly on the people, who use a leader as a means to interpret their mandate. In this sense, the word “people” is an entelechy which may be shaped in such a way that only the leader can define it. This paradigm results in the concentration of power in the hands of one person, who has control of the country’s institutions and economic resources (Di Tella, 2011; Zanatta, 2012, 2014; Amaral, 2014).

To validate and maintain this new scheme of power, Perón needed an overwhelming popular support, which he got by endorsing women’s empowerment on the one hand, and by including ten electoral districts which had never voted before<sup>2</sup> on the other. Apart from that, he also needed to formalize this new institutional arrangement, which is why he conducted a constitutional reform. It is worth noting that both, the changes to the electoral base, and the formalization of the new institutional arrangement happened during his first presidency (see Chapters 2 and 3).

In a democracy, any massive popular approval is expected to be reflected in votes, which made it essential for Perón to increase the percentage of voters supporting his project. In this sense, it is not clear whether the impulse he gave to female enfranchisement was founded on civil rights convictions or had an underlying opportunistic drive. In other words, considering the systematic opposition of the previous conservative administrations which denied women electoral participation, Perón may have seen in them an invaluable chance to increase his electoral base by the incorporation of millions of new voters that had been neglected in the past.

To fully understand Perón’s ascent to power, it is necessary first to discuss the fundamentals of a populist government, and to contextualize it by referring to the local and the international socio-economic and political contexts and the changes that took place during the 30s and the 40s. Section 1.2 presents a brief discussion on the underlying characteristics

---

<sup>2</sup> Until the 1946 presidential election, the only electoral districts allowed to participate in the elections were the original fourteen provinces and the federal district of Buenos Aires (capital city of Argentina), thus leaving aside nine National Territories and one Military Governorate.

found in a populist regime, in order to compare the political framework followed by Perón's administrations to a stylized model, as understood nowadays. Sections 1.3 to 1.5 examine Argentine domestic, foreign and public sectors, and describes relevant economic variables that would help the reader have a better understanding of the shift in the political and institutional paradigm during those critical years. Finally, some closing remarks are offered.

## **1.2. The Shape of a Populist Regime**

As discussed by Cassullo (2014), three types of approaches can be taken to analyze the nature of a populist regime. According to the field of sociology, a populist government emerges in the periphery, and it is conceived as a class coalition between industrial workers, influence groups and a charismatic leader. From the standpoint of political science, a populism is a political strategy which emerges from a liberal democracy, where both political paradigms conform a system in permanent tension. Lastly, an economic approach would emphasize the inter-temporal inconsistencies of the policies engaged by a populist administration.


To begin with, taking a sociological perspective, we can say that Perón merged different sectors of the Argentine society in order to sustain his candidacy. Particularly, he incorporated anti-liberal and nationalistic minority groups, who had supported the 1943 military administration where he was a key player, and included right-wing intellectuals who accepted Perón's populist alignment. Furthermore, the protectionist policies he implemented between 1943 and 1946 as a high rank official in the Farrell administration were attractive to the new industrialist bourgeoisie, worried about the change in the world scenario after the war.<sup>3</sup> This group required the continuation of the protectionist policies in order to survive. The set of alliances complete with the incorporation of the Unions, with the direct relationship he established with the working class, as his charismatic figure rose (Di Tella, 2011; Cassullo, 2014, Cortés Conde, 2015).

Figure 1.1 resumes Perón's support strategy with regards to the alliances he used when building the structure in which he based his climb to the presidency.

---

<sup>3</sup> Before becoming president, Perón actively participated in the 1943 Coup D'Etat, which ended up, first, with Pedro Ramírez in the presidency, and from 1944 to 1946 with Edelmiro Farrell as the President of Argentina. During those years, Perón occupied different positions; he was first appointed as Vice-minister of the Ministry of War and head of the Secretary of Labor and then, in 1944, as Minister of War and Vice-President of the country.

**Figure 1.1. Perón's alliances during the 1940s.**



Source: Author based on Di Tella (2011: 288).

In line with this configuration, Dornbusch and Edwards emphasize that “[populisms use] political mobilization, recurrent rhetoric and symbols designed to inspire the people, it draws on a heterogeneous coalition aimed primarily at the working class, but including and led by significant sectors from the middle and upper strata and third, populism has connoted a reformist set of policies tailored to promote development without explosive class conflict” (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1990: 249).

This framework views populism as a system that is more prone to flourish in the periphery, where the different sectors of society find themselves in permanent tension, as a result of the dispute for the redistribution of income. In this sense, the more advanced countries are perceived as less prone to having such regimes, since populist systems tend to emerge in societies experiencing critical phases of modernization, or in times of deep transformation of their social structures (Zanatta, 2012).

Another interesting point to consider is the multi classist conformation of populist regimes, at least, in its origins. Because of the limited resources, the lower strata of society cannot be organized without the help of the higher one. (Di Tella, 2011). In this regard, Di Tella points out that “the representation [of the workers by the higher class] always involves a certain degree of manipulation” (Di Tella, 2011: 229).<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Translation of “La representación, por lo tanto, siempre involucra una cierta dosis de manipulación”.

It is worth mentioning at this point that Perón's participation in the Farrel military administration became crucial to his electoral success in 1946. These three years of service made it possible for him to obtain control over the immense amount of public resources to build the electoral machinery that led him to the presidency (Zanatta, 2014: 87), and it was also during this period that he, as Secretary of Labor, was able to establish a direct association with the unions. Hence, Perón's alliance with blue collar workers was twofold; not only did they have a direct relationship, but they were also indirectly linked through the unions, as can be seen in Figure 1.1. As a result, the number of affiliates to the unions grew from almost five hundred and thirty thousand in 1945 to one and a half million in 1947, and to approximately three million in 1951, which means a six-fold in just 6 years (Murmis and Portantiero, 1971: 135).

A further important consequence of the alliance between Perón, the laborers and the unions is that voters are more likely to be vulnerable to manipulation by the leader's rhetoric of a homogeneous nation. To explain this idea, the concept of holistic democracy comes in handy. A holistic democracy is a system that considers all political and social discrepancies as an unnatural and undesired feature of society and, thus, the system must aim at the creation of a homogeneous social body for unanimity to arise. It is only by presuming this social homogeneity that the leader undertakes the country's representation, and then the government and the nation become the same entity.<sup>5</sup> "At the center of the holistic idea of democracy lays, not the individual, but the social bodies, to the point that it is at the base of corporate orders, as with the case of Peronism"<sup>6</sup> (Zanatta, 2014: 80-81).

To build a homogeneous social body, different sectors of society must be integrated, and any manifestation of discrepancy must be viewed as an enemy, not of the leader, but of the nation itself. It is then, once this opponent is pinpointed, that it becomes essential for a populist regime to ally with different groups in order to antagonize with the opposition, hence creating a breach between the two. The leader is expected to control the country and handle their enemy by the use of different tools which normally include, as defined by Fernández, a *corpus mysticum*, such as religion invocations, or a doctrine legacy left by any previous

---

<sup>5</sup> On the contrary, a liberal democracy accepts the political pluralism as key in a healthy nation. Therefore, under this system, minorities must be represented in order to be protected from the majorities' discretion.

<sup>6</sup> Translation of "En el centro de la idea holística de democracia no está el individuo, sino los cuerpos sociales, hasta el punto de que ésta se encuentra en la base de órdenes de tipo corporativo, como lo fue el peronismo".

charismatic leader (Fernández, 2014: 5; Fernández, 2015: 2-3; Zanatta, 2009: 41-42; Zanatta 2012: 168-169). In fact, as stated by Acemoglu et al., “the label *populist* is often used to emphasize that these politicians use a rhetoric that aggressively defends the interests of the common man against the privileged elite” (Acemoglu et al., 2013: 771).

In this sense, as stated by Cardoso and Heldwege (1991), Perón’s administration can be analyzed as an example of Classical Populism, which means building a strategic alliance between the working class and the industrial bourgeoisie and minimizing the differences between both social classes through the use of a nationalist ideology. This was also the case with Vargas in Brazil after 1945, Cárdenas in Mexico between 1934 and 1940 and Velasco in Peru from 1968 until 1975.

Having said that, it is worth mentioning that a populist regime contrasts a liberal democracy not only because it rests on a charismatic leader’s abilities, but also because it rejects the idea of a check and balances institutional system. By assuming that the leader represents the actual will and spirit of the nation, it becomes imperative to protect their country from the groups that work against the national interests (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Rodríguez Braun, 2011; Zanatta, 2012; Fernández, 2014, 2015). Following this notion of populism, *peronism* is seen as a political movement, rather than as a political party, which allowed Perón to claim the representation of Argentina and to be the interpreter of his people’s needs. In the long run, he aimed to substitute the party scheme for a corporative system, understood as bureaucratic organizations controlled by the government (Sebreli, 2002).

In this sense, a populist regime aspires to become the whole nation, instead of being a portion of that whole. The populist leader sees the project as the only one embodying moral values - hence, with ethical superiority - and expects the political movement to be perceived as the genuine incarnation of the moral principles of the nation. As stated by Rouquié (2017: 73), in his rhetoric, Perón assimilated the *Peronist* Movement with the people and the nation, and, therefore, the opposition represented the anti-nation interests and they could only be considered traitors.

Secondly, from the standpoint of political sciences, interpreting a populist regime in constant tension with a liberal democracy, means bearing in mind that the rules for its institutionalization, even though they conspire against the discretion intrinsic in any populist

model, will eventually be created. Normally, populist leaders experience difficulties in their ascent to power, as they represent the anti-system option; nevertheless, once in office, they engage in institutional changes to make the regime official. These changes may include some constitutional reforms, and the creation of a more stable political party, which will take the place of the personalist movement created with the sole purpose of having an electoral instrument. In this sense, the populist government needs to reframe the legal rules to be able to accumulate power and ensure that no further changes in the new populist paradigm will be made. Perón's administration, as will be discussed in the following chapters, is a clear example of how this strategy was put to practice.

An additional issue to consider, as discussed by Cassullo (2014), is the apparent paradox found in populist regimes, since they have some characteristics rejected by a democratic republic, such as the lack of a check and balance system, the concentration of power on the leader and the suppression of the opposition (see chapter 2), but they also share some of the features found in a liberal democracy, such as the enlargement of the electorate and other civil rights (see chapter 3).

With regards to the populist leader, a key feature to study when taking this perspective is their ability to enlarge the political project by means of opportunistic policies. In this respect, Perón was not an exception. Normally, this type of opportunistic behavior involves the leader's nationalistic rhetoric as a means to justify the implementation of policies which favor the popular, even when it is known that, in the long run, such policies may negatively affect the welfare of the community. When describing Perón's policies, Smith argued that "in Argentina the patent futility of constitutional procedures helped persuade the mobilized masses to follow Perón; however cynical and selfish he actually might have been, it was he who gave the urban lower class a feeling of significance and strength" (Smith, 1969: 49). Furthermore, Fernández (2015) defines this type of opportunism as *impenitent opportunism*, implying that the populist leader, who is responsible for the design of the policies that will eventually have a negative impact on the economy, does not face any consequences for doing so. Therefore, when following public policies that are inter-temporally consistent, the individual incentives that a populist leader has are quite low.

Lastly, the third approach to the study of the movement is the analysis of populist regimes from an economic perspective. In this sense, a broad definition of populism, following



Dornbusch and Edwards (1990, 1991) and Acemoglu et al. (2013) emphasizes that the set of public policies, even though they are favored by a large share of the population, in the long-run, result in worse economic conditions for the majority, and in an inferior macroeconomic equilibrium, when compared with the potential level that could have been reached under a different political arrangement. In fact, what a populist system proposes is very tempting for agents, since it encourages an increasing level of consumption in the short run, thus making it difficult for other systems to compete. Nonetheless, in the long run, the costs associated with these economic policies entail lower levels of consumption, when compared with the potentiality of an inter-temporally consistent non-populist system. However, it should not be expected that the scheme is easily rejected, since, even for a rational agent, it is hard to perceive the consequences when, to do so, they have to compare the tangible results of actual policies with counterfactual scenarios of alternative programs. As posited by Fernández (2015), a populist regime assumes that agents hold fuzzy preferences, either because they lack convictions about their preferences, or because the imperfect information they handle does not allow them to envisage the possible future dynamics of the events. In the case of *peronism*, the short-term objective was within the essence of their economic program. As stated by Raúl Mendé, a former minister of Perón's first cabinet, "the *peronist* economy is based on consumption. Consumption must determine the production [...] and not the other way around".<sup>7</sup>

The rise of a populist leader is not a hazardous event. Charismatic leaders are latent in all societies, waiting for the right political but also economic conditions to emerge, which normally implies favorable terms of trade, as it is essential to accumulate vast resources in the face of the imminent redistribution scheme. Despite the view that the main objective of a populist system is to change the economic structure of the country, in an attempt to redistribute income, the real common denominator in all populist regimes is the willingness of the head of state to accumulate as much power as possible to create a plebiscitary democracy. In this sense, the redistribution of income becomes a means to an end, rather than the end itself. In Latin America, the examples are particularly numerous; Argentina (Canitrot, 1975; Kaufman and Stallings, 1991; Sturzenegger, 1991; Ávila, 2011; Fernández and

---

<sup>7</sup> Translation of: "La economía justicialista está fundada sobre el consumo. El consumo debe determinar la producción [...] y no al contrario [Mendé Raúl (1951)].". "El justicialismo. Doctrina y Realidad Peronista", Rouquié (2017: 68).

Monteserin, 2014), Brazil (Rabello de Castro and Ronci, 1991; Kaufman and Stallings, 1991), Chile (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1990; Kaufman and Stallings, 1991), Nicaragua (Ocampo, 1991); Mexico (Bazdresch and Levy, 1991), Peru (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1990, Lago, 1991; Kaufman and Stallings, 1991), and Venezuela (Kaufman and Stallings, 1991, Lupu, 2010).

This being said, it becomes evident that the main goal of a populist regime is the redistribution of income from a minority group - labelled "the enemy" - to the masses, for which many different tools are used, such as protectionist policies, central banking and fiscal centralism, international isolation, import substitution measures, price controls and an increase in spending, which will all help generate a higher economic growth in the short-run (Cardoso and Helwege, 1991; Ávila, 2011, Sturzenegger, 1991). Nonetheless, what brings about the long-run inconsistencies is, above all, the use of the existing stocks of the country's resources. As described by Dornbusch and Edwards, the dynamics of the process can be divided in different stages. Firstly, as the increase in real wages goes into effect, the economy starts growing more rapidly, at the expense of running down inventories and foreign reserves. This, in turn, creates bottlenecks in the supply, and inflation begins to go up, as well as fiscal deficits. On the other hand, balance-of-payment problems arise, together with persistent shortages. In the end, agents find themselves in worse conditions than the ones before the populist policies began, which in turn leads to an orthodox stabilization program, put forward by a new government (1990: 250). In other words, the populist policies eventually end up in an economic crisis involving fiscal deficits, inflation and shortages of basic goods. (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1990: 250).

The underlying economic assumption of a populist regime is that the economy operates in its full capacity and, because of that, the use of discretionary policies is pertinent. Price controls, quotas, the use of inflation to finance government deficits and the state interventionism in the private sector, are all necessary measures taken with the objective of pushing the economy to its potentiality (Sturzenegger, 1991). Despite the fact that, at first, the effects of these policies accelerates the rate of growth of the nation's economy, by making the output to expand, it is also true that, as time passes, the country begins to face a wide range of problems involving the acceleration of inflation, supply bottlenecks, balance of payments difficulties, and the increase of fiscal deficit which makes output fall, to a degree

that lowers the levels of income even more than in pre populist years (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1990).

A stylized model proposed by Fernández, which was inspired in the works of Lotka (1925), Volterra (1926) and its applications in Schmitt (1927) and Goodwing (1967),<sup>8</sup> shows how these shortages are generated (Fernández 2011a: 6; Fernández, 2011b: 5, 2014). The Prey and Predator model, as it is known, proposes that, due to the regulations imposed by the government, a given good can arbitrarily lower its real price and, therefore, its consumption in the short-run will result in an rise in the market equilibrium. However, since the incentives to increase the production will diminish, in the long run, the shortages make consumption levels to drop and prices to increase, even to a higher level than the one exhibited before the government regulations, especially price controls, were enforced. What can be susceptible to price manipulation, ranges from energy resources, public transportation, food, medicines and any capital good that can be subject to predation by the policies followed by a populist administration.

Bearing that in mind, it is only logical to say that, if the rate of consumption speeds up, there will eventually be a reduction in the stock of the good, which will, in turn, stimulate investors to increase the production, considering that the relative scarcity of that good ought to increase its price. At that point, the cycle could start all over again. On the other hand, it may also be possible that, as long as the populist regime remains in power, the private sector will lack incentive to invest and produce goods, knowing that the government will eventually drive prices down, resulting, again, in a shortage of the goods. In this sense, it is possible to say that, in the populist regime, the shortage of goods is endogenous to the system and its dynamics. If this becomes evident, it may give a populist leader an extra reason to accumulate as much power as possible, and, under these assumptions, it could be speculated that they will try to make the main reforms in a relatively short period of time, otherwise, as shortages arise, elections could make them leave office.

In the case of Perón, as will be discussed in the next chapters, the first three years of his administration were fundamental to the accumulation of his hegemonic power. The

---

<sup>8</sup> As explained by Fernández (2011a, 2011b), Volterra (1926) was inspired by their observations of the increase and decrease of the fishing boats in the Adriatic Sea. Goodwing (1967) uses the same idea to develop a cyclical growth model, and Fernández and Mantel (1986) use the model known as Prey and Predator Model to explain the dynamics of the inflation stabilization programs under the price control policies.

massive support from the constituency can be explained by recognizing that they found in Perón the means to meet their demands. As described by Gerchunoff, quoting a conversation that Perón had with the representative of the US State Department during 1954, the President of Argentina took anti-capitalist policies only to gain the favor of the voters, and not because of his personal convictions (Gerchunoff, 2018: 202-203). Moreover, once Perón obtained the plebiscitary support he was looking for, in the 1951 election and after he had spread his overwhelming power to other branches of the State (see Chapters 2 and 3), his policies shifted to line up with a more orthodox model, as the economic policies that had been followed so far started to show their limitations (Gerchunoff, 2018; Newland and Cuesta, 2017; de Pablo, 2005).

What I have just described is a stylized version of a populist regime from a modern perspective, understanding that the inter-temporal inconsistencies affect the long-term growth, as compared with a system based on check and balances, in line with a liberal democracy. However, the consequences it had were not understood then, when globalization and the role of multilateralism were fading, and it was unclear how the countries were going to interact with each other from the crisis of the '30s onwards. The collapse of the economy worldwide after 1929 made it somehow natural to leave aside the model that was perceived responsible for the global turmoil (i.e. liberal policies) and, hence, the old paradigm was replaced by a new and unorthodox economic system. The public policies aimed at an autarkic economy, with a reinvigoration of the national industry, in order to guarantee the supply of industrial goods and fulfill the internal demand. The state leaned on interventionist policies, by using import substitution measures, quotas, price controls, and the creation of state-owned companies, despite the fact that this new paradigm resulted, ex-post, in an inferior equilibrium.

In fact, many of the most prominent nations shifted from free trade and orthodox policies to interventionism, assuming that the only way to overcome the consequences of the high unemployment rates and the under-use of capital capacity was to move from free trade and free market paradigms to actively interfere with the market results. This has been the case of England, especially after the Unions gained power and influence because of the increasing speed at which industrialization was growing. In fact, as posited by Di Tella (2011), from the last decade of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the *New Unionism* in England reached the lower

social classes which changed the agenda of the political parties toward public policies and the redistribution of income. Also, in France, after the success of the *Front Populaire* in 1936, there was a remarkable increase in the workers' affiliation to the Unions which altered the priorities of the government. Interventionist policies were also strong in Spain, Italy, Portugal and Germany, where the governments were in hands of autocrats and dictatorships from the right wing (Di Tella, 2011; Zanatta, 2014).

The US also experienced deep, and probably more striking, changes in the policies followed when Roosevelt took office in 1933. The *New Deal* was developed as part of the economic reforms undertaken. In fact, in the first couple of years of his administration, many laws which changed the role of the State were enacted, leading to a scheme where the private sector experienced an unprecedented influence from the government and from the new set of legislations. Among the most important reforms was the *National Industry Recovery Act*, which was an emergency regulation aimed at tackling the effects of the 1930s crisis. By transferring special powers to the presidency, Roosevelt was allowed to set an ambitious infrastructure program to regulate the industrial sector. The *Agricultural Adjustment Act* is also worth mentioning, for it had the purpose of limiting the production and eliminating the surpluses in order to elevate the prices of the agricultural products and thus increase the income of the farming sector and their suppliers. Roosevelt's administration also engaged in reforms of the banking system, and in the creation of the Security and Exchange Commission to control the security market. During that period, several state-owned companies were created, in an attempt to stabilize the economy, such as the *Reconstruction Finance Corporation*, the *Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation*, the *Defense Plant Corporation*, and the *Rubber Reserves Corporation*. In fact, the number of companies owned by the state reached fifty-eight by end of the Second World War (Bianchi, 2008).

Going back to Perón's administrations it is important to emphasize that the description corresponds to stylized models conceived to understand the policies followed by leaders that were ex-post labeled as populists. In the case of Perón, the initial aim of his economic public policies was probably inspired by the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century world experiences, and were, by no means, original, since he followed the policies conducted by other nations. As described in De Pablo (2005), the economic measures carried out by Perón were nationalistic and state-oriented, in a time where, worldwide, it seemed unthinkable to

follow other type of public policies. In fact, the victory obtained by the Labor Party in England in 1945, and the U.S. New Deal defined the new world ideological wave (Luna, 1984; De Pablo, 2005). Moreover, not only did Perón align his public policies with the widespread ideas of the time, but he also incorporated his vision of a hypothetical third-world conflict between occident and the communist countries. Given that worst-case scenario, the country needed to be prepared by having shifted the economic paradigm of an open economy to an autarkic nation (De Pablo 2005; Gambini, 2007b; Zanatta, 2009; Rouquié, 2017). Hence, Perón's economic policies aimed at the redistribution of income at the expense of the competitive agricultural sector in order to favor the industrialists and the new unionized blue-collar workers, who came from the rural areas to the urban centers, especially, though not exclusively, to the city of Buenos Aires, intensifying thus the social and demographic changes that the country experienced from the '30s onwards. The incorporation of workers in the industrial activities favored immensely not only the unions, but also the industrialists, who experienced high profits in the sector as a result of protectionist policies (Gerchunoff and de León, 2018: 204).


### **1.3. The Domestic Sector**

As stated in the previous section, the ideas and the new economic paradigm in the world was of great influence in the redefinition of the policies followed by Argentina after the Great Depression. Therefore, evaluating the public policies followed prior to Perón's first electoral victory becomes essential when trying to describe the strategies undertaken in the economic sphere during his first two administrations. One of the main features of the new economic scenario in Argentina was the impulse given to the domestic demand and to the import substitution strategy, which aimed at stimulating the national industry. Apart from that, it is worth mentioning that the strong protectionist policies promoted the import substitution industrialization. (D'Amato and Katz, 2018: 147; Gerchunoff and de León, 2018: 201).

At the beginning of the Second World War, the economic crisis associated to the Great Depression had been overcome in Argentina. As stated by Della Paolera and Taylor, it was surprising that the impact of the crisis had been "so mild and short lived by international standards" (Della Paolera and Taylor, 1999: 569). In fact, although by 1939 the GDP per capita

did not equal the levels reached before the Great Depression, for it was still a 4.5% lower than in 1929, the Argentine GDP was a 14.5% higher when compared to the one observed in 1929 and a 32.8% higher in comparison with the year 1932, which represents the most critical period of the crisis.<sup>9</sup> Figure 1.2 shows Argentina's GDP and the per capita GDP performance from the time of the Great Depression up to 1955, Perón's last year in office.

**Figure 1.2. Argentine GDP and Per Capita GDP. 1929= 100.**



Source: Author's calculations based on Ferreres (2005).

Notes:

- (1) Ferreres (2005) reports that the GDP of the countries considered are expressed in 1990 Geary-Khamis constant US Dollars, which are extracted from Maddison (2001) "The World Economy. A Millennial Perspective". For the Argentine figures, the publication considers the Maddison 1990 value, extrapolating it by using the variation of the national GDP at constant 1993 pesos extracted from the Argentine Statistical Institute (INDEC).
- (2) Ferreres (2005) constructed the population series from data extracted from the INDEC (1975) "La Población Argentina" until 1949; from 1950 onwards, it was extracted from INDEC's projections.

In line with this, it is worth mentioning that the recovery rate in Argentina was better than in the US. As can be seen in Table 1.1, the ratio of Argentina to the USA GDP per capita was better in 1939, when compared to the year 1929 (67.1 and 66.9, respectively). It is also

<sup>9</sup> Note that this difference between the increase in the country's GDP and the per capita GDP means an impressive growth in population. In fact, between 1929 and 1939 the population in Argentina grew from 11,616,970 inhabitants to 13,933,977 inhabitants, which represents almost a 20% increase in that decade.

worth noting that the intensity of the crisis in Argentina was milder than in the US, as the ratio of the GDP per capita in the year 1933 reached its highest value of over 80% in both countries.

It should be also pointed out that the largest Latin American economies performed better than Argentina during the 1930s crisis. If considering Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela together, the economy of Argentina accounted for the 47.2% of the share in 1930, and by the end of the world's economic crisis in 1933, it had dropped to a 43.6%. In fact, as appreciated in Table 1.1, this ratio continued to decrease during the following twenty-five years, reaching the lowest value at the time Perón left the presidency, in 1955.

The tendency of the per capita GDP in Argentina, as compared with other Latin American economies, was also negative during this twenty-five-years period. In 1930, the average income per capita reported in these other nations accounted for 35% of the income per capita in Argentina, approximately, and during Perón's second presidency it rose to 50%. The evolution of these numbers puts in perspective the fact that Argentina had a great performance during the war years, and during Perón's presidencies. However, the relative significance of Argentina's economy with regards to the continent was impressive, considering that the population of Argentina ranged just from a 16.7% to a 14.9% of the total population of the mentioned Latin American countries during that period.

Having said that, the world economic turmoil brought about in Argentina a perfect excuse to move away from the orthodox policies that had been followed until the beginning of the Great Depression (Della Paolera and Taylor, 1999). The result was the starting point of a series of changes in the public policies that, by the mid-40s, ended up with a populist regime, with strategies that centered around an autarkic economic strategy and an import substitution scheme (Taylor, 1992), as the one described in the previous section of this chapter. As pointed out by Gerchunoff and Llach (1998), the global crisis brought about a series of institutional changes that were intensified during the following decade. In particular, the Central Bank and Regulatory Boards were created which was the starting point of a deeper economic interventionist policy by the government.



**Table 1.1. Argentine Economic Performance (1929=100).**

	Great Depression		Recovery Period		Second World War		Perón's 1 <sup>st</sup> Presidency		Perón's 2 <sup>nd</sup> Presidency	
	1929	1933	1934	1939	1940	1945	1946	1951	1952	1955
<b>Arg. to USA GDP per cap.</b> (in %)	66.9	80.3	79.4	67.1	62.8	39.6	53.7	53.0	48.4	50.8
<b>Lat. Am. to Arg. GDP per cap.</b> (in %)	35.3	38.3	38.1	40.0	40.5	42.2	42.4	45.2	50.0	49.1
<b>Arg. to Lat. Am. GDP</b> (in %)	47.2	43.6	43.9	40.4	40.6	37.3	37.1	34.2	30.7	30.3
<b>Arg. to Lat. Am. Pop.</b> (in %)	16.6	16.7	16.7	16.2	16.5	15.7	15.7	15.5	15.3	14.9

Source: Author's calculations based on Ferreres (2005).

Notes:

- (1) The Latin American countries considered are: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.
- (2) Ferreres (2005) reports the GDP of the countries considered expressed in 1990 Geary-Khamis constant US Dollars which are extracted from Maddison (2001) "The World Economy. A Millennial Perspective". For the Argentine figures, the publication considers the Maddison value for year 1990 and extrapolate it using the variation of the national GDP at constant 1993 pesos extracted from Argentine Statistical Institute (INDEC).
- (3) Ferreres (2005) reports the population figures from Maddison except for Argentina which was constructed until 1949 from data extracted from INDEC (1975) "La Población Argentina" and from 1950 from INDEC's projections.

The import substitution policy during the years of the Great Depression also had a considerable impact on the demographic sphere of the nation. From the late 1920s onwards, and exhibiting an accelerated pace during Perón's presidencies, the country experienced an intense process of internal migration from the rural areas to the city centers, especially to Buenos Aires and its metropolitan area. In fact, between 1929 and 1955, Perón's last year in office, the urban population increased by a 19.8% (i.e. from 57.1% to 68.4% of total population), as shown in table 1.2. In this regard, as referred by Cortés Conde, the unfavorable relative prices of agriculture products between 1935 and 1945 can be said to have been responsible for the abrupt increase in the migration rate. During that period, over one million people migrated from rural sectors to the urban centers, especially to the city of Buenos Aires and its metropolitan area, thus changing the composition of the urban proletariat (Cortés Conde, 1998:45). Apart from that, the rapid increase in the demand for workers by the industrial sector can also help explain this rate of migration (Torre and Pastorisa, 2002).

**Table 1.2. Urban and Rural Population.**

	1929	1939	1946	1952	1955
<b>Urban Population (%)</b>	57.1	60.0	61.9	66.2	68.4
<b>Rural Population (%)</b>	42.9	40.0	38.1	33.8	31.6


Source: Ferreres (2005).

Note: Ferreres (2005) reports the population figures from data extracted from INDEC, until 1949 (1975) “La Población Argentina”. From the year 1950 onwards, it is based on INDEC’s projections.

With respect to the industrial sector’s performance, after reaching its lowest level in 1932, the industrial output experienced a sharp recovery, making the production level more than double by 1945, which denotes an average growth rate of 5.6% per year. In terms of the share of the sector in the nation’s GDP, the growth meant that the industrial output rose from less than 13% of the GDP, in 1932, to 17% approximately, thirteen years later (see Figure 1.3). Despite increasing by 58.5%, the performance of the industrial sector was uneven during Perón’s presidencies, from 1946 to 1955. In particular, the graph shows a significant growth in the Industrial Production index, which rose by 30% between the year prior to Perón’s first victory and 1947, increasing from 167.9 in 1945 to 218.3. During the last two years of Perón’s second administration, there was another significant increase by 21% (from 219.7 to 266.1). However, the industrial production did not experience significant changes from 1947 to 1952.

With respect to the national GDP, the importance of the industry in the whole economy hardly changed considering that from 1946 to 1955 the share ranged from 17.5% of the GDP in 1946 to 18.1% in 1955. On the other hand, the period from 1932 up until the end of World War II shows a constant increase of the Industrial Production Index, which goes from 82.5 to 166.9, meaning that the industrial output more than doubled in the thirteen-years period mentioned (an average increase of 5.6% per year). Also, in contrast with its performance during the *peronist* decade (1946 – 1955) in which it remained basically unchanged, the industrial production to the GDP ratio jumped from 12.7% to 16.9%, between 1932 and 1945.

**Figure 1.3. Argentina's Industrial Production.**



Source: Author's calculations based on Ferreres (2005).

Note: Ferreres (2005) presents the industrial sector GDP in constant Pesos of 1993 based on data extracted from *Secretaría de Asuntos Económicos* (1955) "Producto e Ingreso de la República Argentina en el Período 1935-1954", until 1949. From 1950 onwards, it was extracted from *Banco Central de la República Argentina* (1975) "Sistema de Cuentas del Producto e Ingreso de la Argentina. Cuadernos Estadísticos, vol II".

The increase in the industrial production during the war years was not the result of the import substitution strategy which Argentina followed the previous decade exclusively; the demand of industrial products from neighbor countries also had a bearing, as other Latin American economies were also dealing with shortages from the main industrialized nations that were directly involved in the war. Nevertheless, even though the percentage of the total exports to Latin American nations increased from 10.8% in 1939 to 28.2 in 1944, it did not prove to be a permanent shift, for it dropped back to 22% in 1945 and to 15.2% in 1946.<sup>10</sup> Clearly, the external shock that the war had awakened was a key feature in the transformation of the productive matrix in Argentina. One of the main consequences of this new scenario was

<sup>10</sup> I calculate these figures adding up the Argentine exports to Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Bolivia reported in US dollars and dividing the result in the total Argentine exports. I base my calculations from Ferreres (2005) who extracts the data of Brazil and Chile from Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos (1944), "Anuario de Comercio Exterior" and Vázquez Presedo, Vicente (1988) "Estadísticas Históricas Argentinas". Ferreres (2005) obtains the data on Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Bolivia from Boletín Estadístico of the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC) and he extracts the total exports from Vázquez Presedo, Vicente (1988) "Estadísticas Históricas Argentinas".

the increased labor demand in the industrial sectors that were located around large-urban centers. The internal migration intensified, as mentioned before, which, in turn, reshaped the configuration of the cities, as they incorporated a new type of worker who did not find a political interpreter of their needs, to capitalize the new demographic scenario. As stated by Smith, the workforce in nonagricultural occupations increased from an average of two million people between 1910 and 1914 (65.8% of total workforce) to 4.5 million between 1945 and 1949, accounting for 70.8% of the total workforce (Smith, 1969:33). It is also worth noting that, after the war, the industrial sector experienced a negative shock in their demand since, as it was expected, the US regained the markets that had been left aside in order to satisfy the needs that aroused during the war. It is most likely that Perón, while a member of the Farrell administration, perceived these changes and began working to secure that constituency. In fact, Perón's alliance with the industrialists and the blue-collar workers through the Unions had its genesis during this period. As acknowledged by Smith (1969), by the time of the presidential election, it was clear to the new urban masses that making Perón the president of Argentina was their means to gain power and benefits.

Besides the demographic transformation which increased the blue-collar workers at the expense of the rural workforce, the war years brought about a debate within the armed forces, that would eventually have economic consequences. There were two antagonizing groups; one of them was more prone to join the allies, while the other was influenced by the Axis ideas. Within this latter group, which eventually prevailed, Perón was identified. As part of their nationalistic strategy, they aimed at obtaining economic autarky and developing a strong industry by aligning with the military and other strategic sectors. The national army company, *Fabricaciones Militares*, was created in 1941, and the first state-owned steel mill of the country, *Altos Hornos Zapla*, became operational in 1945. However, the national industrialist model soon moved to other sectors, which made the Industrial Union of Argentina (*Unión Industrial Argentina*, UIA) eager to make a political alliance with the military administration, enlarging thus the definition of a strategic sector. In fact, in June 1944, an executive decree established the criteria by which a given activity could be declared strategic for the national interest. These were "those [activities] which use only national raw material and its production is destined to supply the domestic demand, or those that using partially or totally imported raw materials or semi-elaborated foreign products, produce basic goods or

are of interest for the national defense.”<sup>11</sup> (de Pablo, 2005: 271). Because of this, several activities were declared of national interest and protected with tariffs and quotas. However, it is important to note that the idea of an extraordinary increase of industrial output was challenged by Fodor (1989) who pointed out that the industrial output did not substantially increase, despite the fact that there was the general impression of a generalized industrialization and a feeling was of abundance based on food surpluses. As discussed previously, even though the growth rate of the industrial production index increased by 26% between 1939 and the end of the war (from 133.18 to 167.86), the share of the industrial sector in the GDP increased only from 15.5% to 16.9% (see Figure 1.3).

Not subject to debate is the fact that the Farrell administration (1944-1946) played an important role in helping Perón be perceived as a popular and charismatic leader, which was the reason behind the many policies aimed at supporting him as the candidate for the 1946 presidential election. For example, the decision of implementing an additional salary, payable at the end of the year (*aguinaldo*), which mainly favored formal workers, took place in December of 1945, only a few months prior to the election, further intensifying the consumption boom of those years. In line with this, other measures taken by the government were: the prohibition of seizure the salaries for public servants in August 1943, the wage adjustment according to the price index in September 1943 and the paid-vacations decree in January 1945 (De Pablo, 2005: 252), together with rent control regulations and the enlargement of the population who received pensions from the state. As pointed out by Torre and Pastoriza, during those 12 years, the average rent levels experienced less than a 28% increase between 1943 and 1955, while prices went up by 700%, approximately (Torre and Pastoriza, 2002: 12). Besides, regarding the pension scheme, the number of beneficiaries, many of whom had never made any contribution whatsoever, (Sánchez Román, 2013: 118) jumped by 12.4% from 82.3 thousand beneficiaries in 1943 to 92.5 in 1946. It is worth noting that the number of pension beneficiaries reached to over half a million by the end of Perón’s administrations (see Section 1.5). These policies had a significant impact on the consumption levels, as the real salaries increased. In fact, between 1945 and 1948 the sales of durable goods and clothing increased between 100% and almost 220%, depending on the product. In

---

<sup>11</sup> Translation of: “... aquellas [actividades] que emplea[n] exclusivamente material prima nacional y cuya producción estuviera destinada a abastecer el mercado interno, o que, utilizando parcial o totalmente materias primas o artículos semielaborados de procedencia extranjera, produjeran artículos de primera necesidad o interesaran a la defensa nacional.

particular, shoes sales went up by 133%, clothing between 100% and 125%, fridges sales increased by 218% and radios by 600% (Gerchunoff and Antúnez, 2002: 146; Rouquié, 2017: 68).

#### **1.4. The Foreign Sector**

Despite the fact that Argentina was not directly involved in World War II, the country could not escape from the economic consequences of the global conflict. During those years, the increasing deficits in the world trade significantly intensified the import substitution policies already under motion, basically regarding industrial products. It was only logical that the countries directly involved in the conflict would put their industrial production efforts there, causing Argentina to suffer the decrease in the import of capital goods, thus resulting in a negative shock regarding the level of international trade. Even though in relative terms both, exports and imports, fell considerably (see Table 1.3), the impact was greater on imports. In fact, in the five-years period before the war, exports represented an average of 15.6% of the GDP, while imports accounted for the 11.4% of the national product. On the other hand, during war years, the average annual exports went down by 3.2% of the GDP while imports dropped by 4.4% of GDP. This reduction in imports urged the country to produce capital goods which fueled the import substitution policies undertaken, thus impacting on the openness of the economy. The index, defined as the sum of imports and exports divided by the GDP, fell to 27.0 between 1934 and 1940, and to 19.4 between 1940 and 1945. It is worth noting that, even during the Great Depression, which was characterized by limited world trade, Argentina's exports and imports represented an average of 24.4% of the total economy.

**Table 1.3. Exports, Imports, Balance of Trade and Openness. Annual averages (% of GDP).**


Period		Exports	Imports	Balance of Trade	Openness
<b>Great Depression</b>	1930-1933	13.3	11.2	2.1	24.5
<b>Recovery Period</b>	1934-1939	15.6	11.4	4.2	27.0
<b>Second World War</b>	1940-1945	12.4	7.0	5.4	19.4
<b>Perón's 1<sup>st</sup> presidency</b>	1946-1951	19.5	19.4	0.1	38.9
<b>Perón's 2<sup>nd</sup> presidency</b>	1952-1955	14.9	16.6	-1.7	31.5

Source: Author's calculations based on Ferreres (2005).

Note: Ferreres (2005) collects the data for Exports in FOB US dollars and data from Imports in CIF US dollars. Both series were extracted from Boletín 235 (1945) of *Dirección Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos* for figures until 1934; from 1935 onwards, from Vázquez Presedo, Vicente (1988) "Estadísticas Históricas Argentinas". The GDP is calculated by dividing the GDP in Pesos considering the exchange rate between the Peso and the US dollar.

As shown in Figure 1.4 and Table 1.4, before the war, the economy of Argentina had experienced a significant improvement of its terms of trade, increasing by almost 30% the annual average levels reached during the Great Depression (102.3 and 78.9 respectively). As a result, there was a positive response with regards to the balance of trade, which led the country to accumulate high levels of international reserves in the Central Bank. This positive shock wave in the terms of trade continued even more strongly during Perón's first presidency, growing another 26.5% to reach a level of 129.5. However, this external shock proved to be temporal, as the average value of the index fell by 27.7%, from 129.5 to 93.6 in Perón's second presidency but, if we consider the highest and lowest point in the decade Perón was president (1948 and 1952 respectively), it decreased by 35.8%. As described in D'Amato and Katz, the nation lacked strong fiscal and monetary institutions to limit the economic cycles which led the government and the agents to behave as if the positive shocks experienced by Argentina were permanent (D'Amato and Katz, 2018: 148). This type of behavior, focused only on short-term goals, is one of the characteristics described by Dornbusch and Edwards (1990; 1991) as macroeconomic populism, as discussed in section 1.2. Moreover, it was also wrongly perceived during Perón's administrations that the positive trade balance was, not only permanent, but also free from consequences. In fact, the imports restrictions which came along with the world conflict eventually lead to limitations in the renewal of the stock of capital that had been depreciated during the 40s, which, in time, caused bottlenecks in the production of goods and services.

**Figure 1.4. Argentina's Terms of Trade. 1929 =100.**



Source: Díaz Alejandro (1981).

Note: Díaz Alejandro (1981) estimates the Terms of Trade by dividing the value of a unit of export by a unit of import, both expressed in US Dollars. The information is extracted from CEPAL (1976) "América Latina: Relación de Precios del Intercambio".

**Table 1.4. Argentina's Terms of Trade. Average for each period. 1929 = 100.**

Period		Terms of Trade	Change Respect Previous Period (in %)
Great Depression	1930-1933	78.9	
Recovery Period	1934-1939	102.1	29.4
Second World War	1940-1945	102.3	0.2
Perón's 1 <sup>st</sup> presidency	1946-1951	129.5	26.5
Perón's 2 <sup>nd</sup> presidency	1952-1955	93.6	-27.7


Source: Author's calculations based on Díaz Alejandro (1981).

Note: Díaz Alejandro (1981) estimates the Terms of Trade by dividing the value of a unit of export by a unit of import, both expressed in US Dollars. The information is extracted from CEPAL (1976) "América Latina: Relación de Precios del Intercambio".

Considering the accumulation of international reserves, the stock grew from 495.4 million dollars in 1939 to 1615.3 million dollars in 1945, which represents an increase of 226% in 6 years. In terms of the nation's GDP, the improvement rose from 14.7% to 26.9% respectively (see Figure 1.5). More astonishingly, international reserves on average were equivalent to almost 16 months of imports between the years 1934 and 1939 and during the war, the average increased to the equivalent of 38.3 months of imports, with a peak of 62.9 in 1945 (see Table 1.5).



**Figure 1.5. Argentina's International Reserves**



Source: Author's calculations based on Ferreres (2005).

Note: Ferreres (2005) reports the stock of international reserves as the amount of Gold and Foreign currency at the end of each year expressed in US dollars. The data is extracted from *Revista Estudios* 39 (1988) of the *Instituto de Estudios sobre la Realidad Argentina y Latinoamericana – IEERAL*, until 1934. From 1935 onwards, it was extracted from Vázquez Presedo, Vicente (1988), “*Estadísticas Históricas Argentinas. Compendio 1873-1973*”, Academia Nacional de Ciencias Económicas. Ferreres (2005) reports the GDP in US Dollars dividing the GDP in domestic currency by the Peso to US Dollar Exchange rate.

**Table 1.5. Argentina's International Reserves. Selected Periods.**

Period		Annual Avg. Reserves (Millions of US Dollars)	Avg. months of Imports	Avg. % of GDP
Great Depression	1930-1933	493.0	17.6	15.8
Recovery Period	1934-1939	497.3	15.9	14.7
Second World War	1940-1945	928.8	38.3	19.2
Perón's 1 <sup>st</sup> presidency	1946-1951	801.5	9.6	11.1
Perón's 2 <sup>nd</sup> presidency	1952-1955	340.9	4.3	5.3

Source: Author's calculations based on Ferreres (2005).

Note: I calculate the average months of imports by dividing the average reserves by the amount of imports for each year and then multiplying that number by 12. Ferreres (2005) reports the imports figures from Boletín 235 (1945) of *Dirección Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos* for figures until 1934; from 1935 onwards, it is extracted from Vázquez Presedo, Vicente (1988) “*Estadísticas Históricas Argentinas*”. Ferreres (2005) reports the GDP in US Dollars dividing the GDP in domestic currency by the Peso to US Dollar Exchange rate.

As stated by Canitrot, three set of prices exist, which are prone to experience strong control of the state: food prices, tariffs of state-owned public service companies, and housing rent (Canitrot, 1975: 335). Perón used the three of them to achieve the full-employment goal,

by subsidizing the least competitive activities, normally the industrial sectors, which were labor intensive, and had begun their operation before the end of the war. The public policies implemented during his administration were tariffs, restrictions to import quantities and the overvaluation of the Peso. By doing so, the salaries in real terms increased, at least in the short-run. However, the overvaluation of the Peso meant an implicit tax to exports, since it was assumed that the agricultural sector productivity would be sufficiently high to pay for the subsidies without suffering because of the intervention to the exchange market. It is worth saying at this point that the overvaluation of the currency, despite generating a negative impact on the competitiveness of exports, did not make imports more accessible, for the government demanded foreign traders a special approval to get their products into the country. Furthermore, the authorities followed a multiple exchange rate system, sorting exports and imports, in an attempt to calibrate the international trade. As can be expected, a black market emerged.

The difference between the Peso and Dollar rates that resulted from the multiple exchange rate system can be appreciated in Table 1.5, which shows the increasing incentives for exporters to operate in the black market, and for importers to obtain the favor of the authorities in order to obtain the permits required to import their products. In fact, the exporters obtained a less favorable exchange rate, ranging from 26% to 68% in the years corresponding to Perón's first and second presidencies (last column of Table 1.6). With regards to the growth of the different rates, the market rate increased by 645.7% between 1946 and 1955, while the export and import exchange rates rose by 104.8% and 138.8% respectively during the *peronist* decade. It is only logical that the distortions created in the exchange market generated a sub-optimal allocation of resources, and plenty of room for corrupt behavior and lobbying to develop.

**Table 1.6. Exchange Rates. *Peso Moneda Nacional* per Dollar. Annual Average.**

	Free Market Exchange Rate (Black Market)	Official Exchange Rate for Exports	Official Exchange Rate for Import	X and M Exchange rates difference (in %)
1946	4.09	3.36	4.23	26
1947	4.53	3.36	4.23	26
1948	6.98	3.36	4.23	26
1949	11.70	3.36	4.85	44
1950	16.00	3.91	6.56	68
1951	23.70	5.00	7.50	50
1952	22.90	5.00	7.50	50
1953	22.60	5.00	7.50	50
1954	25.30	5.00	7.50	50
1955	30.50	6.88	10.10	48

Source: Anexo 1- Boletín Informativo-Techint N° 262 (March/April 1990) and author's calculations.

Note: The Boletín Informativo-Techint reports the different exchange rates as the annual average of the considered rates.

But the exchange market intervention was not the only policy implemented to get hold of the rents from the agricultural sector. The creation of a federal agency, which was expected to work as a monopoly, dealing with all international buyers, and, at the same time, as a monopsony to the local producers, became another key component of the economic strategy followed during Perón's administration. The aim of the Institute for the Promotion and the Commerce of Argentina (*Instituto Argentino para la Promoción y el Intercambio- IAPI*) was to concentrate all international trade flow on one agency, which worked by buying the totality of the exportable production and negotiating with the potential buyers by means of bilateral trade agreements, as opposed to the multilateral system which operated before the Great Depression. Furthermore, the decree enacted to create the IAPI in May 1946, established that the institute commanded by the Central Bank could buy, sell, permute or rent any kind of good, service, or equity and celebrate any type of commercial contract with third parties, without any restrictions (de Pablo, 2005: 259). Also as stated by De Pablo, the discretionary scope of the Institute was immense, and it lacked proper control of the use of the resources, which eventually intensified the room for corruption and arbitrary decisions significantly (De Pablo, 20015: 262).

The foundation of the IAPI was crucial for the *peronist* trade scheme, as can be appreciated in Table 1.7, which shows the concentration of the international commerce in the

IAPI's hands during those years. Perón's government assumed that the domestic food prices may become more stable if this mechanism was implemented, but, above all, it was supposed to allow his administration to, firstly, limit the increase in domestic food prices associated with the international values after 1945, secondly, push real salaries up, and lastly, obtain vast resources to be redistributed as discussed before.

**Table 1.7. Participation of IAPI in Argentine's International Trade. In %.**

	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Participation of IAPI in Exports	98.3	70.4	68.6	60.5	70.3

Source: Novick (1986). "IAPI: Auge y decadencia". Buenos Aires. Centro Editor de América Latina. In Cortés Conde (2005: 183).

The IAPI worked by buying the goods from local producers at a price fixed by the government, and selling them in the international market, thus profiting from the difference between the local and the international prices, assuming that the latter were higher. In its role of exporter, the IAPI paid the local producers considerably less than what they got by selling their products in the international market. On the other hand, in its role of importer, the company sold foreign products to other private importers which were prohibited by the Central Bank to get the necessary US Dollars to buy these products directly in the international market. The use of this governmental agency implied that the agricultural sector subsidized the industrialists, but, mainly and more intensively, the urban workers, as a means to control the effect that the high levels of food prices may have on the consumption price index, thus avoiding the negative impact on real salaries. Unexpectedly, however, a few years after the creation of the IAPI, the international food supply improved, which made the international prices to decrease and, as a result, the IAPI experienced terrible losses as the agency had guaranteed minimum prices to the local producers. The total debt of the IAPI at the end of 1955 (last year of Perón in office) rose to 20.48 billion of current Argentinian pesos, accounting for 20.47% of the total national debt (Cortés Conde, 2005: 187).

Table 1.8 shows the source of these losses by considering the domestic prices paid by the IAPI to local producers for wheat, corn and beef, the three main export products of the country. It also indicates the international prices the IAPI obtained for selling these products in international markets and the ratio between foreign and local prices. In this respect, values

higher than one indicate that the IAPI run surpluses while the local producers received less than they could have obtained if the government would not have intervened the market. In other words, ratios greater than one show that the rural sector subsidized the urban areas and its activities. Although during the first three years of Perón's first mandate the difference between the international and domestic prices was positive representing net gains for the IAPI in all three products, from 1949 onwards, the profitable international-market scenario started to change. In fact, the price of wheat that the local producers received, was much higher when compared with what the national agency obtained. A similar behavior is observed regarding corn in 1950 and from 1953 to 1955, and despite the fact that the price of beef remained fairly stable during most of these years, it also experienced a negative balance in 1953 and 1954.

**Table 1.8. Domestic and International Prices. Majors Exportable Products. In m\$ñ per ton.**

	Domestic prices			Export prices			Export price / Domestic price		
	Wheat	Corn	Beef	Wheat	Corn	Beef	Wheat	Corn	Beef
1946	170	115	380	223	184	666	1.31	1.60	1.75
1947	200	140	480	465	296	683	2.33	2.11	1.42
1948	230	155	530	648	340	756	2.82	2.19	1.43
1949	235	160	620	129	241	1051	0.55	1.51	1.70
1950	305	320	720	281	209	901	0.92	0.65	1.25
1951	340	400	1150	418	496	1525	1.23	1.24	1.33
1952	500	450	1620	482	533	1913	0.96	1.18	1.18
1953	500	450	1940	493	360	1785	0.99	0.80	0.92
1954	500	450	2000	357	279	1813	0.71	0.62	0.91
1955	700	650	2000	367	335	2311	0.52	0.51	1.16

Source: Ferreres (2005) and author's calculations.

Notes:

- (1) Ferreres (2005) collects the data on Wheat and Corn domestic prices from Bolsa de Cereales (1966) "Número Estadístico". The domestic prices on Beef correspond to the ton of livestock reported by Junta Nacional de Carnes (1967) "Estadísticas Básicas", also reported in Ferreres (2005).
- (2) Ferreres (2005) calculates the data regarding Wheat, Corn and Beef export prices from Vázquez Presedo, Vicente (1988) "Estadísticas Históricas Argentinas. Compendio 1973 – 1973".
- (3) In order to have the export prices in m\$ñ I use the official exchange rate for exporters reported in Table 1.6.

The overall result of the IAPI experiment in terms of resources can also be noted by observing how the terms of trade of the country experienced a decrease of almost 28% in the average level during Perón's first and second administrations, which means a drop from 129.5

to 93.6 respectively (see Table 1.4). The other negative effect of the IAPI as a government agency for international trade was the negative incentives it had on producers who saw the results of their business plan could be jeopardized by a discretionary decision of a federal agency. In fact, the country's average exports of its two main crops in the decade prior to the war (i.e. between 1930 to 1939) were 6.23 million tons for corn and 3.41 million tons for wheat, whereas in the ten years corresponding to the *peronist* administration, corn exports dropped to 1.35 million tons and wheat exports to 2.21 million tons. These represent a 78.3% and 35.1% decrease in the volume of exports respectively.

### **1.5. The Public Sector**

The deficits suffered by the IAPI added up to the overall fiscal deficit run by the administration, which had a negative impact on the consumption price index, as the inflation began to be an important source for financing the increasing expenditures made by the government. Table 1.9 shows the fiscal performance during the years when Perón was in office. During his first presidency, the average deficit accounted for 3.2% of the GDP, which represented 28.8% of total expenditures. During his second mandate, the indicator increased by 3.3%, making up 29.9% of total expenditures.

**Table 1.9. National Government Expenditures, Deficit and Inflation.**

	Total Expenditures (% GDP)	Deficit (% GDP)	Deficit (% of expenditures)	Inflation (%)
1946	9.88	4.12	41.67	17.04
1947	9.31	1.60	17.16	16.46
1948	12.90	2.73	21.19	13.56
1949	11.82	3.98	33.68	29.02
1950	11.21	3.38	30.21	28.15
1951	11.96	3.47	29.03	33.56
1952	11.94	3.00	25.13	37.83
1953	11.01	3.11	28.29	7.69
1954	10.97	3.23	29.45	3.52
1955	10.21	3.76	36.88	13.49

Source: Author based on *Boletín Informativo Techint* N° 262 (Jul.- Ago. - Sep. 1981); Ferreres (2005) and Newland and Cuesta (2017).

Note:

- (1) The Total National Government Expenditures and the National Deficit are extracted from *Boletín Informativo Techint* N° 223.
- (2) The GDP is taken from Ferreres (2005) who calculates it at market prices using the GDP implicit price index to the GDP at constant pesos of 1993.
- (3) The inflation rate is taken from Newland and Costa (2017) and it is calculated as the weighted average of the Consumer Price Index of the city of Buenos Aires (68%) and the Rural Price Index (32%). The weights consider the proportion of urban and rural workers. The Consumer Price Index of Buenos Aires comes from the Publication of the Dirección Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (1963) while the Rural Price Index is extracted from Vila, Antonio (1958) "Precios de Paridad para Productos Agrícolas en la Argentina", Sociedad Rural Argentina.

As expected, the monetization of the deficit caused an inflationary process which could not be stopped during the *peronist* administration. In fact, during Perón's first presidency, the country faced an unprecedented increase in the consumer's price index of over 241%, which, in the 4 years of his second mandate, rose to almost 75%, reaching its peak in 1952, of almost 38% that year only. This was new to the Argentinean, bearing in mind the low inflation rates of previous decades. Particularly, the pace at which the consumer price index increased in the period that goes from the end of the Great Depression and the beginning of the Second World War was 0.9% per year on average. Moreover, during the great depression years, between 1930 and 1933, the economy experienced a deflation process as the price index went down by 12% (see Table 1.10).

**Table 1.10. Inflation Rates. Selected Periods.**

	Period	Period inflation (%)	Annual Average (%)
<b>Great Depression</b>	1930 - 1933	-12.0	-3.1
<b>Recovery Period</b>	1934 - 1939	5.6	0.9
<b>Second World War</b>	1940 - 1945	45.1	6.4
<b>Perón's 1<sup>st</sup> presidency</b>	1946 - 1951	241.8	22.7
<b>Perón's 2<sup>nd</sup> presidency</b>	1952 - 1955	74.4	14.9

Source: Author's calculations based on Ferreres (2005) and on Newland and Cuesta (2017).

Note:

- (1) From 1930 to 1939, the inflation rate is taken from Ferreres (2005) who reports the Consumer Price Index extracted from *Anuario Geográfico Argentino* (1941) published by the *Comité Nacional de Geografía*.
- (2) From 1940 to 1955, the inflation rate is taken from Newland and Cuesta (2017). They calculate it as the weighted average of the Consumer Price Index of the city of Buenos Aires (68% of the index) and the Rural Price Index (32% of the index). The weights take into account the proportion of urban and rural workers. The Consumer Price Index of Buenos Aires is obtained from the publication of the Dirección Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (1963), while the Rural Price Index is extracted from Vila, Antonio (1958) "Precios de Paridad para Productos Agrícolas en la Argentina", Sociedad Rural Argentina.

An additional consequence of the inflation process was the impact that the increment in the price index had on wages. As stated before, one of Perón's main objective was to increase workers' real salaries, especially to the internal migrants that enlarged the urban areas of the country, who were incorporated in the growing industrial sector. In this regard, even though the general historiographical consensus has been that salaries in real terms experienced an impressive improvement during Perón's decade as president (among others, Díaz Alejandro, 1983; Gerchunoff and Llach, 2000; Rapoport, 2008), the inflation process casted a shadow over that objective among some sectors of the economy. In order to offset the negative impact that the increase in prices had on real salaries, Perón's administration engaged, as describe previously, in price control policies, especially in food products, medicine, house renting and public services such as transportation and energy fares. In other words, many of the components of the Consumer Price Index, which were calculated by taking into account the urban family, were affected by the intervention of the government in the determination of the prices of those components. However, as stated by Newland and Cuesta (2017), the price control policies were not always effective in deterring price increase, and thus the prices were higher than the allowed levels. As a result, it was "only natural that the public officials who constructed the index would take the maximum values instead of the



determined by the market”<sup>12</sup> (Newland and Cuesta, 2017: 14). In order to obtain a more accurate perspective of the evolution of the salaries, these authors sorted the working population in three different groups, and constructed a weighted average price index to minimize the possible bias in the altered Consumer Price Index, including the Rural Price Index that had not been manipulated up to then. It is worth pointing out that this average helped improve the relevance of the new index, considering that about one third of the population lived in rural areas.

Table 1.11 presents the performance of the real salaries from 1946 to 1955, sorting the economic activities in different groups, and considering how great the impact of inflation on the wages was. The first group includes sectors that were, initially, the beneficiaries of the economic policies; there were activities that had political or union significance, and those which belonged to strategic industries, such as metal and textile. The second group refers to private activities not included in the first one, such as construction workers, domestic employees and the rural workforce. Finally, the last group accounts for the public sector, i.e. teachers or employees from state-owned companies, such as the railroad company. Table 1.11 also includes the overall change in real salaries of the totality of the workers, considered as a whole.

---

<sup>12</sup> Translation of “[Era] natural que los funcionarios que elaboraban el índice tomaran los valores máximos autorizados y no aquellos de mercado”.

**Table 1.11. Salaries in Real Terms. 1946 = 100.**

	<b>Strategic Activities</b>	<b>Other Private Activities</b>	<b>Public Activities</b>	<b>All Sectors</b>
<b>1946</b>	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
<b>1947</b>	107.25	103.38	113.89	103.15
<b>1948</b>	134.68	119.91	110.73	120.04
<b>1949</b>	133.60	123.42	111.87	125.66
<b>1950</b>	123.41	111.20	93.29	112.69
<b>1951</b>	113.61	105.84	83.06	104.33
<b>1952</b>	105.01	106.62	81.13	100.72
<b>1953</b>	101.76	101.54	81.28	100.85
<b>1954</b>	114.87	113.71	84.17	111.52
<b>1955</b>	104.16	110.76	83.04	105.51
<b>Max. Increase (in %)</b>	34.68 (1946-1948)	23.42 (1946-1949)	13.89 (1946-1947)	25.66 (1946-1949)
<b>Decade's Change (in %)</b>	4.16	10.76	-16.96	5.51
<b>Change from Max level (in %)</b>	-22.66	-10.25	-27.09	-16.03

Source: Author's calculations based on Newland and Cuesta (2017).

Note: Newland and Cuesta (2017) used as deflator the weighted average of the Consumer Price Index (68%) and the Rural Price Index (32%). The weights take into account the proportion of urban and rural workers. The authors take the Consumer Price Index from the Dirección Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (1963) and the Rural Price Index from Vila, Antonio (1958) "Precios de Paridad para Productos Agrícolas en la Argentina"; Sociedad Rural Argentina.

Data shows that salaries, in real terms, improved for all groups during the first half of Perón's first mandate; nonetheless, there were some particularities. To begin with, it is striking how different the improvement of the real wages was, depending on the type of occupation. Note that the peak in the salaries for Public Activities occurred only a year after Perón obtained his first presidential victory, while for the other sectors, the maximum level was reached in 1948 and 1949. The decrease in the real value of the salaries is also worth mentioning. In fact, comparing the change in this decade, the public activity was the only category which experienced a decrease by almost 17%, when compared with the data from 1946, the year Perón won his first presidential election. Clearly, the public sector was paying for the unbalanced budget, having less purchasing power. Furthermore, when compared with the highest level reached during his presidencies, i.e. the one reached in 1947, the salaries decreased by over 27%. For the case of the Strategic Activities and the Other Privates Activities, real salaries experienced an increase by 34.68% from 1946 to 1948, and by 23.42% from 1946 and 1949. The difference in the performance of the salaries from the strategic

sectors and other private occupations could have been the result of the increase in the labor supply that came as a result of the massive migration from rural to metropolitan areas discussed above (Newland and Cuesta, 2017: 10). It is also worth noting how real salaries decreased during Perón's last year in power. In this respect, each of the reported activities reverted the positive tendency of the wages from the previous two to three years, leaving the real wages index for all sectors only a 5.51% higher than in 1946.

Another key economic and social policy that was put in motion during Perón's administration was the broadening of the social security system, as much as possible. The generalization of the pension program brought his administration two benefits; one of them was being perceived as the benefactor of neglected sectors, but, at the same time, this gave Perón the chance of using the stock of resources of the new pension scheme as an important source for financing the government expenditures in the absence of a capital market. The "fully funded" pension system that was generalized by the *peronist* administration had its origins in 1895, when a small fund was created to be used by the military forces. Later, in 1904, the public administration and a few other activities followed the example, thus creating their own pension fund. The internal rules of these type of pension schemes made retirement easy to reach, which in turn led to a critical financial condition by the 40s (Wallberg, 2007). The situation improved as the Farrell administration first, and later - and more substantially - Perón generalized the pension system by the inclusion of millions of workers, and by allowing the use of the surpluses of the sound pension funds to compensate for the deficit caused by those in financial trouble. However, the improvement of the financial conditions of the pension system was temporal, considering that the workers savings were used to buy government bonds that did not adjust to inflation. What is more, the government made the pension funds contribution of the public employees using those type of bonds instead of cash, accelerating the insolvency horizon. Eventually, more than half of the total pension resources were invested in government bonds and, because of that, the accumulated government debt rose to 47% of GDP (FIEL, 1998: 79). Moreover, the perception of having a system at a stable equilibrium was also jeopardized, when the ratio of active to retired workers fell drastically as years passed. By 1950, there were, on average, 11.2 active employees paying for each beneficiary, whereas by 1955 the ratio had dropped to 5.2, and by 1961 it rose to 3.1 (Carciofi, 1990: 106). Although the decrease of that ratio implied a long-term solvency problem for the

whole system, during Perón's presidencies, the result of the overall pension scheme was clearly positive. In fact, the surplus of the system in terms of the GDP ranged from 3.9% in 1950 to 2.6% in 1955 (Carciofi, 1990: 105).

Table 1.12 shows some revealing data, with regards to the pension system. First of all, the magnitude of the increase in the total amount of beneficiaries is quite striking; the number grew by almost 468% during Perón's two presidencies, exhibiting the highest growth rate in 1950, with over a 40% rise with respect to the previous year. Clearly, this new population of pension beneficiaries eventually caused the system to experience a financial crisis, considering that the number of active workers did not grow at the same pace. Consequently, the average earnings could not keep up with the inflation rate, resulting in a decrease of the pension benefits in real terms. In fact, on average, the real earnings of the pensions performed similarly as the real salaries of the public activities. During the ten years when Perón was in power, the monthly pension earnings increased by almost 373% in comparison with the 496% inflation rise during the same period of time, with the consequent loss of purchasing power.

**Table 1.12. Pension System Total Beneficiaries and Earnings.**

	Number of Beneficiaries		Pension Earnings		Inflation
	Total	Change with respect to previous year (in %)	Per month (in m\$ <sub>n</sub> )	Change with respect to previous year (in %)	(in %)
<b>1946</b>	92,506	4.4	211	1.9	17.0
<b>1947</b>	100,676	8.8	290	37.4	16.5
<b>1948</b>	114,398	13.6	526	81.4	13.6
<b>1949</b>	148,152	29.5	490	-6.8	29.0
<b>1950</b>	208,045	40.4	455	-7.1	28.2
<b>1951</b>	247,656	19.0	497	9.2	33.6
<b>1952</b>	285,047	15.1	603	21.3	37.8
<b>1953</b>	327,687	15.0	711	17.9	7.7
<b>1954</b>	419,538	28.0	812	14.2	3.5
<b>1955</b>	503,203	19.9	979	20.6	13.5
<b>Perón's 1<sup>st</sup> presidency</b>		<b>179.5</b>		<b>140.1</b>	<b>241.8</b>
<b>Perón's 2<sup>nd</sup> presidency</b>		<b>103.2</b>		<b>97.0</b>	<b>74.4</b>
<b>Decade</b>		<b>467.9</b>		<b>372.9</b>	<b>496.0</b>

Source: Author's calculation based on Ferreres (2005) and Newland and Cuesta (2017).

Notes:

- (1) Until 1948, Ferreres (2005) obtains the number of beneficiaries from Dirección General del Servicio Estadístico Nacional (1951), "Anuario Estadístico de la República Argentina 1958". For the year 1949, the author calculates the number based on the social security revenue from the Tax Collection Agency (AFIP). From 1950 onwards, data is extracted from Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. He calculates the Pension Earnings by dividing the total amounts paid by the number of beneficiaries.
- (2) The inflation rate extracted from Newland and Cuesta (2017) is the weighted average of the Consumer Price Index (68%) and the Rural Price Index (32%). The authors take the Consumer Price Index from the Dirección Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (1963) and the Rural Price Index from Vila, Antonio (1958) "Precios de Paridad para Productos Agrícolas en la Argentina"; Sociedad Rural Argentina.

Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the performance of the pensions in real terms was different depending on the year under consideration. It is true that there were some sub-periods where the increase in the monthly average earnings exceeded the inflation rate, as it is also true that, during the second and third years of Perón's first presidency, the real earnings had a strong increase. As can be seen in Table 1.12, in 1947, the rise of the average pension earnings was 37.4% when compared with 16.5% inflation and during 1948 the nominal change was 81.4% while the price index only experienced an increase of 13.6%. However, it cannot be denied that the overall result of the pension earnings during Perón's first presidential mandate was clearly negative (140.1% for the pensions and 241.8% for the inflation). Moreover, there were two years, i.e. 1949 and 1950, where the earnings even experienced a nominal decrease of around 7% with respect to the previous year. On the other

hand, during the last three years of Perón's second presidency, i.e. 1952 to 1955, pensioners experienced, on average, an increase of their earnings which exceeded the inflation rate leading to an overall positive shift in the period, with earnings rising by 97% and the inflation rates by 74.4%. Despite this apparent gain, the decade was clearly negative in terms of real pensions earnings which further emphasized the decrease in purchasing power that the real salaries of public workers suffered. Having said that, the consequent inconsistency problems become evident, and the idea that all real salaries and pensions multiplied during Perón's presidencies can be demystified.

## **1.6. Final Remarks**

Perón's economic policies were not uniform during his two presidencies. However, as a brilliant opportunist he was, he followed his intuitions, in an attempt to obtain as much support from voters as possible. As Secretary of Labor, the position he requested in 1944 prior to his electoral victory, Perón began to understand that he had to shift from a conservative standpoint to a more populist one, as he realized that, by using a more populist-aligned type of rhetoric, his general support began to boost. He had a few notions which drove his economic thinking to aim, mainly, at achieving social stability. Firstly, he aimed at full employment, so as to avoid social struggles similar to those after World War I; secondly, he aspired to increase salaries in real terms, as a way to avoid a crisis such as the one during the 30s; lastly, he intended to generalize the social security system as much as possible, in order to achieve social stability, which, in turn, would also give Perón the possibility of using the pension funds as an important source for financing the government.

The economic context in Argentina before the 1946 presidential election was characterized by an increase in economic autarky, an accumulation of commercial surpluses due to the positive terms of trade shock, after the increase in the global food demand and the pessimism regarding future world commerce, and an increase in the industrial production. It is also worth mentioning that the shift in the popular preferences which made the use of a nationalistic rhetoric to describe the economic events was an optimal strategy to obtain the support from an increasing constituency. Table 1.13 shows the selected indicators of the economic performance of the country during Perón's first decade as president. At first, the 3.9% average growth indicates an economic success; however, if we compare the country's

economic performance with the economic growth experienced by the USA, the decrease in the percentage of the weight of Argentina's economy becomes evident. Moreover, the relative size of the Argentine economy decreased when compared with other Latin American economies.

**Table 1.13. Selected Economic Indicators.**

	1946	1955	Average Annual Growth
<b>GDP</b> (1939=100)	144.2	196.0	3.9%
<b>GDP per cap</b> (1939=100)	107.1	120.0	1.8%
<b>GDP per cap Arg./GDP per cap USA</b> (in %)	53.7	50.8	-
<b>GDP per cap Lat. Am./GDP per cap Arg.</b> (in %)	42.4	49.1	-
<b>Inflation</b> (in %)	17.0	13.5	19.5%
<b>Salaries in Real Terms</b> (1949=100)	100.0	105.5	0.5%
<b>Public Salaries in Real Terms</b> (1949=100)	100.0	83.0	-1.8%
<b>Industrial Production</b> (1939=100)	189.4	266.4	4.7%
<b>Agricultural Production</b> (1939=100)	115.8	134.7	2.0%
<b>International Reserves/GDP</b> (in %)	21.0	3.7	-
<b>Terms of Trade</b> (1929=100)	135.9	90.3	-4.1%
<b>Openness</b> (Exports plus Imports as % GDP)	23.1	33.0	-
<b>Deficit/GDP</b> (in %)	4.1	3.8	-

Source: Author's calculations based on Ferreres (2005), Newland and Cuesta (2017), Techint (1981) and Díaz Alejandro (1981).

The decrease in the terms of trade implied an extra pressure on the whole economy, since the country could not adapt to the new international context. As a result, there was a reduction in the stock of international reserves, and an increase of protectionist policies in some sectors of the economy, which experienced a growth at a much more accelerated pace than the agricultural one, such as the industrial sector. This growth in the industrial activities reshaped the urban and rural areas of the country which had a profound impact on the electoral results.

The financing of the government's expenditures brought about one of the main macroeconomic problems, as the public deficit could not be balanced throughout the decade and, consequently, a long-term inflation process began, with the logical negative impact on key real variables. In this respect, the decrease in the real salaries of civil servants, state-owned companies' employees and pension beneficiaries intensified the risk of a drop in Perón's popularity. In other words, the bottlenecks found in Perón's economic program, sooner or later, were going to threaten his high level of popularity and his overwhelming electoral support. As will be discussed in the following chapters, the increase of his political power beyond the electoral triumphs, as a consequence of having conquered the other branches of the State, allowed him to maintain his leadership and control, even in front of the possibility of a decrease in popular support because of a potential economic turmoil. In fact, as stated by Cortés Conde, Perón conceived politics as the power of conducting instead of the art of the agreements (Cortés Conde, 2005: 143) which is a conception in line with the characteristics of a populist leader, as previously discussed in section 1.2 of this Chapter. In other words, it was essential for Perón to prevail over all the institutions that could oppose and balance his overwhelming power.



## Chapter 2

### Perón's First Victory: Social Issues and the Role of Economic Voting

*"Perón siempre supo aprovechar con habilidad las ocasiones propicias. Su gran sentido oportunista se reveló apenas puso los ojos sobre el cinturón fabril de que los años de guerra habían enlazado alrededor de Buenos Aires. A él no se le debe la industrialización, como creen algunos, porque ésta comenzó a expandirse durante el gobierno de Castillo. Tampoco fue el encargado de traer peones rurales a las fábricas. Lo único que hizo Perón fue capitalizar esa masa."<sup>13</sup>*

Arturo Jaureche

Founder of FORJA (Fuerza de Orientación Radical de la Joven Argentina). Interview, July 1966 in Gambini, Hugo (2007).  
"Historia del Peronismo. El Poder Total (1943-1951)"

#### 2.1 Introduction

The triumph of Juan Domingo Perón in the 1946 presidential election is still a topic of debate. Many speculations have been made to explain how he obtained the sufficient support to win the presidency. When considering the 1946 election, which saw the rise of the Peronist Party as the most victorious political force in Argentina, researchers have wondered which were the underlying motives which made voters support a candidate like Perón. To many, his victory came as a surprise, since the world was shifting away from totalitarian regimes, and since the main opposing parties participated in the electoral process as a united coalition (the *Unión Democrática*) under very competitive candidates (José Tamborini for president and Enrique Mosca for Vice President). To others, his electoral success was a reaction of the low-income population to previous conservative administrations, since the masses found in Perón a way to access goods and services, unavailable for them until then.

---

<sup>13</sup> "Perón always knew how to take advantage of favorable occasions. His great opportunistic sense was revealed as soon as he laid eyes on the factory belt that the war years had linked around Buenos Aires. He is not to be credited with industrialization, as some believe, because it began to expand during Castillo's administration. Nor was he in charge of bringing rural laborers to the factories. The only thing that Perón did was to capitalize that mass."

In fact, some of the best-known hypothesis regarding Perón's overwhelming electoral support link it to the socioeconomic conditions of the voters and groups of interest, and to how these expected to be beneficiaries if the new political force succeeded. For instance, Murmis and Portantiero (1971) have suggested that the issues of free-trade vs. protectionism, and the role of the country in the international markets brought about a clear division between those in favor of raising tariffs to support the manufacturing sector (the *Unión Industrial Argentina*) and those in favor of expanding the international integration, based on the country's comparative advantage regarding the production of primary goods, in particular, chilled meat (the *Sociedad Rural Argentina*). In this context, those who had a more industrialist view, and favored protectionist policies, would have preferred to vote for Perón instead of for his opponents of the *Unión Democrática*.

On the other hand, the active role that Perón had as Secretary of Labor before the 1946 election allowed him to create a complex network of fidelities with most of the union leaders and, as a result, he was able to obtain the workers' support, which became essential from the very beginning to the development of the Peronist Movement (see Chapter 1). However, the set of alliances that Perón established were more complex and should be carefully analyzed considering that the workers were not a homogeneous group. In fact, as Murmis and Portantiero have also proposed, there were two groups of industrial workers; the first of them composed by the old, more formally unionized blue-collar workers, and a second one integrated by the new industrial workers, usually internal migrants who had been recently incorporated to the manufacturing activity, with smaller levels of qualification, formality and participation, therefore having less decision power in the labor-unions (Murmis and Portantiero, 1971: 114). The interaction of these two types of blue-collar workers and their support for the new political movement has not been analyzed empirically so far.

More recently, a more original view to the analysis of how Perón came out victorious was put forward by Alston and Gallo (2010), who have claimed that Perón's ascent to the presidency was fueled by the electoral fraud carried out by the Conservative Party during the previous decade. Despite being appealing and original, one should be careful of their conclusive assertiveness of this argument. A skeptic could also hypothesize that, if the spurious electoral behavior of previous elections had had an effect whatsoever, it should have been the support for the opposition to Perón, rather than for Perón himself. In other words,

it should have given the *Unión Democrática* the extra impulse to beat Perón in the 1946 election, given that, in the 30s, the incumbent had perpetrated the fraudulent procedures against the UCR party, whose most representative members vigorously opposed Perón a decade later, making up one of the main opposing political parties.

Nevertheless, I believe that, if the fraud indeed had a positive impact on Perón's electoral support, it must be thought and contextualized as part of a more complex phenomenon, and, therefore, one should be quite cautious when explaining Perón's triumph in 1946 based on this hypothesis. In fact, an alternative view which could help explain the fraudulent events in the 1938 election is that conservatives saw their continuation in power at risk, in face of populist candidates. It is clear that with universal suffrage, public policies aiming at the redistribution of wealth would be most likely supported by the masses, especially in the case of urban voters. Consequently, one might speculate that if the fraud could have been avoided, candidates proposing policies similar to the ones which were carried out by Perón would have won earlier. Thus, it could be the case that the overwhelming support for Perón's in 1946 did not come as a reaction to the outrageous events that conspired against a fair election, but, instead, it was just a delay in the victory of short-term policies and protectionist measures. Hence, Perón's triumph is not the consequence of electoral fraud in the late 30s, but the result of his opportunistic strategy. Since he was able to perceive the change in the voter's preferences, he put forward a proposal taking into account their needs; what the fraud did was just to delay the ascent of populism.

Moreover, I speculate that the more classical view regarding the opportunistic policies engaged by Perón in his role as Secretary of Labor during the 1943-1946 administration is crucial to understand his electoral performance in the presidential election, regardless of the electoral events of the 1930's. In fact, as pointed out by Gerchunoff and Antúnez, the social base for Perón's victory in 1946 were the six million employed workers, but more specifically 1.5 million industrial blue-collars that had changed the urban structure of the country since the previous decades (Gerchunoff and Antúnez, 2002: 134). Perón was clever enough to make the accurate interpretation of those demographic changes, and was thus able to adopt public policies before the election that would favor the electorate that ultimately voted for him. As suggested by Lupu (2010) in connection with the case of Chavez in Venezuela, one should not underestimate the right use of the rhetoric and the personal

charisma, which are vital to obtain political success. By all means Perón, as a classical populist leader, made a full use of both, as was discussed in Chapter 1.

My contributions, aimed at corroborating the postulate vis-à-vis the complexity of the process beneath the 1946 Perón's electoral victory, are two. Firstly, in order to go beyond the interesting, but simplistic, assertion which explains Perón's ascent to power as a reaction to the 1930s fraudulent elections, I resorted to an exceptional data set, consisting of the electoral results of the fifteen electoral districts, as well as data extracted from the 1946 National Industrial Census, the 1947 National Agricultural Census and the 1947 National Population Census, all sorted by counties. Secondly, I study some of the key characteristics of the voters who supported Perón in his first run to the presidency. In order to do so, I rely on Ecological Inference techniques aimed at revealing on whom Perón relied the most, in his race to the presidency in 1946.

The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, I present some of the relevant arguments that will help posit the two relevant questions to focus on the debate regarding Perón's victory in 1946. In section 2.3, I present the data used to answer the hypothesis of the multi-factors behind Perón success. Section 2.4 displays the econometric results obtained from the estimation of the models, and it also shows a set of simulations of the electoral outcome under counterfactual scenarios regarding some of the relevant variables. Then, I present the outcomes achieved after performing King's Ecological Inference Methodology to infer the characteristics that the voters who supported Perón had. Finally, I made some closing remarks upon the scope of the results.

## **2.2 The Debate which Aims to Explain Perón's Victory**

Several studies on economic voting which started in the early 70's (Mueller, 1970; Goodhart and Bhansali, 1970 and Kramer, 1971) showed that economic conditions, rather than other issues, are key in trying to explain electoral success. The field of economic voting uses econometrics techniques to mix macroeconomic and political sciences' insights to understand the electoral processes and outcomes. The most important conclusion of this literature suggests that voters tend to reward the incumbent president for prosperity, and punish them in face of economic turmoil, regardless of whether they, for example, are engaged in corrupt

behavior, or insecurity is at its peak. In fact, ever since the early stages of the field, there has been a large body of studies highlighting that, although there might be different idiosyncratic factors which depend on the country under revision, the big two issues of economic voting that affect the voter's behavior are unemployment and inflation (Bartels, 1997; Nannestad and Paldam, 1997; Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000; Hodgson and Maloney, 2012). In an outstanding study that reviews some major democracies, Lewis-Beck (1998) shows how macroeconomics downturns are associated with political inconvenience and a fall in popular support. Furthermore, an important finding in the economic voting field is that voters react more to negative shocks than to positive ones, which creates an asymmetry in the behavior of the constituencies. This asymmetry adds up to the impossibility of voters to foresee the long-run effects of the policies, which makes them myopic agents.

The stylized facts obtained from the economic voting models have changed some of the strategies followed by many political forces, as they internalized the effects described in the economic voting literature. Having acknowledged the influence of economic voting on the final results of an election, the incumbent may be inclined to select a non-competitive candidate in election years when the country is struggling with recession, in an attempt to prevent the best candidates from an eventual, and most likely, defeat. However, behaving in such a way may cause the constituency to vote for the opposition, as they may find non-competitive candidates running for the incumbent (Jacobson, 1983). In this respect, it should be said that the undesired result of incumbent parties choosing non-competitive candidates in bad economic years may not be accounted for by the estimations of the typical time-series model at country level, which may lead to the wrong conclusion that a voter punishes the incumbent for the unsound economic variables instead of for the unfit candidates. One way to avoid the risk of making the wrong inference when basing the conclusions of the aggregate national data on the individual voter (i.e. the ecological fallacy), is to disaggregate the information to a smaller geographic unit of analysis (Lewis-Beck, 1998: 30).

Despite the fact that the acknowledgment of the effect on electoral results that the economic variables have is only a few decades old, the presence of economic voting in the electorate is not new. Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004) show data that confirms some of the hypothesis considered by the economic voting field for the case of the U.S. presidential elections starting in 1932, and Hodgson and Maloney (2012) studied how the British electorate

behaved in the elections from 1857 to 1914, and found that both, unemployment and price levels, had an impact on the outcomes. Therefore, the triumph of Perón may also be analyzed by considering the economic voting findings and, hence, we could speculate that his victory has also been influenced by the economic context in Argentina, during the years prior to the 1946 election, when he ran for the presidency as the incumbent's candidate. However, to make the debate even more interesting, I plan to answer two questions in this chapter, which will be useful when focusing the discussion on the above-mentioned aspects. The first question aims to discover the socio-economic reasons behind his victory. By answering this, it will be possible to identify whether the motives underlying the support for Perón were only related to economic voting, or whether other aspects played their part in Perón's first triumph. The second question is related with who voted for Perón, which were the characteristics of those who gave him their support. To answer this question, an ecological approach is taken, which based its analysis on information regarding geographic units such as provinces, counties or electoral circumscriptions, instead of electoral data of individual voters, basically due to the unavailability of data referring the personal decision on the vote. To clarify the difference between both inquiries, let us suppose a given rate of illiteracy which may have induced voters to support Perón, regardless of the literacy condition of the particular voter. On the one hand, a socio-economic analysis may lead us to infer that literate voters may have evaluated that it was unacceptable to support an incumbent who did not engage in policies that would lead the decrease of those illiterate rates. On the other hand, an ecological analysis will aim at unveiling the illiterates' behavior regarding the vote to find out whether they have voted for a particular candidate, in this case, Perón, more than the literates. Asking the right question is crucial in order to be able to fully grasp the electoral process in Argentina, and to recognize the underlying reasons which allowed Perón to successfully reach the presidency in 1946; at the same time, the right enquiry will also guide us to choose the right analytical tools.

Other studies have taken the ecological inference approach to characterize hegemonic leaders' ascent to power, which monopolized the political life of the nations, and have found key features in their voters, such as gender, income, age, and religion, as is the case of Kopstein and Wittenberg (2003) studying communist Poland, Lupu (2010) in an attempt to analyze Chavez in Venezuela, Blaydes (2011) for the case of Egypt, and De Broomhead (2014) reporting the elections in Germany during interwar years.

In the case of *peronism*, there has been some controversy in the past among scholars, regarding the characterization of Perón's voters. On the one side, there was a traditional view pointing out at the decisive support from the new blue-collar workers from big urban areas, which grew notably because of the internal migration. In fact, according to this view, *peronism* began as a class political movement, supported mainly by the industrial workforce and strongly opposed by the urban middle classes (business owners and white-collars), and it later evolved into a poli-classist political party (Snow, 1969; Germani, 1973; Cantón, 1973; Halperín Donghi, 1975). On the other side, the revisionist interpretation which intends to explain the features beneath Perón's voters, emphasizes the heterogeneity of the first peronist voters, while pointing out that Perón's political party began as a broad coalition that was potentially unstable and that later turned out to be a class movement (Smith, 1972; Smith, 1974; Kenworthy, 1975).

These discrepancies regarding who supported Perón in his climb to the presidency in 1946 should be understood taking into account that "*Peronism* has proved to be such a complex and elusive phenomenon that the rigorous insistence on a preconceived theory would have eliminated the possibility of discovering unsuspected relationships" (Smith, 1974: 170). Due to the complexity of the scenario, and because these studies did not make use of the state-of-the-arts methods when dealing with the Ecological Inference Problems, the results and the scope of the estimations were limited, with the exception of Lupu and Stokes (2009) who present an excellent survey of the social bases of the political parties in Argentina. Furthermore, these authors studied the class cleavage found in the political party system in Argentina from 1912 onwards, based on an ecological inference model. They have also acknowledged that, after Perón's victory in 1946, there was a change in the class cleavage of the political parties leaving the UCR as a middle and upper-middle class party, while the *peronists* became the political party of the workers and the less favored sectors. They have further estimated that, contrary to the generalized idea, Perón reached the presidency mostly because of the support from the literate sectors of society, while the illiterate population voted mostly for the *Unión Democrática* coalition. Put in numbers, they estimate that the probability of illiterates voting for Perón was of 37%, as compared with the 61% probability of them voting for the opposing candidates. On the other hand, the chances that the literates voted for the *Peronist* Party were greater than for the *Unión Democrática* (53% to 45%,

respectively). However, the difference these types of voters showed in the likelihood to vote for Perón was not big enough to conclude that in the 1946 election, *peronism* behaved as a class party.

These apparently surprising findings can be explained by considering a contribution made by Little, who speculated that a possible reason behind the support that Perón had from dissimilar groups, such as unionists, nationalists and opportunists, “was the mutual frustration that they had experienced under the *Concordancia*<sup>14</sup> regime” but, more important, “was the fact that they had derived considerable advantage from Perón’s *de facto* tenure of office between 1943 and 1945 and fear that were he not elected, then those policies which has expressly favored them would be reversed” (Little, 1973a: 645). Furthermore, the author has acknowledged that the triumph obtained by the opposition in many counties other than the capital city of Buenos Aires in the 1946 election can be attributed to a residual political loyalty, given the historical territorial control of the opposing parties, most notably the UCR. Moreover, it was not until after Perón took control of the presidency that his administration was able to use the public resources to colonize the rural electorate. In line with this argument, Smith (1972) suggested that, in rural areas, the influence of local party bosses (*caudillos*) helped the historically established UCR obtain more votes than Perón. In fact, as discussed in Chapter 1, Perón, as part of his populist strategy, allied with three different groups, the military sector, the growing industrial sector that favored from the import substitution policies and the increasingly recognized unions whose members were urban literate workers in comparison with the less educated rural peons.

A different argument which aims at explaining the 1946 victory was put forward by Smith (1969), who acknowledged the possibility that Perón’s rise to power could have been influenced by the lower classes’ acceptance of his economic policies, as a consequence of the memories of the *Concordancia*. As previously mentioned, Alston and Gallo (2010) focused on the events which took place during the previous decade to enlighten Perón’s triumph, by speculating that Perón’s victory came as a reaction to the fraudulent legislative election in 1938. In fact, they emphasized that it had influenced the behavior of voters during the 1946 presidential election in such a determinant way that, as a result, Perón came out victorious. However, this may come as a strong assumption, considering that the fraud was perpetrated

---

<sup>14</sup> Name of the coalition accused of fraud in the previous decade.



against a different political party, and it had taken place eight years before. Moreover, it may be too limited to say that the fraudulent events of the 30's alone can explain Perón's triumph, regardless of any other socio-economic variables indicating the presence of economic voting. One of my contributions in this respect will be showing that Perón's success was fueled by many factors, and that the reaction that voters may have had to the 1938 fraud, was, by no means, such a determining factor, eliminating the presence of economic voting.

## **2.3 Data**

To better understand the electoral process and the results of the 1946 presidential election, I present some descriptive statistics of the electorate.

Some interesting facts become evident in Table 2.1. Even though the percentage of the total votes which Perón obtained in the presidential race in 1946 rose to 53.8% as compared with his main opposition's 43.5% (i.e. the coalition *Unión Democrática*), out of the fifteen electoral districts, Perón won in 10 jurisdictions, which accounts for 67% of the total. On the other hand, changing the focus to the 364 counties, Perón succeeded in 194 of them, which represents 53% of the total, thus indicating that he did better in more populated areas. The jurisdiction with the highest support to his candidacy was the Province of Tucumán, coinciding with the fact that Perón won in the eleven counties in which the province was divided. At the other end, San Juan was the district with least support for Perón, accounting for just 34.5% of the total, and no victories in any of its 17 counties. It is also worth noting that the average population of the counties where Perón obtained most support was higher than those where the opposition succeeded, corroborating that voter's preferences in urban centers were in favor of Perón and that the voters who lived in rural areas were less prone to support him in 1946. This was the case in most provinces, with the exception of Mendoza where the average size of the population in the thirteen counties where Perón won the election was practically the same as the average population of all the provincial counties.

**Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics: Some Electoral Results.**

	Total Counties	N° of Counties won by Perón	Counties won by Perón (in %)	Total Provincial Population	Counties Avg. Population	Counties won by Perón Avg. Population	Votes for Perón (in %)
<b>Federal District</b>							
City of B.A.	20	10	50	1,445,382	72,269	99,478	53.8
<b>Province</b>							
Buenos Aires	112	61	54	2,250,850	20,097	28,591	56.3
Catamarca	15	10	67	71,682	4,779	5,721	57.6
Córdoba	25	7	28	760,520	30,421	51,844	44.9
Corrientes	24	3	13	260,367	10,849	19,496	37.1
Entre Ríos	14	8	57	397,614	28,401	34,144	49.6
Jujuy	15	14	93	88,540	5,903	6,249	68.7
La Rioja	18	12	67	54,628	3,035	3,128	53.2
Mendoza	17	13	76	302,036	17,767	17,732	53.2
Salta	22	16	73	151,286	6,877	7,591	64.1
San Juan	17	0	0	132,876	7,816	-	34.5
San Luis	8	2	25	82,530	10,316	15,714	46.7
Santa Fe	19	12	63	892,721	46,985	60,315	57.0
Sgo. del Estero	27	15	56	232,367	8,606	10,685	52.2
Tucumán	11	11	100	301,021	27,366	27,366	73.0
<b>All Electoral Districts</b>	<b>364</b>	<b>194</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>7,424,420</b>	<b>20,397</b>	<b>26,722</b>	<b>53.8</b>
Max.	112	61	100	2,250,850	72,269	99,478	73.0
Min.	8	0	0	54,628	3,035	3,128	34.5

Notes:

(1) The City of Buenos Aires is divided in 20 electoral sections.

(2) There are 2 counties, Ancasti (Catamarca) and Valle Grande (Jujuy) where Perón obtained exactly 50% and thus these are not considered as "Counties won by Perón".

Source: author based the analysis on the 1947 National Census and Electoral Data extracted from *Archivo General de la Nación*.

Regarding the places in which Perón found extreme support, Tables 2.2.A and 2.2.B list the name of the ten counties in which Perón was voted the most and the least among the 364 reported, respectively. Notably, nine out of the ten top counties belong to provinces located in the Northwest of Argentina (i.e. Jujuy, Tucumán and Salta), showing extreme voting support ranging from over 76% to more than 92% (see Table 2.2.A). On the other extreme, the bottom ten counties were concentrated in five provinces, most remarkably Corrientes and San Juan, and the support obtained by Perón in these cases went from 18% to less than 6% (See Table 2.2.B). The little support for Perón reported in the Province of San Juan is worth considering, since he had been a key player in the fundraising efforts to reconstruct the city of San Juan, which had been devastated after an earthquake in January 1944, while Perón was

Secretary of Labor. Bearing in mind that Perón used that tragic event to become more well-known in the country (Gambini, 2007a: 29), it is striking that it helped him become more respected in all provinces, but San Juan.

Additionally, both tables indicate the size of the counties reported, with respect to the average population of the 364 counties making up the fifteen electoral districts. On the one hand, with regards to the places in which Perón's candidacy was supported the most, four out of ten corresponded to counties above the nation's population average (see Table 2.2.A). On the other hand, the counties where he obtained the least support were poorly populated (see Table 2.2.B). These results are compatible with one of the conclusions at which Lupu and Stokes (2009) arrived, indicating that, in the 1946 election, voters from the urban centers were more prone to support Perón than those from rural areas.

**Table 2.2.A. Top 10 Counties which Voted for Perón in the 1946 Presidential Election.**

County	Province	% of Votes obtained by Perón	County Population	County's Pop. with respect to Tot. Avg. Pop.
Susques	Jujuy	92.4	689	Below
Cruz Alta	Tucumán	88.1	33,479	Above
San Antonio de los Cobres	Salta	86.7	2,972	Below
Famailá	Tucumán	85.5	28,863	Above
Humahuaca	Jujuy	85.1	5,746	Below
San Pedro	Jujuy	83.0	12,811	Below
Campo Santo	Salta	82.6	7,191	Below
Río Primero	Córdoba	81.5	22,753	Above
Río Chico	Tucumán	78.4	25,783	Above
Rosario de Lerma	Salta	76.4	6,131	Below

Source: author based the analysis on the 1947 National Census and Electoral Data extracted from *Archivo General de la Nación*.

**Table 2.2.B. Bottom 10 Counties which Voted for Perón in the 1946 Presidential Election.**

County	Province	% of Votes obtained by Perón	County Population	County's Pop. with respect to Tot. Avg. Pop.
Iglesia	San Juan	5.4	2,893	Below
Pila	Buenos Aires	11.0	2,182	Below
San Martín	La Rioja	12.7	1,969	Below
San Miguel	Corrientes	12.9	3,660	Below
Berón de Astrada	Corrientes	13.7	999	Below
Jachal	San Juan	16.1	8,537	Below
Calingasta	San Juan	16.5	3,777	Below
San Alberto	Córdoba	16.5	9,846	Below
Lavalle	Corrientes	17.3	12,680	Below
San Luis	Corrientes	18.0	8,494	Below

Source: author based the analysis on the 1947 National Census and Electoral Data extracted from *Archivo General de la Nación*.

To evaluate the electoral process which led Perón to his first victory in the polls, I constructed a data set which includes socio-economic and demographic indicators extracted from the 1947 National Population Census, the 1946 National Industrial Census, and the 1947 National Agricultural Census, sorted by counties. The variables selected were *Industrial Employment*, *Average Cattle* per county, *Renters*, *Illiterates*, *Unemployment*, *Wage*, and *Migrants*. Additionally, the variable *Fraud* was included, borrowed from Alston and Gallo (2010), which accounts for the difference in the share of votes that the *Unión Cívica Radical* Party (UCR) obtained, in the 1940 election (considered fair) and the 1938 election (considered fraudulent).<sup>15</sup> The number of observations for this variable adds up to just 233, since the 1940 election did not include some of the 364 counties which participated in the presidential election in 1946.

Considering that each of these indicators may have played an important role in influencing the 1946 electoral results, combining them in a data set could bring to light some revealing findings. To begin with, the variable *Industrial Employment* is included in an attempt to unveil how determinant it was the support Perón received from the industrial workers, since the economic policies that he conducted, which were aimed at substituting imports and protecting the industry during the Farrell's administration, had a profound impact on the relationship that Perón developed with the unions and the workers. As can be expected, the

<sup>15</sup> I thank Lee Alston and Andrés Gallo for generously sharing the data set from their research on the topic.

city of Buenos Aires was the jurisdiction with the highest industrial employment rate, accounting for almost 40% of all workers reported in that district (see Appendix 2.C).

Secondly, the *Average Cattle* variable accounts for the average number of cattle that each livestock farm had. It is generally accepted that cattle ranchers played an important role in influencing policymakers, and the mass opinion (Murmis and Portantiero, 1971). Furthermore, the *Renters* variable is also worth mentioning. Considering that the Farrell administration sustained a rent control policy, one should expect to find that the proportion of farms under some form of tenancy, may have had a positive impact on Perón's electoral triumph. In the province of Buenos Aires, for instance, more than half of the farms were under some sort of renting contract (see Appendix 2.C).

With regards to the *Illiteracy* variable, the rate of male illiteracy is included to verify the existence of a possible class cleavage vote.<sup>16</sup> As already discussed in this chapter, some authors (Smith, 1972; Smith, 1974; Kenworthy, 1975) emphasize the classist cleavage of the *Peronist* Party, considering that the lower strata of society was responsible for the impulse in the growth of the political movement. If this were the case, it should be expected that the illiterate would vote for Perón more than for the *Unión Democrática* coalition's candidate. In this regard, it is worth pointing out that the illiteracy average rate of 11.5% regarding all the jurisdictions which took part in the presidential election in 1946 ranged from a maximum of 26.2% in the province of Jujuy to a minimum of 4% in the city of Buenos Aires (see Appendix 2.C).

Next, it is worth saying that the *Unemployment* variable, although it is important to be included, it should be cautiously studied, considering the difficulty in its measurement in societies where the share of agrarian employment is significant and the proportion of informal workers is high, especially in rural areas, as it was the case in Argentina during the 40s. Moreover, there is no record of unemployment rates in Argentina, from the early 1920s to the mid-1960s. Thus, the data regarding this variable is based on information extracted from the 1947 Population Census, which reports the working situation of the inhabitants. By using the information regarding the proportion of occupied and unemployed males, I estimate the *Unemployment* Rate described. The importance of this indicator has been explained in the

---

<sup>16</sup> Lupus and Stokes (2009) use this variable to analyse the social basis of the political parties in Argentina in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Economic Voting literature as one of the most influential variables regarding a voter's behavior (Bartels, 1997; Nannestad and Paldam, 1997 and Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000). Put in numbers, the unemployment rate reported in 1920, last year in which this variable was measured, was 7.2%, considering the 15 electoral districts (Ferrerres, 2005: 465), and by 1947 it had dropped to 2.3% (see Appendix 2.C).

As regards the *Wage* variable, blue-collar worker's salaries were taken into consideration, in an attempt to study the influence of the policies followed by Perón, in the period that goes from 1943 to 1946. As discussed in Chapter 1, the evolution of real salaries took different paths, depending on the sector. Particularly, the policies put forward by the Farrell administration first, and by Perón later, mostly favored union workers, who acknowledged Perón's leadership, and those who were involved in the activities considered strategic, such as the metal and textile industries. Because of the increase in the blue-collar workers' real salaries, a positive electoral response to Perón's candidacy from these groups of workers should be expected.

Lastly, the *Migrants* variable accounts for the impact that internal migration - together with the consequent new social configuration - had on Perón's eventual triumph. To do so, I consider the data regarding the 1947 Population Census, which reports the number of people in each county who were born outside the province in which that county was located.

To sum up, Table 2.3 shows some descriptive statistics of the variables used to estimate the econometric models at county level.

**Table 2.3. Descriptive Statistics: Explanatory Variables.**

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Fraud (in %)	233	27.5	18.8	-29.5	74.0
Industrial Employment	353	2,828.7	7,759.9	0	71,593
Avg. Cattle	344	125.7	142.1	3.5	1,638.1
Renters (in %)	344	32.7	20.9	0	89.1
Illiterates (in %)	364	17.9	8.7	0.4	47.4
Unemployment (in %)	364	2.4	1.7	0	13.2
Avg. Wage (thousands of m\$n per year)	353	1.9	0.9	0.5	12.3
Migrants (in %)	364	14.2	9.1	1.4	46.2

Note: the difference in the number of observations between variables responds to the availability of the data.

Source: Alston and Gallo and author based their findings on data extracted from the 1947 National Population Census, the 1946 National Industrial Census and the 1947 National Agricultural Census.

It is worth pointing out that, despite the fact that there were 369 counties in the 15 electoral districts which took part in the 1946 presidential election, in order to make the electoral results compatible with the socioeconomic data extracted from the different National Censuses, the number of counties were reduced to 364 (see Table 2.1). In this respect, some remarks should be made. First of all, because the electoral data regarding the Antofagasta de la Sierra County in the Province of Catamarca was not available, this district is excluded from the data set. Secondly, with regards to the Province of San Luis, it is worth mentioning that the 1947 Population Census reported the data corresponding to City of San Luis and Capital City jointly, whereas the information regarding the electoral results in these two counties was reported separately. Hence, I had to sum up the results of the elections in both places, to make both sets of data compatible. Likewise, because in San Luis the population Census presents the information of Pedernera and Mercedes counties jointly, whereas the electoral data shows the results of the elections in these two counties separately, both voting results were added up. As regards the province of San Juan, similar changes had to be made. In order to make compatible the electoral results and the information extracted from the population Census, the data corresponding to the counties Capital, Concepción and Desamparados was added up, to match the Capital and Chimbas figures reported in the Census. It is worth noting that, in 1942, the counties Desamparados, Concepción and Trinidad were included in the Capital District, while Chimbas was part of the Capital County. Also regarding the province of San Juan, it should be noted that Rivadavia County in the electoral records accounts for the population of Rivadavia and Zonda reported in the Census, thus these two figures were added. With respect to the province of Córdoba, the electoral data and the population reported in the Census of Calamuchita and Tercero Arriba counties were added up, in order to make the data compatible with the records extracted from the Industrial Census. Also regarding this province, it is worth pointing out that the amount of livestock registered in the Livestock Census with respect to the county of General Belgrano have been excluded from the data set, since all other data used in the estimations does not include General Belgrano as a separated county. Finally, it must be mentioned that all data from the population Census corresponds to inhabitants older than fourteen, whereas the electoral data refers to people older than eighteen. In order to be able to make inferences regarding the characteristics of the electorate, I consider the rates reported in the Census applicable to the electoral population. For example, in the city of Buenos Aires, the illiteracy rate accounted for

4% of the total population older than fourteen, thus, with the purpose of estimating results, I assume that the illiteracy rate of the voting population in that jurisdiction also accounted for 4% of the voters, even though only people older than eighteen were considered.

## 2.4 Estimation Method and Results

To model a response variable expressed as a proportion, such as the fraction of votes favoring a particular candidate, the bounded nature of the response must be taken into account. Thus, with the intention of determining the factors that affected people's willingness to vote for Perón in the 1946 presidential election correctly, and to be sure that the response variables' values lie strictly within the unit interval, I made use of a Logistic Regression Model. Specifically, I estimated variations of the following empirical specification:

$$\begin{aligned} PeronShare_i = & S_0 + S_1 Fraud_i + S_2 IndEmploy_i + S_3 Cattle_i + S_4 Renters_i + S_5 Illiterates_i + \\ & + S_6 Unemployment_i + S_7 Wage_i + S_8 Migrants_i + S_9 IntMigIndEmploy_i + V_i \end{aligned}$$

Where:

- *PeronShare<sub>i</sub>* is the logarithmic transformation of the share of total votes obtained by Perón in each county *i* in the 1946 presidential election, which is constructed as the natural logarithm of the percentage of votes obtained by Perón, divided into one minus the percentage of votes obtained by Perón.
- *Fraud<sub>i</sub>* is the difference in the share of votes obtained by the *Unión Cívica Radical* party between the 1940 and the 1938 elections, in each county *i*.<sup>17</sup>
- *IndEmploy<sub>i</sub>* stands for Industrial Employment, which is defined as the natural logarithm of the industrial employees and workers in each county *i*.

---

<sup>17</sup> This variable is taken from Alston and Gallo (2010).



- *Cattle<sub>i</sub>* is a measure of density with regards to cattle production, and it is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the numbers of cows, divided into the number of cow farms, in each county *i*.
- *Renters<sub>i</sub>* is defined as the proportion of total farms that are rented in each county *i*.
- *Illiterate<sub>i</sub>* is defined as the proportion of total male population who were illiterate in each county *i*.
- *Unemployment<sub>i</sub>* is defined as the ratio of unemployed male-population to the sum of the occupied male-population and the unemployed male-population in each county *i*.<sup>18</sup>
- *Wage<sub>i</sub>* is the natural logarithm of the ratio of wages (thousands of m\$ per year) to the sum of employees and workers in each county *i*.
- *Migrants<sub>i</sub>* stands for Internal Migrants, which is defined as the ratio of the population born in a different province from the one in which they reside to the total population in each county *i*.
- *IntMigIndEmploy<sub>i</sub>* stand for Interaction between Internal Migration and Industrial Employment, which is defined as the product between the variables *Migrants* and *IndEmploy* in each county *i*.

The summary of the descriptive statistics of the variables described which were used to estimate the different configurations of the proposed logistic model are presented in Table 2.4. In addition, Appendix 2.A presents the cross-correlation matrix, and shows that there was not any strong correlation between the considered variables, thus indicating that the multivariate analysis is appropriate.

---

<sup>18</sup> This variable is elaborated with information available in the 1947 Population Census.

**Table 2.4. Descriptive Statistics: Model's Independent Variables.**

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Peron Share	364	-0.0075	0.6783	-2.8632	2.4979
Fraud	233	0.2753	0.1884	-0.2954	0.7404
Industrial Employment	253	6.0748	2.0461	0.0000	11.1787
Cattle	244	4.3328	1.0728	1.2652	7.4013
Renters	244	0.3273	0.2092	0.0000	0.8907
Illiterate	264	0.1787	0.0868	0.0042	0.4736
Unemployment	264	0.0236	0.0169	0.0000	0.1321
Wage	253	0.5731	0.3542	-0.6931	2.5065
Migrants	264	0.1422	0.0914	0.4619	0.4619

The empirical strategy that I have designed has three steps. Firstly, I replicate the Alston and Gallo (2010) model, by running a model specification identical to the one presented in their study, in order to confirm their estimations. Then, considering that I question the absence of variables in that specification, I modify the configuration of the model to include relevant social, economic and demographic variables not considered so far, in order to arrive at more accurate results and eliminate the bias toward a limited explanation of Perón's triumph. Finally, I perform a series of simulations of the electoral outcomes under contrafactual scenarios regarding some of the main variables in question, to analyze how likely it would have been that Perón had won the 1946 election given a different situation.

Table 2.5 sums up the outcomes of the different versions of the proposed logistic regression model.

**Table 2.5. Model Estimations**  
Dependent Variable: *PeronShare*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Fraud	1.195*** (0.197)	0.943*** (0.188)		
Industrial Employment	0.129*** (0.023)	0.083*** (0.025)	0.005 (0.023)	0.069* (0.031)
Cattle	-0.198*** (0.034)	-0.136*** (0.032)	-0.180*** (0.038)	-0.199*** (0.038)
Renters	0.173 (0.1993)	0.094 (0.205)	0.548*** (0.187)	0.599*** (0.185)
Illiterate		0.368 (0.585)	-0.517 (0.477)	-0.581 (0.479)
Unemployment		7.093*** (2.034)	7.488*** (2.112)	7.232*** (2.179)
Wage		0.318** (0.137)	0.337*** (0.122)	0.348*** (0.121)
Migrants		1.904*** (0.417)	2.374*** (0.378)	5.715*** (1.262)
Interac. Migrants & Industrial employment				-0.510*** (0.188)
Constant	-0.345 (0.244)	-0.910** (0.322)	-0.029 (0.258)	-0.362 (0.180)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.355	0.443	0.295	0.311
F-Test	30.29	21.12	16.83	19.10
Probability (F)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N° Observations	232	232	333	333

Note: The model has been corrected for heteroscedasticity using robust standard errors.

Standard errors in parenthesis; \*\*\* 1% confidence interval; \*\* 5 % confidence interval and \* 10% confidence interval.

Model 1 reports the estimated coefficients of Alston and Gallo's model (2010). As expected, the results I obtained were very similar to theirs. In line with this, the triumph of Perón in the presidential election of 1946 can be explained by referring to three highly significant parameters: *Fraud*, *Industrial Employment* and *Cattle*, the latter exhibiting a negative sign, as was expected. The only difference between the results obtained by Alston and Gallo (2010) and the ones I got is that the parameter associated with the variable *Renters* is not statistically significant.<sup>19</sup> It is worth noting that the number of observations adds up to 232, since the variable *Fraud* is the result of comparing the outcomes of the elections in 1938 to the ones in 1940, bearing in mind that, by 1940, the electorate had enlarged, including

<sup>19</sup> It has been difficult to explain the reason behind this difference. The variable *Renters* that I considered in this chapter was not provided by Alston and Gallo, but it has been generated by typing the information from the original publication of the census. I have checked many times the quality of the data without finding any reason for the discrepancy.

jurisdictions which had not taken part in the elections so far. It is also worth mentioning that the 1940 election is generally termed fair, whereas the 1938 electoral process is acknowledged as a fraudulent one.

In order to make the model more valuable, the same sample of 232 counties was used, but, in an attempt to describe the more complex context which affected the electoral results, a set of economic, social and demographic variables were incorporated, (Model 2). The underlying implication of this model specification is that *Unemployment*, *Migration* and *Cattle* appear to be relevant variables at a level of 1% significance, and *Wage* at the level of 5% significance. Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that the variable *Wage* ought to be contextualized and cautiously considered, since what this variable may be capturing is an industrialization effect. What is more, since a positive relation between the level of salaries and the degree of industrialization has been acknowledged, it is only reasonable to obtain a significant and positive link between Perón's performance in the election and the *Wage* variable.

On the other hand, the variable *Renters* remains non-significant, as well as the variable *Illiterate*, included for the first time in this model configuration. Note that the absolute value of the four coefficients of the variables is smaller than the magnitudes included in the previous model specification. Relative to Model 1, the explanatory power of Model 2 increases significantly, as the  $R^2$  rises from 0.35 to 0.44.

Despite the fact that, by increasing the number of counties from 232 to 333 I improved the estimations, the variable *Fraud* needed to be excluded, since the availability of this variable was limited to the 232 counties. The reports of these estimates can be seen in the Table 2.5. The results show that *Industrial Employment* was no longer a significant variable, as was the case with the *Illiterate* variable, which continued to be non-significant. All other five variables included in this model were significant, at a level of 1% with the expected signs. It is worth noting, though, that the  $R^2$  for this model decreased with respect to the two prior configurations, which included the variable *Fraud*.

In the last model set up (i.e. Model 4) I included an interaction variable between *Industrial Employment* and *Migration*, in an attempt to capture how non-locals influenced the industrial labor market. This variable is crucial when trying to understand the coupled effect that internal migration brought about, because of the growth of the industrial sector in the

main conglomerates, most notably the city of Buenos Aires and its metropolitan area. This new explanatory variable is significant at the level of 1% with negative sign, meaning that, in those counties which exhibited a significant share of blue-collar workers, and which had experienced internal migration processes, the support for Perón tended to go down. In other words, the increment in the numbers of votes for the *Peronist* Party due to an increase in the internal migrants was reduced in counties which exhibited a larger proportion of industrial employment. Yet, it is worth noting that since the maximum value that the variable *Industrial Employment* reached was 11.18 (see Table 2.4), all counties experienced a net positive effect. In fact, only in the case when this maximum value appears, the change in the vote due to the change in the *Migrants* variable is close to zero.<sup>20 21</sup> A possible explanation for this - *a priori* - unexpected result, could be that, in areas with old industries and a large blue-collar population, voters, feeling their jobs jeopardized in face of the new-comers, may have reacted negatively to new migrants and to those policies which brought about the migration from rural areas to the urbanized centers. Furthermore, this new configuration improves the estimates of the whole model. The *Industrial Employment* variable improves its significance when compared with the previous model set up, at a level of 10%. With the exception of the *Illiterate* variable, which remains non-significant as in the other configurations, all the remaining variables included are significant at the level of 1% with the expected signs. The  $R^2$  also improves in comparison to the result obtained from Model 3.

The results of the Models 2,3 and 4 suggest that both explanations, the negative reaction in the behavior of the constituency because of the electoral fraud, and the impact of socio-economic conditions, had a significant impact on the outcomes of the 1946 presidential election and, therefore, the variables included to reflect them are relevant to understand the voters' preferences.

In order to spark off the debate regarding the relative relevance that each of the variables had, vis-à-vis the final outcome of the 1946 election, I performed a set of simulations of the electoral results, under counterfactual contexts, considering some of the variables proposed. In order to be able to speculate whether *Fraud* was more or less significant than other economic and demographic indicators, I define a limited set of relevant variables, i.e.

---

<sup>20</sup> In fact, the first derivative of the variable *PeronShare* with respect to the variable *Migrants*, for the case of the maximum value taken by *Industrial Employment* is  $5.715 - (0.510 * 11.1787) = 0.014$ .

<sup>21</sup> I thank Esteban Nicolini for bringing it up.

*Fraud*, *Unemployment*, and *Migrants*. The counterfactuals are constructed under different scenarios, simply by changing the values of some of the independent variables and using the values of the parameters estimated in the regressions, to obtain a simulated fitted value of the dependent variable. The method used consists of four steps. First of all, I take the parameters obtained in the regression of Model 2, which is the most comprehensive configuration since it includes the variable *Fraud*. Secondly, I constructed a simulated version of the relevant variables, by calculating the 50% and 75% of the parameters from Model 2.<sup>22</sup> Thirdly, I obtained the fitted value of the *PeronShare* for each of the counties, using the simulated variable instead of the original ones. Finally, I calculated the total amount of votes Perón obtained under the simulated scenarios. It is important to emphasize that the simulation can only be performed in the 232 counties for which the information on *Fraud* is available.

Table 2.6 presents the results of these simulations, for the total votes which showed support for Perón in the 232 counties for which the variable *Fraud* was available, under four alternative scenarios. The *PeronTotal* figure indicates the actual value of total votes obtained by Perón.<sup>23</sup> Simulation 1 shows the potential number of votes which may have been obtained by Perón, by adjusting the variable *Fraud*. Simulation 2 and Simulation 3 display the number of votes that Perón might have obtained, by adjusting the variables *Unemployment* and *Migration*, respectively. Lastly, Simulation 4 refers to Perón's possible electoral result, by adjusting both variables simultaneously (i.e. the *Unemployment* and *Migration* variables). The second column of the table indicates the hypothetical outcomes, when adjusting the variables to 50% of their original level. In other words, a speculation is made of the possible electoral results by hypothesizing that *Fraud*, *Unemployment*, or *Migration* had been half of what they actually were. Similarly, the forth column displays the possible outcomes reached, had the variables showed rates accounting for 75% of their original level.

---

<sup>22</sup> For instance, the simulated *Fraud* at 50% is a new variable  $Fraud50 = 0.5 * Fraud$

<sup>23</sup> Remembering that the variable *PeronShare* is the logit transformation of the number of votes, the value of *PeronTotal* is the inverse of the logit transformation of *PeronShare*. The values obtained from the different Simulations were calculated in a similar way.

**Table 2.6. Simulations.**Dependent Variable: *PeronShare*

	Variables at 50%	Change in votes	Change %	Variables at 75%	Change in votes	Change %
<b><i>PeronTotal</i></b>	<b>1,006,518</b>			<b>1,006,518</b>		
Simulation 1	954,208	-52,310	<b>-5.2</b>	979,729	-26,789	<b>-2.7</b>
Simulation 2	967,673	-38,845	<b>-3.9</b>	986,376	-20,142	<b>-2.0</b>
Simulation 3	934,394	-72,124	<b>-7.2</b>	969,968	-36,550	<b>-3.6</b>
Simulation 4	896,529	-109,989	<b>-10.9</b>	951,174	-55,344	<b>-5.5</b>

The results suggest that diminishing *Fraud* by 50% would have reduced the support for Perón by 5.2%, while the reduction in his votes estimated by dividing *Unemployment* or *Migrants* rates by half would have dropped by 3.9% and 7.2% respectively. Moreover, if both *Unemployment* and *Migrants* variables are modified, then the votes to Perón would have fallen by 10.9%. So, at first sight, social conditions related with a key economic voting variable, as well as being an important demographic indicator, have explanatory power- at least to the point of the more political explanation, related with the fraudulent electoral processes of the 30s. A similar pattern can be studied under a reduction of the independent variables by 25%, though the percentage of the support that Perón might have obtained diminishes, as expected.

Thus, considering only the counties where the variable *Fraud* was constructed, the difference between Perón and the opposing coalition was of 196,421 votes, the counterfactuals indicate that, had any of the hypothetical situations speculated in the four simulations been real, Perón would have still succeeded in winning the election in 1946. Furthermore, my hypothesis is that the fraudulent events in the 1938 election played a less important role than the migration effect, and the interaction between the migration and unemployment effects. Moreover, it is worth noting that, as in all contrafactual simulations, the results are only indicative. In the case presented in this section, I am supposing, for simplicity, that if the contrafactual scenario had been the case, the new values of the variables would have affected only the behavior of Perón's voters, leaving the preferences of the *Unión Democrática's* supporters unchanged. The implied assumption in the simulations is that the voters who might have decided to switch preferences and favor the opposing coalition, are

only those who had initially voted for Perón. In addition, what this assumption does is to reinforce the conclusion that Perón would have succeeded, even given a different scenario. To conclude, it is worth mentioning that the success that Perón experienced in his first presidential election had multiple reasons, and, hence, a deeper and broader perspective, as the one I presented, has to be considered to better understand the political process that led him to the presidency.

## **2.5 The Features of Perón's Voters**

Up to this point, I have discussed the predominant reasons underneath Perón's triumph in 1946. I proposed a model which evaluated the relevant socio, demographic, political and economic indicators which gave Perón his first presidential victory. However, these estimations fell short of identifying the essential characteristics that the voters who supported Perón in his first presidential election had.

As previously mentioned in this chapter, in order to characterize Perón's voters, an ecological approach will allow us to estimate the main features of his constituency. Throughout the years, different studies have made speculations with regards to the different features that the first *peronists* had; for example, that migrants were more likely to support Perón (Smith, 1972) as well as voters from urban areas (Smith, 1969; Little, 1973b), industrial workers (Murmis and Portantiero, 1971; Smith, 1972; Gerchunoff and Antunez, 2002) and literates (Lupu and Stoke, 2009). Smith (1972) held that Perón found greater support in the more industrialized urban centers, mainly those which exhibited a significant rate of internal migration, and which were characterized by a substantial proportion of illiterates. The key for Perón's success in the 1946 election was to rely more on the urban sectors, notwithstanding the fact that the opposition found a stronger support in rural areas. However, as explained in Section 2.2 of this Chapter, none of them based their conclusions on ecological inference models in their attempt to better characterize Perón's first voters, with the exception of Lupu and Stoke (2009). Still, the aim of Lupu and Stoke's study was to determine the class cleavage of the party system in Argentina, and not to describe the underlying characteristics of Perón's supporters.



In order to minimize the degree of speculation regarding the characterization of *peronist* voters, I believe it is essential to use an Ecological Inference Model. This model aims at inferring the characteristics of an individual, by extracting information from aggregate data which describes the behavior of the whole population, which basically means being able to capture the relevant features of those who voted for Perón by extracting data from aggregate sources.

I used King's solution to the ecological inference problem to obtain valuable results which will help us better understand the electoral process in Argentina in 1946 (see Appendix 2.B for a more detailed discussion on King's methodology). Since the method does not allow for the use of control variables, the best option is to analyze the data for specific subgroups, such as the ones presented in this Chapter. I chose four different aggregate indicators extracted from the 1947 National Population Census to recreate key Perón voter's characteristics. These are *Literacy Rate*, *Migrant Rate*, *Urban Rate* and *Type of Occupation* (Appendix 2.C presents descriptive statistical in relation to these measures).

The estimations regarding King's model are presented in Table 2.7. The *Resamp* value indicates the number of sampling iterations required to produce valid estimates of the quantities of interest. It is worth noting that, since the Ecological Inference Model is not a multivariate analysis, all possible cross effects should be carefully considered.

**Table 2.7. King's Ecological Inference Results.**  
**Percentage of Votes Supporting Perón in the 1946 Presidential Election.**

	<i>Literacy Rate</i>		<i>Migrant Rate</i>		<i>Living Area</i>		<i>Type of Occupation</i>	
	<i>Illiterate</i>	<i>Literate</i>	<i>Migrants</i>	<i>Non-Migrants</i>	<i>Urban</i>	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Industrial Employment</i>	<i>Rest</i>
<b>Argentina</b>	50.9 (0.0495)	54.2 (0.0068)	75.3 (0.0289)	46.7 (0.0095)	57.6 (0.0068)	48.4 (0.0077)	66.7 (0.0290)	50.7 (0.0071)
<b>Resamp</b>	21		32		17		21	
<b>N</b>	364		364		364		364	


Note: Model Standard Errors are shown between parenthesis.

The results obtained show interesting facts, which unveil the peculiarities of Perón's main voters. First of all, in line with Lupu and Stokes (2009), I concluded that, contrary to common wisdom, *Literates* voted for Perón proportionally more than *Illiterates* (54.2% and


50.9% respectively). Secondly, the estimates confirm that migrants were key players, considering that three out of four migrants voted for him, when compared to the support he obtained from non-migrants, which rose to 46.7%. Furthermore, the massive support that Perón experienced from those internal migrants was consistent with the policies followed by Perón during the Farrell administration, which were autarkic in nature. These policies protected the national industrial sector, thus resulting in the country's accelerated population growth regarding the major cities' metropolitan areas, where it was less costly to provide public goods than in the countryside. Thirdly, the outcomes show that urban voters also played an important role in his electoral success, since they were more inclined to support Perón than voters from rural areas (57.6% and 48.4% respectively). These results are in line with the strong partisan structure that the opposition maintained in rural areas, during the 1946 election. Because of this territorial control, voters were more reluctant to change their preferences and Perón had to wait until his second period to exert control over the rural areas, which historically supported the UCR party. Lastly, it should be mentioned that two out of three blue-collar workers voted for Perón, whereas only half of other type of workers supported the *Peronist* Party. Clearly, Perón's strategy of making alliances with key unions in his role of Secretary of Labor, before the 1946 election, played a crucial role, considering that he obtained the majority of the votes from that social group.

Plotting ecological inference's results are also useful to interpret the outcomes of these estimations. Figures 2.1 to 2.4, known as a *Scatterplot Graphs*, show estimates based on the ecological inference methodology, by plotting the proportion of Perón's Supporters (T) by the illiterate rate (Figure 2.1), by the migrants rate (Figure 2.2), by the urban rate (Figure 2.3) and by the industrial workers rate (Figure 2.4), in each county, which are represented by (X) in each of the graphs. The size of the circles around each point is relative to the population of each observation. The graphs also show the likelihood estimates gotten from depicting the expected proportion of voters supporting Perón (T), given the explanatory variable (X), represented by the yellow line. The red lines in the graphs show the 80% confidence interval around the regression line.


**Figure 2.1. Electorate Literacy Rate**



**Figure 2.2. Electorate Migrant Rate**



**Figure 2.3. Electorate Urban Rate**



**Figure 2.4. Electorate Industrial Employment Rate**




Figure 2.1 suggests that the change in the preferences of Perón's voters ( $T$ ) is not sharp, as the illiterate-voters share increases ( $X$ ). Figure 2.2 shows that the number of voters supporting Perón ( $T$ ) increases, as the internal migrant's rate goes up. Regarding the Urban Rate, Figure 2.3 reveals that, as the proportion of the electorate living in urban areas ( $X$ ) increases, the percentage of Perón's supporters also increases - not drastically, though. Finally, with respect to the behavior of industrial workers, Figure 2.4 shows that the higher proportion of industrial laborers, the higher the support for Perón. It can also be appreciated

in the four *Scatterplot* graphs that most of the county's estimates are located between the 80% confidence interval around the regression line.

## 2.6 Final Remarks

The reductionism which aims at narrowing down Perón's ascent to the presidency to a simple cause, despite appealing, leaves aside a more intricate and complex scenario which ought to be considered to better understand the multidimensional nature of the political preferences of the voters in the 1946 presidential election in Argentina. It has been shown that Alston and Gallo (2010) may have been partially right when pointing out that the electorate reacted to the fraudulent event negatively, considering those groups who were held responsible for pursuing fraudulent policies in the past. However, their findings are limited when it comes to explaining the reasons why Perón was able to reach the presidency. Particularly, they left aside some of the crucial questions of economic voting and the whole literature that aims to understand the complexity of an electoral process. Analogously, the idea leading to explain Perón's ascent to power as a class cleavage phenomenon is also limited and biased. In this respect I showed that the 1946 presidential election in Argentina was influenced by economic, social and demographic variables, which had been notably absent in previous studies. Hence, these indicators must be taken into account in order to have a broader understanding of the reasons which led to the ascent of *peronism*. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that the influence of social factors, as well as the presence of economic voting, greatly influenced the ascent to power of one of the most controversial leaders in the history of Argentina.

In fact, the results of the models analyzed throughout this Chapter have shown the complexity beneath the electoral process when trying to pinpoint the *how* and the *why* of Perón's first presidential triumph. In this regard, none of the individual reasons by themselves seem to be powerful enough to have been able to change the outcomes of the election, as it was shown by means of the counterfactual exercise. It has been revealed that counties with higher unemployment rates and higher shares of internal migration voted for Perón more, considering that the *Unemployment* and *Migrants* variables are robust and quantitatively important. Additionally, even though other parameters considered were less relevant, the estimations are also robust and, thus, their inclusion becomes crucial when trying to

understand Perón's victory. Particularly, the estimations suggest that in those counties where the wages were higher, the support for Perón was more noteworthy. It is also worth pointing out that although in rural areas voters supported more the opposing coalition, not all of them behaved evenly, considering the greater support that Perón experienced in rural zones where there was a large proportion of rented farms. On the other hand, Perón's opposing coalition obtained better electoral results in counties with higher density of cattle, as well as in those areas with high interaction between blue-collar workers and internal migrants, which may indicate that the newcomers may have experienced some level of discrimination from the established workers.

The other relevant question that I tried to answer in this Chapter deals with who supported Perón's candidacy the most. In this regard, I was able to determine the most substantial characteristics of Perón's first voters. Basing the analysis on King's Ecological Inference Model, it was possible to obtain valuable insights into understanding the main characteristics of Perón's supporters, thus confirming some untested hypothesis, and rejecting others. In particular, I came to the conclusion that urban voters were more influenced by Perón's rhetoric and, hence, voted for him more massively than rural voters. In the same way, industrial workers and literates aligned more with Perón, as well as internal migrants who, according to the estimation results, were key participants regarding Perón's first presidential triumph.

A thorough analysis of the characteristics of Perón's constituency reveals how his populist policies were strategically and opportunistically conducted to gain more votes and, consequently, obtain the presidency.

## Appendix 2.A: Correlation Matrix

	<i>PeronShare</i>	<i>Fraud</i>	<i>IndEmploy</i>	<i>Cattle</i>	<i>Renters</i>	<i>Illiterate</i>	<i>Unemploy</i>	<i>Wage</i>	<i>Migrants</i>
<i>PeronShare</i>	1.0000								
<i>Fraud</i>	0.3343	1.0000							
<i>IndEmploy</i>	0.4260	0.0295	1.0000						
<i>Cattle</i>	-0.3272	0.1299	-0.2919	1.0000					
<i>Renters</i>	0.0744	0.3072	0.0851	0.3718	1.0000				
<i>Illiterate</i>	-0.2449	-0.2175	-0.4471	-0.0428	-0.5015	1.0000			
<i>Unemploy</i>	0.2005	0.0819	0.0006	-0.0957	0.0276	0.0904	1.0000		
<i>Wage</i>	0.4029	0.2156	0.3554	-0.2744	0.0289	-0.3707	-0.0124	1.0000	
<i>Migrants</i>	0.4360	0.1362	0.4581	-0.1894	0.1416	-0.3697	-0.0807	0.3014	1.0000

## Appendix 2.B: The Ecological Inference Methodology

To obtain the estimations that may answer these questions, I used the solution to the ecological inference problem proposed by King (1997) which aims at making inferences regarding the attributes of an individual extracted from aggregate behavior. As acknowledged by Blaydes (2011), some scholars have found this methodology controversial, with Cho and Gaines (2004) being a good example. Nevertheless, as stated by King et al. (2004), despite the fact that the uncertainties and the information lost in aggregation make ecological inference one of the most difficult areas of statistical inference, this approach is required in many academic fields.

The formal statement of the ecological inference problem is presented in Table B.1, where the two classes of voters, A and B, have to decide between two political parties, 1 and 2. The entries in the table correspond to the number of voters ( $N$ ), and the superscripts represent the position of the rows and columns, respectively. For instance,  $N_i^{A1}$  refers to the number of people of *Class A* who voted for *Party 1* in district  $i$ . The aggregate data is the only known information, and, since it is normally presented in the margins of the tables, it is referred to as marginal, while the inner cells are the unknowns to be estimated.

**Table B.1. The Ecological Inference Problem.**

Voting Decision			
	Party 1	Party 2	
Class A	$N_i^{A1}$	$N_i^{A2}$	$N_i^A$
Class B	$N_i^{B1}$	$N_i^{B2}$	$N_i^B$
	$N_i^1$	$N_i^2$	$N_i$

Another way to address the problem, which is how King's model deals with the estimations, indicates the counts as proportions, as shown in Table B.2.

**Table B.2. The Ecological Inference Problem.**

		Voting Decision	
		Party 1	Party 2
Class A	$s_i^A$	$1 - s_i^A$	$X_i$
Class B	$s_i^B$	$1 - s_i^B$	$1 - X_i$
		$T_i$	$1 - T_i$

The quantities of interest to be estimated are  $s_i^A$ , which is the fraction of *Class A* who voted for *Party 1* in district  $i$  and  $s_i^B$ , which stands for the fraction of *Class B* voting for *Party 1* in district  $i$ . Analogously,  $(1 - s_i^A)$  stands for the fraction of *Class A* who voted for *Party 2* in district  $i$  and  $(1 - s_i^B)$  accounts for the fraction of *Class B* voting for *Party 2* in district  $i$ . These estimations are calculated from the known aggregate data,  $X_i$  and  $T_i$ .

The first attempt to tackle the ecological inference problem was using a deterministic approach which was developed by Duncan and Davis (1953). However, the results were very limited. The method used the information extracted from the marginals to establish upper and lower bounds on the individual data. The idea behind the concept of the bounds can be explained with the following example: if in a particular province, say Buenos Aires, it is known that the *Peronist* Party obtained 451 thousands votes, and that, in the same district, the illiterate voters sum up to ninety-two thousand, then it can be concluded, beyond shadow of a doubt, that all illiterates voting for Perón range between 0 and ninety-two thousand. Even though the estimations may be more precise, in this case, as in many other examples, the bounds are too distant from each other to make valid inferences about the population in question.

A later effort to cope with the rather inaccurate estimations gotten from the use of the ecological inference methodology was using a statistical approach, and it was first proposed by Goodman (1953;1959). This method is based on establishing a correlation between the observed aggregate proportions, to infer the missing information. As explained by King et al. (1999), Goodman's regression examines the variation in the marginals ( $X_i$  and  $T_i$ ) over districts, to attempt to reason back to country wide fractions of *Class A* and *Class B* who Vote for *Party 1* (the average over  $i$  of  $s_i^A$  and  $s_i^B$  weighted by the number of *Class A* and *Class*



$B$  per district, respectively). However, this statistical approach encompasses a potential problem, known as the Ecological Fallacy, given that the assumptions are wrong. For instance, if the total number of people voting for *Party 1* ( $T_i$ ) is small while the number of people comprising *Class A* ( $X_i$ ) is big, one could infer that *Class A* voters may support *Party 1* less frequently than *Class B* voters; however, it can also be true that *Class B* voters, living in a mostly *Class A* districts, are those who vote for *Party 1* less frequently, leading the opposite ecological inference to the individual level truth. (King et al. 1999: 64).

King (1997) notably improved the ecological inference methodology by developing a way to combine these two previous attempts to do it into a single statistical method, which makes the inferences from the aggregate data more precise. As stated by Leemann and Leimgruber (2009), this was the first Bayesian approach to Ecological Inference. King's method combines the deterministic approach (used in previous attempts to estimate individual behavior from aggregate data) and the statistical method (used in Goodman's model of Ecological Inference). As pointed out by De Broomhead, "King's ecological inference method uses the deterministic information to limit the sample space and then employs regression techniques to extract the required information from within these bounds" (De Broomhead, 2014: 14). Nonetheless, as stated by King and Robert "because the ecological inference problem is caused by the lack of individual-level information, no method of ecological inference, [...], will always produce accurate results" (King and Robert, 2012: 2).

The first step in King's method is specifying the deterministic bounds which will limit the sample space, so that the range of possible values that each unknown proportion can take in each district becomes evident. Thus, the method consists in solving the following equation system:

$$T_i = X_i\beta_i^A + (1 - X_i)\beta_i^B \quad (1)$$

$$\beta_i^B = \left( \frac{T_i}{1-X_i} \right) - \left( \frac{X_i}{1-X_i} \right) \beta_i^A \quad (2)$$

Equation (1) represents Goodman's accounting identity, and it is used to obtain each of the unknown values in terms of equation (2).

This first part of the estimations of King's methodology limits, without making any assumptions, the values that the proportions of interest can take.

The second step in King's method requires a statistical approach, which makes three assumptions:

- a) The proportions of interest, namely the proportion of citizens from each Class voting for each Party in each District, follow a truncated bivariate normal density function.
- b) There should not be any autocorrelation in order to construct the likelihood function. Nevertheless, as explained by King et al. (2004), there is not much bias if this assumption is not met.
- c) The proportions to be estimated are independent of the regressor. In another words, the  $S_A^i$  and  $S_B^i$  are independent of  $X_i$ .

As described in De Bromhead, "the model parameters are estimated using maximum likelihood while the global proportions of interest,  $S^A$  and  $S^B$ , are the means of the district level estimates weighted by population. Thus the King method limits the sampling space for the statistical analysis to within the deterministic bounds." (De Bromhead, 2014: 54). It is worth noting that evidence from a Monte Carlo approach to King's model shows that the model is robust, even if there is a violation of the first two assumptions. Moreover, given that the bounds are narrow, even the third one can be violated. (King, 1997 and King et al., 1999).<sup>24</sup>

**Table B.3. The Ecological Inference Problem at National Level.**

	Votes to <i>Peronist Party</i>	Votes to <i>Other Parties</i>	Total
Number of Illiterate	$S_i^{il}$	$(1 - S_i^{il})$	318,025
Number of Literate	$S_i^l$	$(1 - S_i^l)$	2,442,713
<b>Total</b>	1,486,296	1,274,442	2,760,738

Source: *Archivo General de la Nación* for the 1946 Presidential Election Data and Illiteracy Rates from the 1947 National Population Census.

---

<sup>24</sup>In addition to King's methodology designed for a 2x2 case, further studies (King et al., 1999; Rosen et al., 2001; King et al., 2004 and King et al., 2008) generalized the model to account for the RxC case. Nonetheless, no method can reconstruct the individual information with total accuracy; as pointed out by King, Rosen, Tanner and Wagner, "if a researcher has a choice, it would be better to pick an application with more deterministic information and smaller tables." (King et al., 2008: 973).

Table B.3 shows an example of the ecological problem. The first column refers to the Female support for the *Peronist* Party, while the second is the sum of the votes received by all the other competing political parties. The Rows correspond to the number of women that are literate and illiterate. The aim of the Ecological Inference method is to estimate the population of literate and illiterate females who voted for Perón, and those who supported the other presidential candidates. These unknowns are represented by  $S_i^{jl}$  and  $S_i^j$  in the Table.

## Appendix 2.C: Descriptive Statistics. Relevant Variables sorted by Electoral Jurisdictions

Jurisdiction	Illiteracy Rate	Migrant Rate	Urban Rate	Industrial Employment Rate	Avg. Cattle	Renters	Unemployment Rate
<b>Federal District</b>							
City of B.A.	4.0%	40.7%	100.0%	39.9%	0.0	0.0%	2.4%
<b>Province</b>							
Buenos Aires	9.3%	28.1%	68.2%	19.5%	187.4	50.1%	2.1%
Catamarca	14.9%	11.6%	32.8%	9.6%	52.0	9.0%	3.9%
Córdoba	12.5%	18.8%	51.7%	9.7%	126.6	39.1%	1.6%
Corrientes	26.1%	10.8%	35.8%	5.0%	208.4	22.1%	1.9%
Entre Ríos	19.7%	10.3%	54.4%	7.7%	108.7	30.9%	2.3%
Jujuy	26.2%	29.8%	35.2%	12.1%	42.5	49.5%	2.8%
La Rioja	16.1%	12.4%	33.0%	7.7%	44.1	5.1%	4.6%
Mendoza	15.6%	20.3%	49.7%	13.2%	42.2	13.1%	1.5%
Salta	24.4%	21.3%	37.1%	13.4%	98.4	41.8%	1.4%
San Juan	18.8%	11.0%	45.5%	8.2%	31.3	7.9%	1.6%
San Luis	17.6%	16.3%	40.3%	9.9%	101.7	11.6%	2.9%
Santa Fe	12.5%	22.7%	54.6%	15.7%	116.2	44.9%	2.9%
Santiago del Estero	24.4%	11.7%	28.9%	13.9%	67.0	26.0%	4.8%
Tucumán	19.7%	14.4%	50.9%	12.7%	34.0	14.0%	3.0%
<b>All electoral Districts</b>	<b>11.5%</b>	<b>24.2%</b>	<b>66.1%</b>	<b>20.3%</b>	<b>136.3</b>	<b>36.9%</b>	<b>2.3%</b>
<b>St. dev.</b>	<b>6.4%</b>	<b>8.8%</b>	<b>18.0%</b>	<b>8.2%</b>	<b>59.1</b>	<b>17.2%</b>	<b>1.1%</b>
<b>Max</b>	<b>26.2%</b>	<b>40.7%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>39.9%</b>	<b>208.4</b>	<b>50.1%</b>	<b>4.8%</b>
<b>Min</b>	<b>4.0%</b>	<b>10.3%</b>	<b>28.9%</b>	<b>5.0%</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>1.4%</b>

Source: Author based the analysis on data extracted from the 1947 National Population Census, the 1946 National Industrial Census and the 1947 National Agricultural Census

## Chapter 3

### Perón's 1951 Electoral Success and the New Constituency

*"En esta elección no es suficiente ganar, hay que hacerlo de forma abrumadora."*<sup>25</sup>

*Juan Domingo Perón*

*Radio Campaign Speech. Nov. 8th, 1951.*

#### 3.1. Introduction

As Perón's first mandate was approaching its end, bottlenecks were slowly starting to have an impact on relevant variables, such as the consumer-price index rate - which grew by more than 28% in 1950, and exceeded 33% in 1951 - the public deficit - which accounted for 3.4% and 3.5% of the GDP in 1950 and 1951, respectively - and the real salaries - which fell by 17% during the last two years of Perón's first mandate - (see Table 1.9 and Table 1.11 in Chapter 1). It was to be expected that this new scenario, which was the result of the previously described dynamics of the populist policies followed by Perón, will put his power and overwhelming control of the masses at risk. Sooner or later, the endogenous consequences of the populist regime were going to cause his electoral support to weaken. Nonetheless, it seems paradoxical that the peak of his popular support happened to be when the best economic years were coming to an end, and the signs which indicated the weakening of the economic expansion became more evident. In this regard, the sum of the external negative shocks forced the administration to put forward a series of policies which aimed at restoring the status quo in terms of the economy of the country, in an attempt to make up for the negative effects in terms of real salaries and industrial production during 1949, among other variables. In fact, as stated by Newland and Cuesta, the evolution of real salaries discloses that the gains from the policies put forward by Perón, during his first presidency, would vanish over time in such a way that, by 1955, the levels of real wages would be similar to those in 1939 (Newland and Cuesta, 2017: 19; see also Table 1.11 in Chapter 1). However, considering

---

<sup>25</sup> "This time, winning is not enough, it has to be done overwhelmingly."

that the *peronist* administration used the first few years to obtain an unparalleled popular support, and the control of the other branches of the State, the risk of facing a competitive opposition weakened. Moreover, Perón was able to drive Argentina from a liberal republic into a plebiscitary democracy, as it was discussed in Chapter 1. In this respect, it was essential for him to enlarge the electorate, which meant including in his political agenda issues that were left aside by previous administrations, most notably, the female suffrage.

Perón used the feminist struggle of the first decades of the 20th century as a perfect excuse to enforce the law which allowed women to vote. By making their struggle his own, he was able to obtain massive support from the new female electorate. It is important to point out that the female enfranchisement had not been in Perón's agenda up to that point, thus showing his opportunistic nature. In fact, as discussed in the previous chapter, in his 1946 electoral triumph, he was able to portray himself as a new leader who differed from the established politicians, as if he had not been part of previous military administrations, or had not had a long and active political life. Likewise, the controversy with the US ambassador Spruille Braden,<sup>26</sup> was a carefully-planned and well-designed populist electoral strategy, during the 1946 presidential campaign, which aimed at making voters believe that he was competing against foreign opponents instead of against a national coalition. As it was discussed in Chapter 1, the creation of an enemy to confront is a central characteristic of populist regimes. All things considered, it can be said that Perón's strategic and opportunistic vision paid off in the end, since he obtained the presidency. According to Fernández, he acted as an "impenitent" opportunist (Fernández, 2015), meaning that the impact of his strategy was not punished by the voters, not even once they acknowledged the untruthfulness of his slogans and policies.

Under this scenario, the female electorate which had, for the first time, participated in the 1951 presidential election voted massively for the reelection of Juan Perón, even more vastly than the already overwhelming support that the president had obtained from males. Regarding the female enfranchisement, there is a large body of historical studies which aim at describing the process behind the achievement of the female suffrage, by focusing mainly on aspects related with the political consequences of the female vote, on the importance of the

---

<sup>26</sup> The 1946 campaign slogan was "Braden or Perón".

feminist movement and even on the role of religion vis-à-vis the empowerment of women (Palermo, 1998; Palermo 2011; Acha 2011; Barry, 2011; Valobra, 2008; Valobra, 2011). However, despite the fact that some scholars have acknowledged the vast support the new constituency gave to the incumbent, virtually no emphasis was made on decoding which were the predominant characteristics those new voters had, which made them more prone to vote for the populist regime, ultimately giving Perón the unparalleled victory that he was looking for.

The *peronist* case during the 40s and 50s stimulated a debate, which endeavors to understand how a government might have been able to manipulate the system to gain control of the country, and obtain overwhelming power. In an attempt to understand Perón's power strategy, women's voting preferences and, more importantly, the characteristics that these new voters had, should be analyzed. In this chapter, my contribution to the literature aims at capturing the attributes of the new constituency, and uncovering which of these features were the most relevant to understand their behavior. To do so, I have attempted to figure out how the illiterate females reacted to the new electoral scenario, as compared with the literates, which were the differences, if any, regarding the behavior between married and single voters, whether women living in urban areas showed more support for Perón than for the opposing coalition, and whether working women voted for him more than those females who did not have a paid-job. These aspects have not been deeply analyzed yet, which allowed me to make use of an unique data set, together with ecological inference estimation techniques, to study the females who massively voted for Perón, in an attempt to identify their predominant features.

This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I discuss the two major institutional reforms undertaken during Perón's first administration, which strengthened the nation's populist policies. In Section 3.3, I analyze the overwhelming power that was concentrated in the hands of Perón during his presidencies, and I also describe the new constituency which was the result of the inclusion of the electoral districts that had not voted so far, and, more importantly, the enfranchisement of women. I describe the data used for the estimations in Section 3.4 and I discuss the results in Section 3.5. Finally, some closing remarks are offered.

### 3.2. Two Main Reforms

The first move made by Perón in his attempt to transform the country from a liberal to a plebiscitary democracy was empowering women. In Argentina, there had been many attempts to do it; in fact, the first political efforts to give them the right to vote started at the beginning of the 20th century. As early as 1911, the first project was presented in Congress even though it was not discussed at the time.<sup>27</sup> Another important step was taken in 1927; under the administration of Aldo Cantoni, Governor of San Juan, who modified the Constitution of his province to allow the female suffrage. As a consequence, women voted for the first time in a Latin American country in the municipal and provincial elections on April 8<sup>th</sup>, 1928. A few years later, Ema Acosta, a lawyer, was the first elected woman in the continent. The following year, a new project which aimed at giving women electoral rights throughout the country was endorsed by Mario Bravo, a socialist Congressman. The project was not discussed until 1932, and, despite the fact that it did not pass the Senate which was mostly made up of conservatives, and thus it did not become a Law, it was approved by the Lower Chamber of Congress, showing how the public opinion had started to change.

Finally, after twenty-two attempts, all of which had been rejected by conservatives and other political actors, the Law 13010 was passed on September 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1947, giving women the right to vote in national elections, which they did for the first time on November 11<sup>th</sup>, 1951, during the first administration of Juan Perón. In the process, Perón's second wife Eva Duarte, best known as *Evita*, was perhaps the most influential person behind Perón's decision. Her strategy to introduce the reform in order to empower women differed from the one that previous feminists and suffragists had. Whereas they directed their efforts towards convincing men of women's right to be electorally empowered, Eva Perón directed all her energies to convince other females of their right to vote, as well as to actively participate in the nation's civil life, without considering men's opinion (dos Santos, 1983). As a consequence, there was an even more significant and overwhelming support for the *Peronist* Party: 64.8% of all positive women's votes went to the presidential ticket Perón-Quijano, while only 31.2% went to the opposing coalition, led by Ricardo Balbín and Arturo Frondizi; on the other hand, 62.0%

---

<sup>27</sup>The activist Julieta Lanteri obtained, after taking it to court, the authorization to be included in the electoral roll in the municipal election of the city of Buenos Aires in 1911. In fact, she became the first South American woman to vote. In 1919, she was even able to run for Congress, obtaining 1730 votes.



of men voted for Perón and 33.2 for Balbín. In addition, in the 1951 election, women could, not only vote, but also become candidates for national legislative seats. In fact, Eva Perón pushed the candidature of many females in the *Peronist* Movement ballot list, in a way that all of them ended up elected as congresswomen or senators. Indeed, twenty-three women deputies, six senators and three delegates from the National Territories joined the National Congress in 1952.<sup>28</sup> Table 3.1 summarizes the distribution of the female Congress seats along jurisdictions.

**Table 3.1. Female Members of Congress by District after the 1951 Election.**

District	Total Seats in Lower Chamber	Female Deputies	Percentage of Female in Lower Chamber	Total Seats in Senate	Female Senators	Percentage of Female in Senate
<b>Federal District</b>						
City of Buenos Aires	30	4	13.9	2	1	50
<b>Province</b>						
Buenos Aires	43	6	13.3	2	1	50
Catamarca	2	0	0	2	0	0
Córdoba	15	0	0	2	1	50
Corrientes	5	2	40.0	2	1	50
Entre Ríos	8	1	15.5	2	1	50
Jujuy	2	0	0	2	0	0
La Rioja	2	0	0	2	0	0
Mendoza	6	1	16.7	2	0	0
Salta	3	2	66.7	2	0	0
San Juan	3	1	33.4	2	0	0
San Luis	2	0	0	2	0	0
Santa Fe	17	3	17.6	2	1	50
Santiago del Estero	5	2	40.0	2	0	0
Tucumán	6	1	16.7	2	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>15.4</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>20</b>

Source: Author based the analysis on Molinelli et al. (1999) and dos Santos (1983).

The second structural reform which was key regarding Perón's attempt to obtain overwhelming control of the Nation was the constitutional reform, during his first administration. Perón amended the National Constitution to allow, among other things, the

<sup>28</sup> Additionally, seventy-seven women joined provincial Legislatures, all of them backed by the *Peronist* Movement.

reelection of the incumbent President, which had been prohibited by the 1853 text.<sup>29</sup> It is worth noting that essential amendments to the 1949 Constitution were made, which altered its liberal philosophy, leading the nation to align with a more holistic democratic model, as the one described by Zanatta (2014) and discussed in Section 1.2 of Chapter 1.<sup>30</sup> In fact, the liberal spirit of the constitutional text before these amendments considered political pluralism a fundamental characteristic, in an attempt to embrace different opinions and represent minorities, since it was important for the system that those groups had a voice and were institutionally protected from any possible discretion of the majority. On the contrary, a populist democracy works as a Manichaeian scheme, and, as a result, it considers all political and social discrepancies as an attack to the nation itself, thus making it essential for a populist leader to create a homogeneous social body and to undertake the nation's representation. In this sense, as has been previously discussed, opposing the leader meant opposing the nation itself.

It is true, however, that the liberal principles, in line with the liberal democratic philosophy of the time, were ignored in Argentina in 1930, with the first *coup D'Etat* being proof. Nonetheless, it also has to be acknowledged that the previous non-democratic administrations which had governed the nation up to 1946 did not attempt to modify the basis of the system as Perón did, by amending the National Constitution and changing the institutional paradigm that had ruled Argentina so far. Indeed, the spirit and the philosophical conception of the 1853 constitution was not explicitly altered by the military administrations, including the one which gave impulse to Perón to run for the presidency. It was him who persuaded the public opinion to feel the need to modification the nation's design, from a liberal republic to a plebiscitary democracy.

Additionally, the constitutional reform also had short-term consequences regarding the conformation of the Congress, as it entailed the replacement of a whole parliament, during the 1951 general election, which in turn got Perón the support from the Legislative Branch. In fact, only half of the Lower Chamber in office at the time finished their mandate, and just a third of the Senate. However, in 1951, contrary to the mandatory partial renewal,

---

<sup>29</sup>The 1853 Constitution and its partial modifications in 1860, 1866 and 1898 established a six-years term period for the president, prohibiting their immediate reelection.

<sup>30</sup>In 1957, after President Perón was removed from power in 1955, most of the reforms he had introduced were eliminated, thus returning to the previous constitutional text.

all member of Congress had to be elected. Furthermore, the mandate of the deputies changed from originally lasting a four-years period, to being six years long. In turn, senators shortened their mandates from nine to six years, having the Chamber renewed by half, instead of by a third, every three years. The process regarding the designation of the Senators also changed from being an indirect system, in which the provincial legislatures were responsible for electing the Senators which would represent that jurisdiction in the National Senate, to being a direct one, in which the candidates had to be elected by the people through their votes. As it will be discussed in the next section, these changes accelerated the overwhelming control of the Congress that Perón had, as he made sure that the members of Congress from the opposing parties who had not been renewed had to run for office again.

Having said that, the female suffrage should be analyzed considering this broader context, since the modification of the constitutional paradigm in 1949 had deep implications regarding the organization of the country. In fact, the 1853 Argentine Constitution had been inspired by the French Revolution principles, the U.S. Constitution and the writings of Hamilton, Madison and Jay<sup>31</sup> as well as by Alberdi's work<sup>32</sup>, having the underlying philosophy that individuals were free to aim at their welfare. Giving women full electoral rights reinforced this liberal notion of equality which concerned all citizens under the Law, at a time when these beliefs were, at least, questioned by many countries.<sup>33</sup> Nonetheless, as stated by Cortés Conde, many have compared the *peronist* administration with the European fascist movements (Cortés Conde, 2015: 87), which makes it seem paradoxical that the inclusion of women in the electorate is compatible with the conservative view of vast sectors of society, including the *Peronist* Movement which ultimately made the reform.

Contrary to the liberal view regarding the role of women in society, Eva Perón perceived them as a vital part of a bigger unit, which was the family. In fact, one of the arguments she used to empower women rested on her vision of women as being the "basic household pillar, the guarantee of its permanence and the inspirer of its faith..."<sup>34</sup> (De

---

<sup>31</sup> See "The Federalist". (1780)

<sup>32</sup> See "Bases y Puntos de Partida para la Organización Política de la República Argentina" (1852) and "El Sistema Económico y Rentístico de la Confederación Argentina según su Constitución de 1853" (1854).

<sup>33</sup> For instance, Primo de Rivera in Spain in 1923, Olivera de Salazar and the *Stado Novo* in Portugal from 1932, Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico in 1934, Getulio Vargas in Brazil in 1937, the Franquist triumph in 1939 and Batista in Cuba from mid 30s.

<sup>34</sup> Translation of: "... en razón que somos nosotras las mujeres la columna básica del hogar, la garantía de su permanencia y las inspiradoras de su fe..." Part of Evita's speech defending the project which would allow female's suffrage. Re-printed in De Privitellio (2011: 225).

Privitellio, 2011: 225). As posited by Zanatta, the female stereotype which Evita had in mind was not a person looking for autonomy and in search of new civil rights, but a mother and wife who would fight for the harmony and the happiness of the Argentine people (Zanatta, 2009: 115). First, and above all, she had to become, a *peronist* activist. In this sense, she perceived women as the ones who kept the family together, and not as individuals in line with the liberal spirit of the Constitution of 1853.

Moreover, it is interesting to notice that this view on the role that females had in society was so strong that it was included, at least partially, in the constitutional reform of 1949, which explicitly stated that “the primary education in rural areas would tend to train women for domestic chores” (Constitución Nacional Argentina, 1949: Art. 37, IV, 2).<sup>35</sup> This was not a new idea in the country, in fact there was even an early attempt by conservatives to introduce a “family vote”,<sup>36</sup> which meant the designation of one person, typically the man of the house, to represent all family members when casting the vote. One of the consequences of implementing this idea would have affected not just the way women were considered, as circumscribed to the domestic domain, but it would also have influenced the role of men by vacuuming him from any notion of individualism and placing his role merely as the head of the household. As pointed out by De Privitellio, “far from being just a conservative option, the way women are defined turns out to be essential to understand how *peronism* aimed at confronting the liberal tradition: a society is not the sum of the individuals, but the sum of families, and in those families, women occupy the central role.”<sup>37</sup> (De Privitellio, 2011: 225). In the *peronist* conception, the ideal woman is the one who is not made to work in the labor market, and is clearly differentiated from men. In fact, it is because of the notion that women and men have different roles that, in 1951, the voting booths were separated. The idea of having a unique electoral roll would have implicitly implied acknowledging equality between men and women, as undifferentiated individuals participating in the election of public representatives. An extension of this notion on the distinctive role of women influenced the

---

<sup>35</sup> “La enseñanza primaria en las escuelas rurales tenderá [...] a formar la mujer para las tareas domésticas campesinas”. Art. 37, IV, 2. Constitución Nacional Argentina (1949).

<sup>36</sup>Project presented by the Catholic Congressman Juan Cafferata in the '30s. (De Privitellio, 2011: 224).

<sup>37</sup> Translation of: “Lejos de ser una opción meramente conservadora, la forma en que se define a la mujer resulta fundamental para comprender cómo el peronismo buscaba enfrentar el imaginario liberal: la sociedad no es una suma de individuos, sino de familias, y en ellas las mujeres ocupan un lugar central.”

way in which *Peronism* created and organized the *Female Peronist Party* as will be described in the following section.

It is also worth noting that the empowerment of women by means of using an epic and chauvinistic rhetoric was not an original idea. In fact, as mentioned by De Bromhead (2014), the nationalistic party in Germany in the 1933 election relied on the view of females as the family supporters in a time of a deep economic and social turmoil. Thus, the 1949 reform not only responded to Perón's need to be reelected, but it also intended to change the country's philosophical foundations, as it was discussed in Chapter 1. To accomplish such a deep and structural shift in the national paradigm, an overwhelming majority had to back him up, and that majority would not have been reached without including women in the electorate.

### **3.3. Perón's Dominant Power and the New Constituency**

In order to dominate all spheres of the State, and to make a discretionary use of the nation's resources, Perón needed to have complete control of the country's institutions; thus, I assume that a "simple" electoral triumph based only on men's suffrage was not enough. To be considered a plebiscitary leader, Perón needed most of the population to support his administration, not just the majority of half the population, therefore, the female enfranchisement was fundamental. In line with this argument, Barry (2011, 2014) argues that Perón's administration was especially interested in enlarging the constituency to broaden the base of his political support. Perón's administration in general, and Eva Perón in particular, were able to transmit that the female electoral fight was central to *peronism* and, they were able to capitalize that, first, politically and, eventually, electorally.

To achieve his goal of controlling the different branches of the State, Perón used many political and economic strategies. Firstly, he engaged in a series of reforms, which were aimed at concentrating all possible institutional power under his command. The success of his strategy can be appreciated when one observes that, by the time Perón was re-elected, all provincial governors belonged to Perón's party and they accepted his decisions. Secondly, the head of all National Territories and the Capital District were appointed directly by the presidency, which gave Perón full territorial control of the nation. Furthermore, the Supreme

Court, a powerful player which could have kept his overwhelming power in line, was also conquered after the impeachment of three out of five Justices<sup>38</sup> which, considering the vacancy left by a Justice due to his resignation a few weeks before Perón's first inauguration, gave the new government full control over the country's highest court.<sup>39</sup> The General Attorney was also impeached and removed from office, resulting in all the Judiciary System responding to Perón's discretion.

Perón's full control over the country, and his personalist decision-making process can be observed even in the renaming of two National Territories which became provinces in 1951; Chaco became known as Province "Presidente Perón" and La Pampa was named after his wife, "Eva Perón". What is more, many districts were also named after the President and the First Lady of Argentina. There were three counties named after Perón (namely, *Presidente Juan Domingo Perón* County, in Corrientes, which was part of San Martín County, *General Perón* County, in Mendoza, which was part of San Rafael County, and *Presidente Perón* County, in San Luis, which was part of General Pedernera County) and four counties named after Evita (namely, *Monte Caseros* County, in Corrientes, *La Capital* County, in San Luis, *San Justo* County, in Santa Fe, and *P.B. Luna* County, in La Rioja, changed to *Eva Perón* County). Also, after Eva Perón's death, the capital city of the province of Buenos Aires, i.e. La Plata, was renamed *Ciudad Eva Perón*. This proliferation of territories named after the *peronist* leaders can be seen as part of a broader strategy tending to glorify their leadership. As stated by Waldman, "[Perón] set up a political cult of himself and his government, making his image and his doctrine to spread permanently by means of the newspapers and other means of propaganda of the State, intensifying thus the relationship between the masses and the charismatic leader – due to massive concentrations becoming more frequent every time - and demanding from their political collaborators total submission and worship"<sup>40</sup> (Waldman, 1986: 236).

---

<sup>38</sup> The argument used to impeach the Justices was that they did not overrule the 1930 and 1943 nationalistic military coups D'Etat. Ironically, Perón had actively participated in both coups D'Etat, especially in the 1943 military government as described in footnote 3.

<sup>39</sup> Surprisingly, the impeachment project, dated July 8<sup>th</sup>, 1946, also included the one Justice who had resigned several weeks before.

<sup>40</sup> Translation of: "[Perón] montó un culto político a su persona y su gobierno, haciendo difundir en forma permanente su imagen y su doctrina a través de los diarios y demás medios de propaganda del Estado, intensificando la relación masa-líder carismático - merced a concentraciones masivas, cada vez más frecuentes- y exigiendo de sus colaboradores políticos un total sometimiento y adulación".

In 1953, another National Territory (Misiones) became a Province, and in 1955, shortly before Perón was overthrown from power, a fourth National Territory (Formosa) started to be considered a Province. As a result of these changes, the Senate increased the number of members by six, all of them supporting the incumbent Party. It is worth noting that Perón's opportunistic policies, which were aimed at increasing his control over all branches of the State, can also be perceived in these legal transformations, since the National Territories Law imposed a minimum requirement of sixty thousand inhabitants for a National Territory to become a Province. That legal threshold had been surpassed many years before, since, according to the 1947 National Population Census, Chaco had four hundred and thirty thousand inhabitants, Misiones two hundred and forty-six thousand inhabitants, La Pampa one hundred and seventy thousand inhabitants, and Formosa one hundred and fourteen thousand inhabitants. Nonetheless, none of the previous presidents proposed the transformation of these National Territories into Provinces.

Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 show the overwhelming majorities that Perón had in Congress during his second presidency. It is worth noting that, in order to compensate for the possible close results in the city of Buenos Aires in the 1951 election, Perón had encouraged a *Gerrymandering* electoral system reform, in such a way that out of 798,991 votes, the incumbent obtained twenty-four congressmen, whereas the *Unión Cívica Radical* Party, out of 633,291 votes got just six deputies, two of them being assigned by default for being the minority. As stated by Little, "the election of national deputies was established on the basis of circumscriptions whose limits were to be defined by the government. This power allowed for *guerrymandering* on a staggering scale" (Little, 1973b: 278). In this respect, since it was not possible for Perón to discourage part of the population from voting for the opposition's candidates, then he had to design an electoral system which would prevent the transformation of those votes into legislative seats (de Privitellio, 2011). Evidently, the change in the electoral system did not aim at obtaining special majorities in the Congress, since it was evident that Perón already exceeded the numbers which allowed him to pass any initiative without worrying about any potential dissidence. Instead, it can be inferred that it was a strategy aiming at the creation of a Parliament with no power to deliberate, leaving the minority groups under the arbitrary decision of the ruling party, which reinforced the idea of a Manichean democracy as discussed in Chapter 1. In other words, the system aimed at

creating a homogeneous national social body, outside which all other actors were considered enemies of the nation represented by Perón.

**Table 3.2. Senate Composition by Political Party.**

Year	Peronist Senators	Other parties Senators	Total
1952	30	0	30
1953	32	0	34
1955	34	0	36

Source: Author based the analysis on Molinelli et al. (1999) and *Dirección General de Secretaría, Senado de la Nación*.

Notes:

- (1) In 1953 the Senators of the Provinces of “Presidente Perón” (Chaco) and “Eva Perón” (La Pampa) were incorporated. Additionally, there were two vacant seats, one corresponding to Senator Alejandro Giavarini, from Santa Fe, due to his resignation (he was later replaced, in 1955) and another one corresponding to Senator Justianiano Zerda, from Santiago del Estero, due to his death (he was not replaced).
- (2) In 1955, 2 Senators were incorporated, representing the province of Misiones. Additionally, there were two vacant seats, one corresponding to Senator Juan Velazco, from Corrientes, due to his death (he was not replaced) and another one in Santiago del Estero, which was not replaced either.

**Table 3.3. Lower Chamber Composition by Political Party.**

	Peronist Congressmen		Other parties Congressmen		Total
	Amount	Share	Amount	Share	
1952	135	90.6%	14	9.4%	149
1955	139	92.0%	12	8.0%	151

Source: Author based the analysis on Molinelli et al. (1999).

Perón’s strategy toward his objective of obtaining overwhelming power exceeded the aim to control the other two branches of the State, as he also made a move to control the independent press. In fact, from 1950 onwards, his administration closed about 70 opposing newspapers and media, and the official news-network prohibited the presence of any opposing leader (de Privitellio, 2011; Gambini, 2007a). Additionally, three other important institutions were conquered by Perón, taking his power to an even more striking level. First of all, he controlled the Central Bank, by changing the Charter of the Institution and appointing a President of the Monetary Authority aligned with the Executive power. These decisions, which provided his administration with resources to finance the public expenditure, were not costless, for the inflation rose notoriously from 15.7% on average per year in the period 1946-1948 to 32.1% on average per year between 1949 and 1952 (see Table 1.12 in Chapter 1).



Secondly, he subjugated the Unions, which had responded to Perón's authority since he ran the National Secretary of Labor, prior to his ascent to the presidency. Lastly, he overpowered his own political party, as he demoted all the potential party leaders, who could have eventually replaced him as the presidential candidate.<sup>41</sup>

Operatively speaking, the process toward the female enfranchisement was not easy, as millions of new voters had to be registered in a relatively short period of time. After the Law 13010 was passed in 1947, considering that the vote was compulsory, there was an eighteen-months period to register all women in voting age. The process toward the construction of the women's electoral roll was so complex, that more than one year after the law was passed, women's roll was still significantly incomplete. Nonetheless, despite the fact that during those months some people had even speculated that women were uninterested in participating in the country's political life at all, estimations of the process actually show that most women were included in the electoral roll by the time the presidential election took place on November 11<sup>th</sup>, 1951 (Valobra, 2008: 56). In fact, women's participation ended up being greater than men's, as 90.2% of the eligible women voted, while only 86% of men did. Political parties in general, and candidates in particular, faced a new challenge, vis-à-vis this new electorate's participation in the nation's political life. In this regard, some issues need to be addressed, such as how this new population was going to behave when the time of deciding who to vote came, if their voting was going to be influenced by the behavior of males, or they were going to act more independently, and whether indicators such as literacy or occupation were going to determine their preferences. The correct interpretation of these aspects might have helped the incumbent to win the election.

At the time of the presidential election, Argentina was divided into twenty-five electoral districts, out of which fourteen were Provinces, nine were National Territories,<sup>42</sup> one was a Military Governorate<sup>43</sup> and one a Federal District.<sup>44</sup> Due to the electoral changes, the

---

<sup>41</sup> The most remarkable case was that of Domingo Mercante, the governor of Buenos Aires Province, from 1946 until 1952, who was swept away from the political race when he showed intentions of being Perón's replacement, given that the re-election amendment had not been approved (Gambini, 2007a: 516).

<sup>42</sup> In 1951, the National Territories voted for President and Congressmen for the first time. However, the elected deputies only had the right to speak, and not to vote in the Chamber.

<sup>43</sup> The Military Governorate of Comodoro Rivadavia was created on March 31<sup>st</sup>, 1944, and on June 28<sup>th</sup>, 1955, it was divided into two areas, i.e. the new Provinces of Chubut and Santa Cruz.

<sup>44</sup> **Provinces:** Buenos Aires, Catamarca, Córdoba, Corrientes, Entre Ríos, Jujuy, La Rioja, Salta, San Juan, San Luis, Santa Fe, Santiago del Estero and Tucumán. **National Territories:** Chaco, Chubut, Formosa, La Pampa, Mendoza, Misiones, Neuquén,

population who was old enough to vote increased by almost 153% with respect to the 1946 presidential election. It is true that not all new voters came from the inclusion of women, since the 1951 presidential election was the first in which the population from National Territories and the Military Governorate were allowed to participate, which increased the number of jurisdictions included in the electorate from fifteen to twenty-five. Nevertheless, the number of people from the new electoral districts who were able to vote was just a small portion of the total electoral roll and, hence, could not have altered the results. In 1951, 5,208,525 citizens had been registered to vote for the first time; however, only 545,648 of them were the result of the inclusion of the nine National Territories and the Military Governorate (299,674 males and 245,974 females). In other words, 94.3% of the newly registered voters were the result of the inclusion of women in the electorate, while only 5.7% corresponded to men from the new electoral districts (see Table 3.4). In this respect, Table 3.4 also shows the progression of people able to vote sorted by gender and by the original and the new electoral jurisdictions in the 1946 and 1951 presidential elections. It is evident how extraordinary the increase in the electorate was, as a result of the incorporation of women into the electoral process of the nation. The country's constituency more than doubled with respect to the total country's population, from 23.5% in the 1946 election to 50.3% in 1951.

**Table 3.4. Population and Registered Voters. 1946 and 1951 Elections.**

Year	Country's Population	Registered Voters									Registered Voters to Total Population Ratio (%)
		Men			Women			Total			
		15 Original Districts	10 New Districts	Total	15 Original Districts	10 New Districts	Total	15 Original Districts	10 New Districts	Total	
1946	14,510,871	3,405,473		3,405,473				3,405,473		3,405,473	23.5
1951	17,138,573	4,086,577	299,674	4,386,251	3,981,773	245,974	4,227,747	8,068,350	545,648	8,613,998	50.3

Source: author based the analysis on *La Prensa* Newspaper, extracted from *Centro de Estudios de Historia Política - Universidad Nacional de San Martín, Archivo General de la Nación* and *INDEC*.

As discussed in a previous section of this Chapter, the females who had been recently included in the political life of Argentina, found in Evita their best representative. After having had women's participation guaranteed, Perón and Evita designed a strategy by means of

---

Río Negro, Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego. **Governorate:** Gobernación Militar de Comodoro Rivadavia. **Federal District:** City of Buenos Aires.

which females could also be part of the ballot lists, which would support Perón's presidential candidature. The creation of a new Political Party, the Feminine *Peronist* Party (*Partido Peronista Femenino – PPF*), together with the *Peronist* Party (*Partido Peronista – PP*) and the Central Labor Confederation (*Confederación General del Trabajo – CGT*) constituted the *Peronist* Movement (*Movimiento Peronista*). Despite the fact that the creation of this whole new political party (i.e. instead of integrating the new electorate in the existing *Peronist* Party) may seem unorthodox, the strategy regarding the conception of the role of women in society which *peronism* had must be understood. The female role, as understood by *peronism*, encouraged the separation of genders in all aspects of social life, considering that women's role in society was conceived as different from men's role, as it was discussed in section 3.2.

Another aspect regarding the *Female Peronist Party* which should be considered, is the strong verticality in the chain of command, as was the case of the *Peronist* Party itself. The new branch of the *Peronist* Movement prohibited the incorporation of men in the *PPF*<sup>45</sup> and had a clear goal, expressed by Evita in July, 1949, and was explicitly written in the first document of the party, which stated that “[The *peronist* woman must have as] great ideal, the motherland's; as the one and only leader, Perón; and as the only political aspiration, to serve under Evita's command”.<sup>46</sup> The *PPF* did not actively participate with its own ballot list supporting Perón, but was integrated in an exclusive electoral option made up of the three main branches of the *Peronist* Movement. Evita herself negotiated the positions of the members of the new female political party in the general ballot list, being perfectly effective if one considers that all the females she incorporated as candidates ended up winning a seat in Congress.

Taking into consideration the increase in the electorate due to the inclusion of women, one could argue that citizens may have voted differently depending on their gender. Table 3.5 shows some descriptive statistics and extreme values on gender gap in the twenty-five electoral districts corresponding to the 1951 presidential election. Clearly, these results illustrate that, *a priori*, voters behave differently depending not only on district, but also on gender. Despite the fact that people voted mainly for the *Peronist* Movement in the twenty-

---

<sup>45</sup> The only exception was Perón himself.

<sup>46</sup> Translation of “[La mujer peronista debe tener como] gran ideal el de la Patria; como único líder, Perón; y como única aspiración política: servir a las órdenes de Evita”. Circular N° 1. Movimiento Peronista Femenino. October, 1949. Extracted from Barry (2011: 135).

five electoral jurisdictions, and in most of the counties (for a more detailed description of counties electoral results see Section 3.5), there were differences in the behavior of voters depending on gender. Additionally, it is worth pointing out that even though there were several parties which opposed Perón in 1951, in terms of voting preferences, leaving aside the *Peronist* Movement, only the UCR party had a national presence to run competitively. Ricardo Balbín and Arturo Frondizi, the candidates for president and vice president of this party, embodied a liberal alternative to Perón. In terms of total votes, Perón and Balbín obtained 95.9% of the total positive votes leaving 4.1% of the votes to be distributed among six different political groups.<sup>47 48</sup>

If we evaluate the performance of *peronism* alone, in the country as a whole, sorting the electorate by gender, it becomes evident that women voted for Perón in an even more massive way than men, (64.8% and 62%, respectively). It is worth noting that the differences in the gender's preferences were generalized across jurisdictions. For instance, considering the extreme values, it can be seen that, although the province of Córdoba was the district in which Perón obtained the lowest support, there was still an important gender gap (53.4% of females voted for the incumbent compared with 52% of males). The difference was maintained when taking into consideration the district which exhibited the strongest support for Perón; in the National Territory of Chaco, females voted for him in 84.2% of the cases, whereas 82.6% of males casted their vote to the incumbent. Table 3.5 also indicates the resulting gap between men and women regarding their voting behavior. It is worth noting that only in two out of the twenty-five jurisdictions, men supported Perón more greatly than women (i.e. in the National Territories of Santa Cruz and La Pampa). Additionally, it can also be appreciated that the largest gap between men and women's electoral choices rose to 6.2% in the Province of Mendoza, and to 6% in the National Territory of Santa Cruz. Another interesting point worth making is that, despite the fact that the new electorate which was the result of the inclusion of the ten new districts did not imply a significant increase in terms of voters, once again Perón showed his opportunistic ability by seeking to gain as much support as possible, in order to increase his power. As detailed in Table 3.5, the support he obtained

---

<sup>47</sup> These parties were the *Partido Demócrata Nacional*, *Partido Comunista*, *Partido Socialista*, *Partido Salud Pública*, *Partido Demócrata Progresista* and *Partido Concentración Obrera*.

<sup>48</sup> It is interesting to note that the *Partido Comunista*, which obtained 0.95% of all positive votes, chose Alcira de la Peña the candidate for the vice-presidency, becoming the first woman to run for an executive post in the country.

from the new electoral jurisdictions was much higher, than the support he found in the original electoral districts (76.7% and 61.8%, respectively).

**Table 3.5. Incumbent's Electoral Results by District and Gender. 1951 Presidential Election.**

District	Total Votes for Perón (% of positive votes)	Male Votes for Perón (% of positive votes)	Female Votes for Perón (% of positive votes)	Gender Gap (Women – Men)
<b>Federal District</b>				
City of Buenos Aires	55.9	54.4	58.0	3.5
<b>Province</b>				
Buenos Aires	63.2	61.4	64.9	3.5
Catamarca	77.0	72.6	75.5	2.8
Córdoba	52.9	52.0	53.4	1.3
Corrientes	64.4	62.3	65.5	3.2
Entre Ríos	63.3	62.2	63.8	1.6
Jujuy	79.3	78.0	80.6	2.6
La Rioja	73.9	71.8	75.8	4.0
Mendoza	67.3	63.8	70.0	6.2
Salta	77.2	75.3	79.1	3.8
San Juan	78.6	75.8	81.3	5.5
San Luis	70.9	68.5	73.5	5.0
Santa Fe	65.7	63.5	66.8	3.3
Santiago del Estero	78.7	77.7	79.9	2.2
Tucumán	71.7	70.2	73.3	3.1
<b>National Territory</b>				
Chaco	83.8	82.6	84.2	1.6
Chubut	78.3	73.8	78.7	4.9
Formosa	72.3	70.9	73.9	3.0
La Pampa	75.0	75.3	74.7	-0.7
Misiones	71.2	70.3	71.4	1.1
Neuquén	81.2	79.7	82.3	2.5
Río Negro	75.1	74.3	76.1	1.8
Santa Cruz	71.9	74.3	68.4	-6.0
Tierra del Fuego	69.7	69.1	70.3	1.2
<b>Military Governorate</b>				
Comodoro Rivadavia	79.9	79.6	80.2	0.5
<b>Country</b>	63.5	62.0	64.8	2.8
<b>15 Original Electoral Districts</b>	61.8	60.2	63.4	3.2
<b>10 New Electoral Districts</b>	76.7	76.3	77.2	0.9
<b>Max</b>	83.8	82.6	84.2	1.6
<b>Min</b>	52.9	52.0	53.4	1.3

Source: author based the analysis on *Archivo General de la Nación*.

### 3.4. About the Data

Several attempts have been made to try to explain electoral outcomes by focusing on gender differences; for instance, in Argentina (Lewis, 1971; Palermo, 1998; Bercoff and Meloni, 2013), in Chile (Panzer and Paredes, 1991), in Germany (De Broamhead, 2014), in Egypt (Blaydes, 2011; Blaydes and Trauty, 2009), in the US (Welch and Hibbing, 1992; Kennedy Chaney et al., 1998), and in Switzerland (Funk and Gathman, 2005). Since it is unusual to find countries using separate ballot boxes for men from women, these studies have generally depended on information extracted from surveys, which may exhibit concealment, or even untruthful information, given that voters may lie about their actual choice. Fortunately, from 1951 (first time women voted) until 2007, the electorate in Argentina was divided according to gender, making it possible for us to obtain the records which show the results of the elections sorted, not only by electoral districts and political parties, but also, by gender. Because of this, the behavior of males and females can be analyzed more accurately, since the data obtained from ballot boxes exhibits no potential bias, and the voter's preferences are congruent with their behavior, making the results coincide.

I based my analysis on the electoral results from the twenty-five electoral districts (i.e. nineteen provinces, nine national territories, one military governorate and the federal district corresponding to the Capital City of Argentina). All electoral data was extracted from the records collected by the *Justicia Electoral* and currently preserved at the *Archivo General de la Nación*. In the case of the city of Buenos Aires, the information was also extracted from Cantón and Jorrat (2001). The data is presented at county level when it is available, which allowed me to increase the number of observations significantly. As a matter of fact, despite the fact that the preserved electoral data sorted by county and gender is incomplete, the total number of observations covers two hundred and seventy out of the four hundred and twenty-four Argentine counties, which make up the twenty-five subnational jurisdictions in which the country was divided in 1951. Regarding those districts for which the county data was not preserved, I resorted to the information of the whole district. For example, although the Province of San Juan was divided in nineteen counties, since the electoral records regarding each of them were not preserved, I estimated the results based on the data from the Province itself. In the cases in which the county data for a jurisdiction was available, but incomplete, I considered all the unreported counties as a group, by calculating the difference between the

provincial data and the sum of the counties with available information, for that particular province. For instance, in the Province of Buenos Aires, the reported records for electoral data cover only nineteen out of the one hundred and eleven counties which make up the district, so, I subtracted from the provincial data set the sum of the existing nineteen counties; the result is reported as ***Rest of Counties***. It is also worth pointing out that the number of counties used for estimation purposes regarding the province of Buenos Aires total twenty, which is the result of adding the nineteen counties with available individual information and the single observation obtained by difference.

Table 3.6 resumes the number of counties per jurisdiction used to obtain the estimations. Additionally, as a first approximation to understand the differences in gender preferences and in the voting behavior of men and women, I present the number of counties in which the percentage of women's votes to the incumbent exceed the percentage of support that Perón obtained from men. As it can be appreciated, in two hundred and thirty-one out of the two hundred and seventy observations, which accounts for 85.5%, the females voted for Perón in an even more overwhelming manner than the males.

**Table 3.6. Number of Counties per Jurisdiction. Incumbent Performance at County Level Sorted by Gender. 1951 Presidential Election.**

District	Total Number of Counties	Total Number of Observations Used for Estimations	Total Number of Observations Where Women's Vote for the Incumbent Exceeded Men's
<b>Federal District</b>			
City of Buenos Aires	28	1	1
<b>Province</b>			
Buenos Aires	111	20	18
Catamarca	16	16	13
Córdoba	26	26	21
Corrientes	25	24	22
Entre Ríos	14	1	1
Jujuy	15	15	11
La Rioja	18	18	17
Mendoza	17	17	16
Salta	22	1	1
San Juan	19	1	1
San Luis	9	8	8
Santa Fe	19	19	18
Santiago del Estero	27	27	26
Tucumán	11	11	11
<b>National Territory</b>			
Chaco	8	8	7
Chubut	12	1	1
Formosa	9	9	8
La Pampa	22	15	6
Misiones	11	11	10
Neuquén	16	16	10
Río Negro	13	1	1
Santa Cruz	7	1	0
Tierra del Fuego	2	2	2
<b>Military Governorate</b>			
Comodoro Rivadavia	12	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>489</b>	<b>270</b>	<b>231</b>

Source: author based the analysis on *Archivo General de la Nación* and the 1947 National Population Census.

It is astounding how massive and generalized the support for Perón was in 1951. If we consider men's preferences, only in twelve out of the two hundred and seventy counties used for the estimations, the support for the incumbent represented 40% to 50%; on the other hand, if we consider the female's preferences, the number of counties with that range of support dropped to only nine. Table 3.7 summarizes the number of counties with regards to



the degree of support that Perón obtained, sorted by gender. As observed, in the first three categories reported, i.e. those in which Perón obtained at least 70% of total positive votes, women outnumbered men, while in the lower ranges, it was the opposite.<sup>49</sup>

**Table 3.7. Degree of Support for Perón Sorted by Gender. 1951 Presidential Election.**

Perón's Voting Share (Range in %)	Men's support (Number of counties)	Women's support (Number of counties)
[90,100]	15	19
[80,90)	42	58
[70,80)	80	85
[60,70)	68	56
[50,60)	53	43
[40,50)	12	9
<b>Total counties</b>	<b>270</b>	<b>270</b>

Source: author based the analysis on *Archivo General de la Nación*.

A great deal of work allowed for the electoral data to be compatible with the variables extracted from the different National Censuses, and a careful and detailed effort was made to ensure that the information was homogeneous, and susceptible to comparison. In this respect, the first point that must be made is relative to the availability of the electoral information. The following paragraphs will explain the steps followed.

There are seven districts for which there are no electoral records at county level; these are the provinces of Entre Ríos, Salta and San Juan, the National Territories of Chubut, Río Negro and Santa Cruz, as well as the Military Governorate of Comodoro Rivadavia. Thus, for all these cases, I considered the jurisdictional aggregate values for the estimations. Regarding the Province of Buenos Aires, only nineteen counties had the information reported separately from the provincial aggregate figure. Regarding *Avellaneda* County, in the Province of Buenos Aires, there is missing data regarding to one of the three electoral sections of the county. Thus, I used the results corresponding to the proportion of total positive votes

<sup>49</sup> I also performed a Paired t-Test for the 1951 presidential election, to compare two population means, in which the observations in one sample can be paired with the observations in the other. The test indicates that the means of the two populations are statistically different from each other at a 0.01 level, signifying that voters behaved differently depending on gender. The test is presented in Appendix 3.A.

obtained by Perón in the two available electoral circumscriptions and extrapolated the percentage to the whole *Avellaneda* County. As previously mentioned, all the counties with missing information were regarded as one observation labelled *Rest of Counties*. Data regarding the provinces of Catamarca and Santa Fe correspond to the legislative election outcomes, which took place on the same day as the presidential election, due to the lack of preserved results regarding the executive designation. In the National Territory of La Pampa, the electoral data of several counties was reported jointly; thus, I used these aggregates as individual observations.<sup>50</sup>

To make the estimations compatible, I added up the information extracted from the Population Census in a similar way. In the province of Mendoza, the electoral data reports the results from an additional county named *General Perón* which was, up to 1950, part of the *San Rafael* County. Since the Population Census used for the estimates dates back to 1947, it does not report this new county, which is why I summed up both sets of data. On the other hand, in the electoral records of the Province of Corrientes, there is information regarding *President Juan Domingo Perón* County; however, according to the data provided by the 1947 Population Census, this county did not exist, so it was included in *San Martín* County, considering that it was located in the same geographic area. Again, I summed up both sets of data.

A note has to be made, with regards to the city of Buenos Aires. At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the country's Capital City elected twenty National Congressmen, based on a uninominal system, which ended up with the city being divided into twenty electoral circumscriptions that coincided with the twenty divisions reported in the 1947 Population Census. Since there was a renovation of half the seats in Lower Chamber of Congress every two years, people from electoral circumscriptions voted to renew the corresponding representatives every other election. In the 1951 presidential election, the electoral system had been changed increasing the representation of the district to thirty congressmen, so the city was divided into fourteen electoral circumscriptions, which would choose twenty-eight representatives for the majority and two for the minority. Additionally, since the congressmen's mandate had been modified to last six instead of four years, it was established that the renewal of the deputies by half would take place every three years, based on a

---

<sup>50</sup> These are, firstly, *Caleu Caleu*, *Cura Co*, *Hucal* and *Lihuel Calel*; secondly, *Chalilco*, *Chicalco* and *Loventue* and lastly, *Limay Mahuida*, *Puelen* and *Utracan*.

uninominal system. Since the 1951 election was the first one after the 1949 constitutional reform, instead of renewing half of the Legislative Branch, the election was set to define a whole new Parliament. Thus, although the city of Buenos Aires had to elect fourteen congressmen for the majority and one for the minority, the 1951 electoral process became an exception, since thirty congressmen were elected in that district. Moreover, the controversy started when the design of the electoral circumscriptions took place. Clearly, Perón engaged in a *Gerrymandering* procedure, as the design for the fourteen circumscriptions followed an arbitrary scheme. As a result, with 55.8% of all positive votes, the *Peronist* Movement obtained 80% of all the possible seats, as mentioned in Section 3 of this Chapter. Unfortunately, due to the reshaping of the precincts, based on the available data, it is not possible to link the electoral results of each circumscription with the demographic data extracted from the 1947 Population Census. Therefore, I considered the city of Buenos Aires as one district for estimation purposes.

Despite the missing information at county level regarding some of the districts, the richness of the data set is uncommon, and has allowed me to perform King's Ecological Inference Methodology on a significantly large population and to obtain crucial estimations regarding the relevant characteristic of the new electorate which will expand the understanding of Perón's presidential re-election.

In parallel to the electoral data, I considered four aggregate demographic characteristics, extracted from the 1947 National Census, to describe the new female constituency. These are their *Illiteracy Rate*, their *Living Area*, their *Marriage Status* and their *Working Situation*. Each characteristic is classified in two groups, considering that the best results from the methodology are achieved in the two by two cases (King et al., 2008).

With regards to the indicators considered, certain observations should be made. First of all, according to the 1947 National Population Census, an illiterate is an individual older than 14 years old, who is unable to read or write. As regards the living area of the population, the Census classified agents as living either in rural or urban areas. Among the two hundred and seventy observations under analysis, seventy-four counties are considered 100% rural, whereas only five are 100% urban. Concerning marriage status, the Census classified agents into four categories: single, married, divorced and widow. To limit the categories to two types, I clustered the four informed groups following the criteria of women who could not have been

influenced by a current of former husband (single and divorced) and those who could have been biased by their opinion (married and widows). With regards to the occupation dimension, according to the Census, agents are classified into five categories: *Paid Workers*, *Occupied without Retribution* (housekeepers and students), *Not Occupied with Rent* (renters, retirees and pensioners), *Not Occupied without Rent* and *Unemployed*. I clustered these last four categories and labeled the result *Rest*.

Since, as previously mentioned, the official records report all these indicators on women older than fourteen, but the voting age started at eighteen, for estimation purposes, I extrapolated the data gotten from the Census to the population in voting age. For example, in the City of Buenos Aires, the Census reported a 7.3% illiteracy rate for women older than fourteen; thus, I assumed that the illiteracy rate for females older than 18 in that district also accounted for 7.3%. Appendix 3.B shows the values and some descriptive statistics regarding the four variables which correspond to the population who was able to vote, sorted by electoral jurisdictions

### 3.5. Estimations and Results

Knowing that women's voting behavior in the 1951 presidential election reflected that they supported Perón more overwhelmingly than men, a key inquiry should aim to capture the general features that the female constituency had. In order to obtain estimations to answer this question, I relied once again on an ecological analysis, i.e. King's solution to the Ecological Inference Problem.<sup>51</sup> The results have proven to be an important contribution to the literature, considering that previous studies had not tackled the issue empirically. Not even Lupu and Stokes (2009) who, as referred in Chapter 2, studied all presidential elections that were held in Argentina from 1912 until 2003, but the one celebrated in 1951.

The reported values of the estimates which were the result of performing King's Ecological Model are presented in Table 3.8. Let us remember that the *Resamp* value indicates the number of sampling iterations required to produce valid estimates of the quantities of

---

<sup>51</sup> For a discussion on the methodology, see Chapter 2, Appendix 2.B.

interest, and that, since the ecological inference technique is not a multivariate analysis, all possible cross effects should be considered carefully.

**Table 3.8. King's Ecological Inference Results.**  
**Percentage of Female Votes for Perón in the 1951 Presidential Election.**

	<i>Literacy Rate</i>		<i>Marital Status</i>		<i>Living Area</i>		<i>Type of Occupation</i>	
	<i>Illiterate</i>	<i>Literate</i>	<i>Single and Divorced</i>	<i>Married and Widows</i>	<i>Urban</i>	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Paid Workers</i>	<i>Rest</i>
<b>Argentina</b>	90.9 (0.0192)	60.3 (0.0033)	77.6 (0.0345)	55.0 (0.0262)	61.5 (0.0076)	70.2 (0.0194)	83.3 (0.0840)	59.5 (0.0241)
<b>Resamp</b>	38		5		38		23	
<b>N</b>	270		270		270		270	

Note: Model Standard Errors are shown between parenthesis.

Regarding the indicators that I have analyzed, although there are notable differences between the two categories within each variable, the overall results show the expected overwhelming support that Perón obtained. First of all, it is tremendous the high percentage of illiterate females who supported Perón, when compared with the literate women, which rose to almost 91% and a little bit over 60%, respectively. One possible reason behind this difference may be that the policies put forward by Perón had a more significant impact on those sectors which had been mostly unattended up to then. In these segments, more women were excluded from basic education, causing that 15.2% of women in Argentina were illiterate (in contrast with 12.1% of males), reaching the maximum level of over 45% in the province of Jujuy (see Appendix 3.B).<sup>52</sup> Evidently, this vulnerable population was more inclined to embrace Perón's political platform, especially after Evita encouraged them to actively participate, to carry out the social reforms which were taking place. Additionally, although it should be taken cautiously, if it is assumed that less educated voters are more short-time oriented consumers, it could be speculated that these women could have perceived less clearly the inter-temporal inconsistencies of the public policies followed by Perón's administration, and, as a result, they may have increased their willingness to vote for his re-election. It is also interesting to point out that these estimates contrast with the behavior observed from males in the 1946 election,

<sup>52</sup> If we consider rural and urban areas, the contrast is also remarkable: in urban centers, 7% of males and 10.5% of females were illiterates, whereas in the country side, 20.9% of men and 26.2% of the women were so (IV Censo General de la Nación, Tomo I, 1947: 22).

which took Perón to the presidency. In that election, half of the illiterate voters elected Perón, while, in 1951, 90% of the illiterate females supported his re-election (see Table 2.7 in Chapter 2). This can be better understood if we consider the conclusion reached by Lupu and Stokes (2009) regarding the shift of *peronism* from a multi-classist party in 1946 to a lower-class cleavage political force after that first election.

Furthermore, the Ecological Inference estimations show how women who lived in urban centers were less prone to vote for Perón than those living in rural regions (a little over 61% and about 70%, respectively). In this regard, Perón's policies toward the rural areas, although not a priority, since his rhetoric focused on emphasizing the importance of developing the national industry, showed that it was considered an important sector; otherwise the government would not have massively allotted funds to agricultural activities, especially since 1949 (Girbal Blacha, 2016; Moreyra, 2016). The policies were electorally positive, as the support he got from females in rural areas was proportionally higher than the already overwhelming support obtained from women in the urban centers.

Additionally, with regards to the living area of voters, the estimates may also indicate a shift in the loyalties of the rural party bosses between the 1946 and the 1951 presidential election may have probably encouraged the new voters to choose Perón as president, instead of voting for the opposing coalition's candidates. In this respect, *peronism* became more of a territorial political movement in 1951, when compared with its origins, in 1946. Moreover, as the main opposition to Perón, the *UCR*, shifted to become a more middle-class based party (Lupu and Stokes, 2009: 75), its previous constituency consisting of low-income sectors from rural areas, changed their preferences to support the incumbent. In fact, it is worth noting that the new female electorate did not behave analogously to the first *peronist* voters, considering that back then, the literates were more prone to support Perón's candidacy (see Chapter 2).

The results also reveal that single and divorced females voted for Perón more massively than women who were either married or widowed (almost 78% vs. 55%). These outcomes could be consistent with the fact that males voted for Perón in a less overwhelming manner than women, and thus, married females could have been more influenced by their husbands' political views, expressing it through their votes. As a result, those women who were more autonomous (i.e. Single and Divorced) may have evaluated Perón's victory as their

chance to achieve more independence and found themselves more captivated by Evita's rhetoric, thus supporting the administration and voting for Perón. Lastly, outcomes also show that more than four out of five working females with paid jobs voted for Perón, as compared with the three out of five from the rest of the women (83% and 59% respectively). These results are consistent with the interpretation extracted from the Marital Status estimations, as, in 1951, the more economically independent women voted more vastly for Perón, probably because they were less influenced by men who supported the incumbent less overwhelmingly.

These last two estimates are thought-provoking, since, contrary to the underlying conception of the role of females that *peronists* conveyed through their rhetoric, results might be indicative of the fact that women may have perceived their empowerment in more liberal terms. As already discussed in Section 3.2 in this Chapter, Perón's administration conceived females in the same way as the conservatives did. In this regard, it is worth making reference to what the brains behind the constitutional reform of 1949, Arturo Sampay, said in one of his statements for Congress. Regarding the changes in the Constitution, he expressed that the ideal woman was the one who was not forced to go into the labor market (De Privitellio, 2011: 226). Moreover, Eva Perón herself embraced the underlying peronist conception of women and their role in society, as subordinated to the domestic sphere: "And with time, what the world really needs are more homes and, as a consequence, more women willing to meet their destiny and accomplish their mission well. That is why the primary aim of a feminine movement which attempts to do good to women ... which does not aspire to make them resemble men, must be the home. We were born to build homes. We were not born for the street" (Perón, 1951: 137).<sup>53</sup> One possible interpretation of the results of these estimates is that, despite the *peronist* conception, females may have interpreted the enfranchisement as a way to obtain more independence from the male figure, regardless of the conservative ideology of the *peronist* leaders.


As in the previous chapter, plotting the Ecological Inference results is an advantageous complementary tool which will enable us to interpret the outcome of the estimations. Figures 3.1 to 3.4 present *Scatterplot Graphs* which represent the estimates

---

<sup>53</sup> Translation of: "Y cada día el mundo necesita en realidad más hogares y, para eso, más mujeres dispuestas a cumplir bien su destino y su misión. Por eso el primer objetivo de un movimiento femenino que quiera hacer bien a la mujer... que no aspire a cambiarlas en hombres, debe ser el hogar. Nacimos para constituir hogares. No para la calle".

obtained from the Ecological Inference methodology. The graphs depict the proportion of Perón's Females Voters (T) by the proportion of the Female *Illiterate Rate* (Figure 3.1), by the proportion of the Female *Single and Divorce Rate* (Figure 3.2), by the proportion of the Female *Urban Rate* (Figure 3.3) and by the proportion of the Female *Paid Work Rate* (Figure 3.4), in each county, all represented by (X) in the figures. The size of the circles around each point is proportional to the population of each observation. The figures also show the likelihood estimates by depicting the expected proportion of female voters supporting Perón (T), given the explanatory variable (X), represented by the yellow line. Additionally, the red lines in the graph show the 80% confidence interval around the regression line.

**Figure 3.1. Electorate Literacy Rate**




**Figure 3.2. Electorate Single and Divorce Rate**





**Figure 3.3. Electorate Urban Rate**



**Figure 3.4. Electorate Paid Work Rate**




Figure 3.1 suggests that there is an important shift in the female voting preference for Perón (T), as the illiterate female voter rate increases (X). Figure 3.2, on the other hand, proposes a positive but less powerful effect on Perón's support (T), regarding females' marriage status. With respect to the Urban Rate depicted in Figure 3.3, the graph shows that, as the proportion of the female electorate living in urban areas (X) increases, the results in favor of Perón decrease, not drastically, though. Finally, with regards to women's occupation status, Figure 3.4 suggests that Perón found a higher support from the females who had a paid job, as compared with women who were involved in other unremunerated activities.

### 3.6. Final Remarks

The overwhelming popular support obtained by Perón in his re-election, had indeed multiples reasons. Among them, one can point out that the policies implemented by his first presidency, as the Classical Historiographic Analysis accepts, was inclined to reallocate vast amount of federal resources in order to "consolidate the relationship between the new political movement in power and its social base" (Gerchunoff, 1989: 81). I argue that those economic policies were carried out not only to incorporate vulnerable and neglected social sectors into the economic life of the country, but also to gain as much political power as possible.

Perón's first administration set up the structural institutional changes which enabled him to accumulate overwhelming control of the country. The female enfranchisement should be inscribed in this context. The economic model based on import substitution, protectionist

measures and the nationalization of trade aimed at increasing consumption in the short run which, together with a nationalistic rhetoric, helped him capture the vote of the majority of the constituency, most notably, females. In fact, Perón used the unparalleled popular support he gained to consolidate his regime, even when economic struggles due to the inconsistencies of the policies put forward arrived. In this sense, the enlargement of the constituency aimed - or at least helped him - to obtain a plebiscitary victory and gain full control of the nation. In this respect, Perón statement is revealing, "I won my first election because of men, I will win the second one with the support from women, and the third one will be with the children's favor".<sup>54</sup>

Clearly, his opportunistic ability was crucial in that it allowed him to go forward with the structural institutional changes, which in turn, caused the constituency to more than double in the period ranging from the first election in which he ran for the presidency to the second, less than 6 years later. The role that the short-run economic policies he implemented had, together with the rhetoric he used, resulted in the success of his ultimate objective of increasing his personal power. However, none of the measures he put forward would have validated his government more than a plebiscitary victory, and that type of electoral triumph was only possible by means of allowing women to vote. In this context, I find the results presented in this chapter a revealing contribution.

The uniqueness of the data set constructed on the basis of electoral results records sorted by gender, together with a state-of-the-art technique, allowed me to confirm that women behaved differently from men in the 1951 presidential election, and their support, which was even more massive than men's, was decisive in the sense that it allowed Perón to achieve the vastest electoral victory that had ever been experienced in Argentina, which boosted his power to unprecedented levels in the country. Even more importantly, I was able to establish the underlying characteristics of the new constituency which massively voted for the incumbent's re-election. The results not only show that women's support was a determining factor in helping Perón obtain the overpowering victory in the 1951 presidential election, but also illustrate the characteristics of those females in whom he relied on the most, to capture such an unparalleled triumph.

---

<sup>54</sup> Translation of: "Gané la primera elección con los hombres, ganaré la segunda con las mujeres y la tercera con los niños". Quoted in Gambini, Hugo (2007b: 34).

## Appendix 3.A

A paired t-Test compares two population means, in which the observations regarding one sample can be paired with the observations regarding the other. The null hypothesis is that both samples' means are equal.

### Paired t-Test for the 1951 Presidential Election.

Variable	Obs.	Mean
Women Vote	270	72.0717
Men Vote	270	70.7396
diff	270	2.4129
mean(diff) = mean(women vote – men vote)		t = 7.9755
Ha: mean(diff) != 0		Pr( T  >  t ) = 0.0001
Degrees of freedom = 269		

The results gotten from this test allow us to reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative regarding the 1951 presidential election. The test indicates that the means of the two populations are statistically different from each other at a 0.01 level.

## Appendix 3.B

### Descriptive Statistics

Jurisdiction	Female Illiterate Rate	Female Single and Divorced Rate	Female Urban Rate	Female Paid-Jobs Share
<b>Federal District</b>				
City of Buenos Aires	7.3%	39.9%	100.0%	31.2%
<b>Province</b>				
Buenos Aires	10.4%	36.5%	76.8%	19.5%
Catamarca	21.2%	54.2%	35.8%	29.2%
Córdoba	14.0%	42.6%	57.6%	20.2%
Corrientes	35.8%	65.4%	39.4%	22.9%
Entre Ríos	19.8%	53.1%	58.6%	18.3%
Jujuy	45.8%	51.8%	51.9%	26.1%
La Rioja	19.8%	54.1%	34.5%	22.8%
Mendoza	19.2%	41.8%	27.4%	17.3%
Salta	35.1%	54.8%	45.7%	23.4%
San Juan	19.9%	49.9%	51.2%	17.1%
San Luis	16.3%	48.5%	44.7%	22.5%
Santa Fe	14.3%	41.1%	64.6%	18.3%
Santiago del Estero	37.1%	54.1%	30.1%	24.8%
Tucumán	22.5%	53.1%	56.9%	19.5%
<b>National territory</b>				
Chaco	36.4%	60.7%	35.9%	23.4%
Chubut	29.7%	47.9%	30.1%	14.8%
Formosa	32.0%	67.5%	28.3%	19.4%
La Pampa	15.4%	42.1%	34.7%	17.3%
Misiones	28.4%	50.6%	23.4%	20.3%
Neuquén	32.9%	49.2%	27.7%	16.6%
Río Negro	28.2%	48.8%	31.7%	16.3%
Santa Cruz	9.4%	32.8%	48.5%	19.7%
Tierra del Fuego	10.1%	22.9%	0.0%	15.8%
<b>Military Governorate</b>				
Comodoro Rivadavia	13.1%	33.84%	66.9%	15.3%
<b>Country</b>	15.3%	43.2%	67.3%	22.5%
<b>Max</b>	45.8%	67.5%	100.0%	31.2%
<b>Min</b>	7.3%	22.9%	0.0%	14.8%

Source: Author based the analysis on the 1947 National Census Results and on *Archivo General de la Nación*.

## References

1. Acemoglu, Daron; Egorov, George and Sonin, Konstantin (2013). "A Political Theory of Populism". *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* **128** (2): 771-805.
2. Acha, Omar (2011). "Género y Política ante el Voto Femenino en el Catolicismo Argentino, 1912-1955". In Barry, Carolina (comp.). *El Sufragio Femenino*. Tres de Febrero, Provincia de Buenos Aires: Editorial Eduntref: 63-90.
3. Alberdi, Juan Bautista (1852). *Bases y Puntos de Partida para la Organización Política de la República Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Emecé. Reprinted (2010)
4. Alberdi, Juan Bautista (1854). *Sistema Económico y Rentístico de la Confederación Argentina Según la Constitución de 1853*. Buenos Aires: Emecé. Reprinted (2010)
5. Alston, Lee and Gallo, Andrés (2010). "Electoral Fraud, the Rise of Peron and Demise of Checks and Balances in Argentina". *Explorations in Economic History* **47** (2): 179-197.
6. Amaral, Samuel (2014). "La Democracia y los Orígenes del Peronismo". In Novaro, Marcos (comp.). *Peronismo y Democracia. Historia y Perspectivas de una Relación Compleja*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Edhasa: 47-78.
7. Ávila, Jorge (2011). "Economic Denationalization as an Antidote against Populism". *Revista de Instituciones, Ideas y Mercados* **55** (October): 151-162.
8. Barry, Carolina (2011). "¿Una Cruzada de Evita? El Peronismo y la Ley de Sufragio Femenino". In Barry, Carolina (comp.). *El Sufragio Femenino*. Tres de Febrero, Provincia de Buenos Aires: Editorial Eduntref: 113-143
9. Barry, Carolina (2014). "El Peronismo Femenino: la Precuela (1945-1949)". *Documento de Trabajo* **547**. Universidad del CEMA.
10. Bartels, Larry. (1997). "Econometrics and Presidential Elections". Department of Politics and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University. Published in abbreviated form in *Journal of Economic Perspectives* **11** (3): 195-196.
11. Bazdresch, Carlos and Levy, Santiago (1991). "Populism and Economic Policy in Mexico, 1970-1982". In Dornbusch, Rudiger and Edwards, Sebastian (editors). *The Macroeconomics of the Populism in Latin America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 223-262.
12. Bercoff, José and Meloni, Osvaldo (2013). "Evita's Choice: are Women Different at the Polls? The Case of Argentina". *Anales de las XLVIII Reunión de la Asociación Argentina de Economía Política*. Rosario, Provincia de Santa Fe.
13. Bianchi, Alberto (2008). *Historia Constitucional de los Estados Unidos. Tomo II*. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Cathedra Jurídica
14. Blaydes, Lisa and El Tarouty, Safinaz (2009). "Women's Electoral Participation in Egypt: The Implications of Gender for Voter Recruitment and Mobilization". *Middle East Journal* **63** (3): 364-380.
15. Blaydes, Lisa (2011). *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

16. Canitrot, Adolfo (1975). "La Experiencia Populista de Redistribución de Ingresos". *Desarrollo Económico* **15** (59): 331-351.
17. Cantón, Darío (1973). *Elecciones y Partidos Políticos en Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Siglo XXI.
18. Cantón, Darío and Jorrot, Jorge (2001). *Elecciones en la Ciudad, 1864-2003. Tomo II: 1912-1973*. Buenos Aires: Instituto Histórico de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires.
19. Cardoso, Eliana and Heldwege, Ann (1991). "Populism, Profligacy and Redistribution". In Dornbusch, Rudiger and Edwards, Sebastian (editors). *The Macroeconomics of the Populism in Latin America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 45-74.
20. Carciofi, Ricardo (1990). "La Desarticulación del Pacto Fiscal. Una Interpretación sobre la Evolución del Sector Público Argentino en las Dos Últimas Décadas". *Working Paper* **36**. CEPAL.
21. Cassullo, María Esperanza (2014). "¿En Nombre del Pueblo? Por qué Estudiar el Populismo Hoy". *PostData* **19** (2): 277-313.
22. Cho, Wendy and Gaines, Brian (2004). "The Limits of Ecological Inference: The Case of – Ticket Voting". *American Journal of Political Science* **48** (1): 152-171.
23. Constitución de la Nación Argentina de 1949.
24. Cortés Conde, Roberto (1998). *Progreso y Declinación de la Economía Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
25. Cortés Conde, Roberto (2005). *La Economía Política de la Argentina en el siglo XX*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Edhasa.
26. Cortés Conde, Roberto (2015). *El Laberinto Argentino*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Edhasa.
27. D'Amato, Laura and Katz, Sebastián (2018). "Una Constante en la Evolución Macroeconómica Argentina: Dinero, Deuda y Crisis (1945-2015)". In Cortés Conde, Roberto and Della Paolera, Gerardo (Directores). *Nueva Historia Económica Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Edhasa: 141-176.
28. De Bromhead, Alan (2014). "Women Voters and Party Preference in Weimar Germany". Mimeo.
29. Della Paolera, Gerardo and Taylor, Alan (1999). "Economic Recovery from the Argentine Great Depression: Institutions, Expectations, and the Change of Macroeconomic Regime". *The Journal of Economic History* **59** (3): 567-599.
30. De Pablo, Juan Carlos (2005). *La Economía Argentina en la Segunda Mitad del Siglo XX. Tomo I*. Buenos Aires: Editorial La Ley.
31. Di Tella, Torcuato (2011). *Sociología de los Procesos Políticos. De la Movilización Social a la Organización Política*. Buenos Aires: Editorial El Ateneo.
32. Di Tella, Rafael and Dubra, Juan (2010). "Peronist Beliefs and Interventionist Policies". *Working Paper* **16621**. NBER.
33. De Privitellio, Luciano (2011). "Las Elecciones entre Dos Reformas: 1900-1955". In *Historia de las Elecciones de la Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Editorial El Ateneo: 135-233.

34. Díaz Alejandro, Carlos (1981). "Tipo de Cambio y Términos de Intercambio en la República Argentina 1913-1976". *Documento de Trabajo* **22**. Universidad del CEMA.
35. Díaz Alejandro, Carlos (1983). *Ensayos Sobre la Historia Económica Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Amorrortu.
36. Dirección Nacional del Servicio Estadístico. Ministerio de Asuntos Técnicos. Presidencia de la Nación (1946). *IV Censo General de la Nación. Censo Industrial*.
37. Dirección Nacional del Servicio Estadístico. Ministerio de Asuntos Técnicos. Presidencia de la Nación (1947). *IV Censo General de la Nación. Tomo I. Censo de Población*.
38. Dirección Nacional del Servicio Estadístico. Ministerio de Asuntos Técnicos. Presidencia de la Nación (1947). *IV Censo General de la Nación. Tomo II. Censo Agropecuario*.
39. Dirección Nacional del Servicio Estadístico. Ministerio de Asuntos Técnicos. Presidencia de la Nación (1947). *IV Censo General de la Nación. Tomo III. Censo Industrial, de Comercio, de Empresas de Construcción, Bancario, de Seguros y Empresas de Capitalización y Ahorro*.
40. Dos Santos, Estela (1983). *Las Mujeres Peronistas*. Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina.
41. Dornbusch, Rudiger and Edwards, Sebastian (1990). "Macroeconomic Populism". *Journal of Development Economics* **32** (2): 247-277.
42. Dornbusch, Rudiger and Edwards, Sebastian (1991). "The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America". In Dornbusch, Rudiger and Edwards, Sebastian (editors). *The Macroeconomics of the Populism in Latin America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 7-13.
43. Duncan, Otis and Davis, Beverly (1953). "An Alternative to Ecological Correlation". *American Sociological Review* **18** (6): 665-666.
44. Eisenberg, Daniel and Ketcham, Jonathan (2004). "Economic Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections: Who Blames Whom for What". *Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy* **4** (1): 497-521.
45. Fernández, Roque (2011a). "El Ciclo Ganadero y el Modelo de Díaz Alejandro". *Documento de Trabajo* **465**. Universidad del CEMA.
46. Fernández, Roque (2011b). "El Modelo Presa-predador y el Ciclo Populista". *Documento de Trabajo* **466**. Universidad del CEMA.
47. Fernández, Roque (2014). "El Populismo como Lógica de Acción Colectiva". *Documentos de Trabajo* **552**. Universidad del CEMA.
48. Fernández, Roque (2015). "Populismo Racional". *Documentos de Trabajo* **567**. Universidad del CEMA.
49. Fernández, Roque and Mantel, Rolf (1986). "Estabilización Económica con Controles de Precios". *Ensayos Económicos* **36** (12): 1-23.
50. Fernández, Roque and Monteserin, Paula (2014). "Fundamentos Atávicos del Populismo Argentino". *Documentos de Trabajo* **537**. Universidad del CEMA.

51. Ferreres, Orlando (2005). *Dos Siglos de Economía Argentina (1810-2004)*. Buenos Aires: Editorial El Ateneo.
52. FIEL (1998). *La Reforma Previsional Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Manantial SRL.
53. Fodor, Jorge (1989). "Argentina's Nationalism: Myth or Reality?". In Di Tella, Guido and Dornbush, Rudiger (Editors). *The Political Economy of Argentina, 1946-83*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press: 31-55.
54. Funk, Patricia and Gathmann, Christina (2005). "What Women Want: Suffrage. Female Voter Preferences and the Scope of Government". Mimeo.
55. Gambini, Hugo (1983). *La Primera Presidencia de Perón*. Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina.
56. Gambini, Hugo (2007a). *Historia del Peronismo. El Poder Total (1943-1951)*. Buenos Aires: Editorial B de Bolsillo.
57. Gambini, Hugo (2007b). *Historia del Peronismo. La Obsecuencia (1952-1955)*. Buenos Aires: Editorial B de Bolsillo.
58. Gerchunoff, Pablo (2018). *La Caída, 1955*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Crítica.
59. Gerchunoff, Pablo (1989). "Peronist Economic Policies, 1946-55". In Di Tella, Guido and Dornbush, Rudiger (1989). *The Political Economy of Argentina, 1946-83*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press: 59-85.
60. Gerchunoff, Pablo and Antúnez, Damián (2002). "De la Bonanza Peronista a la Crisis de Desarrollo". In Torre, Juan Carlos (Director). *Nueva Historia Argentina, Tomo 8: Los Años Peronistas (1943-1955)*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana: 125-205.
61. Gerchunoff, Pablo and de León, Gonzalo (2018). "Entre la Flexibilización y la Institucionalización: Una Historia Circular del Mercado de Trabajo Argentino (1914-2016)". In Cortés Conde, Roberto and Della Paolera, Gerardo (Directores). *Nueva Historia Económica Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Edhasa: 199-222.
62. Gerchunoff, Pablo and Llach, Lucas (1998). *El Ciclo de la Ilusión y el Desencanto. Un Siglo de Políticas Económicas Argentinas*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Ariel Sociedad Económica.
63. Germani, Gino (1973). "El Surgimiento del Peronismo: el Rol de los Obreros y los Migrantes Internos". In Mora y Araujo Manuel and Llorente, Ignacio (1980). *El Voto Peronista*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana: 87-163.
64. Girbal-Blacha, Noemí (2016). "Estrategias Agrarias en Tiempos de la Argentina Peronista (1943-1955)". *XV Congreso de Historia Agraria de la SEHA*. Lisboa, Portugal.
65. Goodhart, Charles and Bhansali, R. J. (1970). "Political Economy". *Political Studies* **18** (1): 43-106.
66. Goodman, Leo (1953). "Ecological Regressions and Behavior of Individuals". *American Sociological Review* **18** (6): 663-664.
67. Goodman, Leo (1959). "Some Alternatives to Ecological Correlation". *American Journal of Sociology* **64** (6): 610-625.



68. Goodwing, Richard (1967). "A Growth Cycle". In Feinstein, Charles (Editor). *Socialism, Capitalism and Economic Growth: Essays Presented to Maurice Dobb*. New York: Cambridge University Press: 54-58.
69. Halperín Donghi, Tulio (1975). "Algunas observaciones sobre Germani, el Surgimiento del Peronismo y los Migrantes Internos". In Mora y Araujo Manuel and Llorente, Ignacio (1980). *El Voto Peronista*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana: 219-250.
70. Hamilton, Alexander; Madison, James and Jay, John (1780). *El Federalista*. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica. Spanish Edition (1982)
71. Hodgson, Robert and Maloney, John (2012). "Economic Voting in Britain, 1857-1914". *Electoral Studies* **31** (4): 668-678.
72. Jacobson, Gary (1983). *The politics of Congressional Elections*. Boston: Little Brown.
73. Jagers, Jan and Walgove, Stefaan (2007). "Populism as Political Communication Style. An Empirical Study of Political Parties' Discourse in Belgium". *European Journal of Political Research* **46** (3): 319-345.
74. Kaufman, Robert and Stallings, Barbara (1991). "The Political Economy of Latin American Populism". In Dornbusch, Rudiger and Edwards, Sebastian (editors). *The Macroeconomics of the Populism in Latin America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 15-43.
75. Kennedy Chaney, Carde; Alvarez, Michael and Nagler, Jonathan (1998). "Explaining the Gender Gap in US Presidential Elections, 1980-1992". *Political Research Quarterly* **51** (2): 311-339.
76. Kenworthy, Eldon (1975). "Interpretaciones Ortodoxas y Revisionistas del Apoyo Inicial del Peronismo". In Mora y Araujo Manuel and Llorente, Ignacio (1980). *El Voto Peronista*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana: 191-218.
77. King, Gary (1997). *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstructing Individual Behaviour from Aggregate Data*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
78. King, Gary; Rosen, Ori and Tanner, Martin (1999). "Binomial-Beta Hierarchical Models for Ecological Inference". *Sociological Methods and Research* **28** (1): 61-90.
79. King, Gary; Rosen, Ori and Tanner, Martin (2004). *Ecological Inference. New Methodological Strategies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
80. King, Gary; Rosen, Ori; Tanner, Martin and Wagner, Alexander (2008). "Ordinary Economic Voting Behavior in the Extraordinary Election of Adolf Hitler". *The Journal of Economic History* **68** (4): 951-996.
81. King, Gary and Roberts, Margaret (2012). "EI: A (n R) Program for Ecological Inference". Mimeo.
82. Kopstein, Jeffrey and Wittenberg, Jason (2003). "Who Voted Communism? Reconsidering the Social Bases of Radicalism in Interwar Poland". *Slavic Review* **62** (1): 87-109.
83. Kramer, Gerald (1971). "Short-term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior. 1896-1964". *American Political Science Review* **65** (1): 131-143.
84. Lago, Ricardo (1991). "The Illusion of Pursuing Redistribution through Macropolicy: Peru's Heterodox Experience, 1985-1990". In Dornbusch, Rudiger and Edwards, Sebastian

- (editors). *The Macroeconomics of the Populism in Latin America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 263-330.
85. Leemann, Lucas and Leimgruber, Philipp (2009). "Ecological Inference and 113 Votes". *Paper prepared for the Annual Conference of the Swiss Political Science Association*.
  86. Lewis, Paul (1971). "The Female Vote in Argentina 1958-1965". *Comparative Political Studies* **3** (4): 425-441.
  87. Lewis-Beck, Michael (1998). *Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
  88. Lewis-Beck, Michael and Paldam, Martin (2000). "Economic Voting: An Introduction". *Electoral Studies* **19** (2-3): 113-121.
  89. Little, Walter (1973a). "Party and State in Peronist Argentina. 1945-1955". *The Hispanic American Historical Review* **53** (4): 644-662.
  90. Little, Walter (1973b). "Electoral Aspects of Peronism, 1946-1954". *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* **15** (3): 267-284.
  91. Lodka, Alfred (1925). *Elements of Physical Biology*. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins.
  92. Lupu, Noam and Stokes, Susan (2009). "The social bases of political parties in Argentina 1912-2003". *Latin American Research Review* **44** (1): 58-87.
  93. Lupu, Noam (2010). "Who voted for Chavismo? Class Voting in Hugo Chávez's Venezuela". *Latin American Research Review* **45** (1): 7-32.
  94. Molinelli, N. Guillermo; Pananza, M. Valeria and Sin, Gisela (1999). *Congreso, Presidencia y Justicia en Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Temas.
  95. Moreyra, Beatriz (2016). "La Política Social en los Espacios Rurales en el Peronismo Fundacional (1946-1955)". *XV Congreso de Historia Agraria de la SEHA*. Lisboa, Portugal.
  96. Mueller, John (1970). "Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson". *American Political Science Review* **64** (1): 18-34.
  97. Murmis, Miguel and Portantiero, Juan Carlos (1971). *Estudio sobre los Orígenes del Peronismo*. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Editores. Second edition (2012).
  98. Nannestad, Peter and Paldam, Martin (1997). "The Grievance Asymmetry Revisited: A Micro Study of Economic Voting in Denmark. 1986-1992". *European Journal of Political Economy* **13** (1): 81-99.
  99. Newland, Carlos and Cuesta, Eduardo (2017). "Peronismo y Salarios Reales: Otra Mirada al Período 1939-1956". Mimeo.
  100. Novaro, Marcos (2014). "Historia y Perspectiva de una Relación Difícil". In Novaro, Marcos (comp.). *Peronismo y Democracia. Historia y Perspectivas de una Relación Compleja*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Edhasa: 15-45.
  101. Ocampo, José (1991). "Collapse and (Incomplete) Stabilization of the Nicaraguan Economy". In Dornbusch, Rudiger and Edwards, Sebastian (editors). *The Macroeconomics of the Populism in Latin America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 331-368.
  102. Organización Techint. Boletín Informativo. Various Numbers.

103. Palermo, Silvana (1998). "El Sufragio Femenino en el Congreso Nacional: Ideologías de Género y Ciudadanía en la Argentina (1916-1955)". *Boletín del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana "Dr. Emilio Ravignani"*. Tercera serie. N° 16 y 17. 2° semestre de 1997 y 1° de 1998.
104. Palermo, Silvana (2011). "Sufragio Femenino y Ciudadanía Política en la Argentina, 1912-1947". In Barry, Carolina (comp.). *El Sufragio Femenino*. Tres de Febrero, Provincia de Buenos Aires: Editorial Eduntref: 29-62.
105. Panzer, John and Paredes, Ricardo (1991). "The Role of Economic Issues in Elections. The Case of the 1988 Chilean Presidential Referendum". *Public Choice* **71** (1-2): 51-59.
106. Perón, Eva (1951). *La Razón de mi Vida*. Buenos Aires: Buro Editor. Re-printed (2010).
107. R Development Core Team (2008). *R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing*. R foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. <http://www.R-project.org>.
108. Rabello de Castro, Paulo and Ronci, Marcio (1991). "Sixty Years of Populism in Brazil". In Dornbusch, Rudiger and Edwards, Sebastian (editors). *The Macroeconomics of the Populism in Latin America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 151-173.
109. Rapoport, Mario (2008). *Historia Económica. Política y Social de la Argentina. 1880-2003*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Emecé.
110. Rodríguez Braun, Carlos (2011). "Valores Liberales y un Nuevo Populismo Latinoamericano". *Revista de Instituciones, Ideas y Mercados* **55**: 133-149.
111. Rosen, Ori; Jiang, Wenxin; King, Gary and Tanner, Martin (2001). "Bayesian and Frequentist Inference for Ecological Inference: the RxC Case". *Statistica Neerlandica* **55** (2): 134-156.
112. Rouquié, Alain (2017). *El Siglo de Perón. Ensayo sobre las Democracias Hegemónicas*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Edhasa.
113. Sánchez Román, José Antonio (2013). *Los Argentinos y los Impuestos. Lazos Frágiles entre la Sociedad y el Fisco en el siglo XX*. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Editores.
114. Schmitt, Carl (1927). *The Concept of the Political*. Translation of Schwab, George (1996). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
115. Sebreli, Juan José (2002). *Crítica de las Ideas Políticas Argentinas*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana.
116. Smith, Peter (1969). "Social Mobilization, Political Participation, and the Rise of Juan Peon". *Political Science Quarterly* **84** (1): 30-49.
117. Smith, Peter (1972). "The Social Base of Peronism". *The Hispanic American Historical Review* **52** (1): 55-73.
118. Smith, Peter (1974). "Las Elecciones de 1946 y las Inferencias Ecológicas". In Mora y Araujo Manuel and Llorente, Ignacio (1980). *El voto Peronista*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana.
119. Snow, Peter (1969). "The Class Basis of Argentina Political Parties". *The American Political Science Review* **63** (1): 163-167.

120. Sturzenegger, Federico (1991). "Description of a Populist Experience: Argentina, 1973-1976". In Dornbusch, Rudiger and Edwards, Sebastian (editors). *The Macroeconomics of the Populism in Latin America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 77-120.
121. Taylor, Alan (1992). "External Dependence, Demographic Burdens, and the Argentine Economic Decline after the Belle Époque". *The Journal of Economic History* **52** (4): 907-936.
122. Torre, Juan Carlos and Pastorisa, Elisa (2002). "La Democratización del Bienestar". In Torre, Juan Carlos (Director). *Nueva Historia Argentina, Tomo 8: Los Años Peronistas (1943-1955)*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana: 257-312.
123. Valobra, Adriana (2008). "La Ciudadanía Política de las Mujeres y las Elecciones de 1951". *Anuario del Instituto de Historia Argentina* **8**: 53-89.
124. Valobra, Adriana (2011). "Prácticas y Debates sobre los Derechos Políticos de las Mujeres en la UCR y el PCA, 1946-1955.". In Barry, Carolina (comp.). *El Sufragio Femenino*. Tres de Febrero, Provincia de Buenos Aires: Editorial Eduntref: 145-173.
125. Volterra, Vito (1926). "Variations and Fluctuations of a Number of Individuals in Animal Species Living Together". In *Animal Ecology* (1931). New York: McGraw Hill: 409-449.
126. Waldman, Peter (1986). *El peronismo. 1943-1955*. Buenos Aires: Hyspamerica.
127. Wallberg, Gustavo (2007). "El Largo Penar del Sistema de Jubilaciones". Mimeo.
128. Welch, Susan and Hibbing, John (1992). "Financial Conditions. Gender and Voting in American National Elections". *Journal of Politics* **54** (1): 197-213.
129. Zanatta, Loris (2009). *Breve Historia del Peronismo Clásico*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana.
130. Zanatta, Loris (2012). *El Populismo*. Buenos Aires: Katz Editores.
131. Zanatta, Loris (2014). "El Peronismo Clásico y la Vía Holística de la Democracia". In Novaro, Marcos (comp.). *Peronismo y Democracia. Historia y Perspectivas de una Relación Compleja*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Edhasa: 79-104.